Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal Federalism: A Critique by Adler, Robert W.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 50 
Issue 5 Issue 5 - October 1997 Article 2 
10-1997 
Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal Federalism: A Critique 
Robert W. Adler 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Government Contracts Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert W. Adler, Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal Federalism: A Critique, 50 Vanderbilt Law Review 1135 
(2019) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol50/iss5/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal
Federalism: A Critique
Robert W. Adler 50 Vand. L. Rev. 1137 (1997)
The term "unfunded federal mandates" is used to challenge federal ob-
ligations imposed on states and localities without accompanying funding.
Unfunded mandates were alluded to by both the majority and dissenting
opinions in Printz v. United States, in which provisions of the Brady
Handgun Violence Protection Act were invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court
on Tenth Amendment grounds. In this Article, Professor Adler critiques the
fiscal, legal, and policy arguments against unfunded federal mandates. This
analysis, in turn, raises two broader issues. First, is the concept of unfunded
mandates independently useful to the nation's ongoing debate about federal-
ism? Second, does the mandate issue provide insight into the key legal ques-
tion of whether judges or elected officials are best suited to decide the appro-
priate roles of the federal and state governments?
Following a brief history of the debate over unfunded federal man-
dates, the Author analyzes the term and its component parts and concludes
that the phrase has been used too broadly to challenge actions that are not
properly "unfunded," "federal," or "mandates." Next, Professor Adler
concludes that past efforts to assess the costs of unfunded federal mandates
seriously overstated the costs of such mandates to states and cities. Moreover,
he argues that the costs of federal mandates are more than offset by all forms
of federal aid and that states and cities remain net beneficiaries in
intergovernmental fiscal relations. The legal analysis concludes that, for most
purposes, the degree of funding attached to federal programs is not relevant to
their validity on Tenth Amendment grounds. Last, the Author challenges the
presumption that unfunded federal mandates are "bad" on normative
grounds, rather than legitimate, neutral policy choices about what level of
government should decide and pay for various aspects of public policy.
Because the unfunded federal mandate terminology defies precise
definition, because it is legally irrelevant to the validity of federal programs
on constitutional grounds, and because such mandates can be supported as
well as opposed on normative grounds, Professor Adler concludes that the
mandate concept provides little independent utility to the ongoing debate
about federalism. Moreover, since elected officials can properly weigh the
costs and benefits of individual mandates in the context of overall federal tax,
spending, and regulatory policy, while federal judges are limited to discrete
challenges to individual federal programs, the analysis lends strong support
to the view that the political branches are better equipped than the judiciary to
decide important issues of federalism.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the nation was created, courts, elected officials, scholars,
and others have debated the appropriate balance between federal and
state rights and obligations-the basic nature of federalism in the
United States.' The most recent slogan used by state and local advo-
cates in this ongoing debate is opposition to "unfunded federal man-
dates." 2 The phrase refers to obligations imposed on states and locali-
ties by the federal government without federal funding,' which many
perceive as an abuse of power by the national government.4 Indeed, in
1. See generally David L. Shapiro, Federalism, a Dialogue 107-140 (Northwestern U.,
1995) (discussing the importance of federalism and the bases of the federal system).
2. The terminology has been effective as political rhetoric. Rhetoric has been used
frequently in debates over federalism, beginning with the Federalists' appropriation of the term
"federalism." See Shapiro, Federalism at 11 (cited in note 1) (stating that "[m]any battles have
been won, at least in part, by the ability of one side or the other to march under the proper
linguistic banner"); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L. J. 1425, 1426
n.9 (1987) (noting the use of rhetoric by Chief Justice Rehnquist in the federalism debate);
Ronald D. Rotunda, Intergovernmental Tax Immunity and Tax Free Municipals After Garcia, 57
U. Colo. L. Rev. 849, 854 (1986) (stating that "[s]logans are very important, not only for revolu-
tions but for constitutional law").
3. The more general term "unfunded mandates" can refer to mandates imposed by states
on municipal forms of government. See generally Janet M. Kelly, State Mandates, Fiscal Notes,
Reimbursement, and Anti-Mandate Strategies 1 (National League of Cities, 1992) (defining state
mandates); U.S. General Accounting Office, Legislative Mandates, State Experiences Offer
Insights for Federal Action 1-5 (U.S. G.P.O., 1988) (discussing state mandates); Susan A.
MacManus, 'Wiad" About Mandates: The Issue of Who Should Pay for What Resurfaces in the
1990s, Publius: The Journal of Federalism 59 (Summer 1991) (discussing mandates imposed
upon state and local governments); Robert M. Shaffer, Comment, Unfunded State Mandates and
Local Governments, 64 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 1057, 1057-59 (1996) (discussing the effect of state
mandates upon local government entities). This Article addresses principally the issue of federal
mandates, with state mandates discussed selectively for purposes of comparison.
4. See Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the "Nvew (New)
Federalism" Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 97, 103-06 (1996) (implying
that unfunded mandates may be an abuse of federal power); David A. Dana, The Case for
Unfunded Environmental Mandates, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1995) (identifying the absence of
political accountability as the strongest case against unfunded mandates); Edward A. Zelinsky,
Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth Amendment: On Public Choice, Public
Interest, and Public Service, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 1355, 1356 (1993) (suggesting that unfunded
mandates "infring[e] upon the scope of local consent" by creating fiscal constraints on local
government); David L. Markell, The Role of Local Governments in Environmental Regulation:
Shoring Up Our Federal System, 44 Syracuse L. Rev. 885, 904 (1993) (debating the balance
between the federal government and local governments with regard to environmental legisla-
tion); Makram B. Jaber, Comment, Unfunded Federal Mandates: An Issue of Federalism or a
'Brilliant Sound Bite"?, 45 Emory L. J. 281, 298 (1996) (discussing limits on federal power to
impose unfunded mandates on state and local governments); Susan E. Leckrone, Note, Turning
Back the Clock. The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 and Its Effective Repeal of
Environmental Legislation, 71 Ind. L. J. 1029, 1036 (1996) (discussing the burden of federal
mandates upon the states); Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial
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the last U.S. Supreme Court case decided during the 1996-97 Term,
which invalidated parts of the Brady Handgun Violence Protection
Act 5 (the "Brady Bill") on federalism grounds, both the majority and
dissenting opinions alluded to the issue of unfunded mandates in
dicta.6
This Article assesses the fiscal, legal, and policy arguments
advanced to challenge the validity of unfunded federal mandates.
Fiscal opposition is based on the assertion that the cumulative impact
of these mandates has grown dramatically over the past several dec-
ades as the costs of implementing mandates have increased while
accompanying federal funding has declined. Legal opposition is based
on the Tenth Amendment and other principles of federalism. Finally,
policy or normative opposition is based on issues of autonomy, political
accountability, economic efficiency, and equity.7
An evaluation of these three arguments raises two broader,
cross-cutting questions. First, is the concept of unfunded federal
mandates independently useful to the nation's ongoing debate about
federalism?8 In other words, can federal mandates legitimately be
challenged on legal, fiscal, or policy grounds because they are not
funded as opposed to other legal or normative grounds? Second, does
the unfunded federal mandates analysis offer useful insight into the
principal legal debate over federalism in recent decades, namely the
question of who should decide the appropriate role of the national
government vis-a-vis the states? To some, federalism needs and de-
Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847, 869 (1979) (describing related ideas without using the unfunded
mandate terminology).
5. Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994).
6. Printz v. United States, 65 U.S.L.W. 4731, 4731 (1997). Some lower courts had held
certain provisions of the Brady Bill to be unfunded mandates and, therefore, unconstitutional.
See notes 289-94 and accompanying text. Given the possibility that these references will fuel
additional judicial consideration of the issue, it is particularly appropriate to assess the validity
of unfunded mandates as a basis for federalism jurisprudence.
7. Dana, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 3 (cited in note 4).
8. This debate involves a journey through a mass of literature, see Shapiro, Federalism at
10 (cited in note 1) (discussing the large amount of primary and secondary sources concerning
federalism), and a maze of hotly contested issues involving federalism. It is highly partisan,
ideological, and nearly impossible to resolve. See Paul E. Peterson, The Price of Federalism xi
(The Brookings Institution, 1995) (discussing the ideological differences that exist between
parties on opposite ends of the federalism debate). David Shapiro has stated that:
The debate over the extent to which the Constitution itself protects the integrity and
autonomy of the states in our federal system can perhaps never be fully resolved because
there were so many conflicting forces at work at the time of the founding and because so
much has happened politically and technologically since the adoption of the Constitution.
Shapiro, Federalism at 108-09 (cited in note 1). It is neither prudent nor possible to revisit these
issues exhaustively here. Rather, the issue of unfunded federal mandates is weighed in the
context of the nation's broader ongoing discussion of federalism.
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serves judicial protection in the same way as other constitutional
rights and values s For others, judicial intervention in matters of
federalism is neither necessary nor appropriate: Such issues are best
left to resolution by the political branches.' 0
The Article begins with a brief history of the unfunded federal
mandate debate. After the idea was introduced with little political
success in the 1980s,1 opposition to these mandates resurfaced in the
9. See Robert F. Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League of Cities in
Perspective, in Philip B. Kurland, Gerhard Casper, and Dennis J. Hutchinson, eds., 1981 The
Supreme Court Review 81, 85-86 (U. of Chicago, 1982) (noting that judges and scholars tend to
see consitutional values in terms of individual rights and tend to "undervalue judicial protection
of principles that allocate decisionmaking responsibilities among governmental units"); Kaden,
79 Colum. L. Rev. at 858-68 (cited in note 4) (describing the growing need for judicial protection
of federalism because of the reduced accountability between government and citizens and
because of the states' lessened ability to protect their autonomy); Zelinsky, 46 Vand. L. Rev. at
1385 (cited in note 4) (discussing state and local governments' inability to control the growth of
unfunded federal mandates); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonmy:
Federalism for a Third Century, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 14-15 (1988) (proposing that the Framers of
the Constitution designed the stucture of the federal government to protect constitutional rights
and values); William F. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1709,
1732 (1985) (stating that "[there is not the slightest suggestion that the Court was expected to
take federalism questions more lightly than other questions").
10. This "structural protection" theory of federalism was advocated by Herbert Wechsler.
Herbert Weschler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543, 543 (1954). Its
origins, however, lie in the constitutional debates. See Federalist No. 17 (Hamilton) in Clinton
Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 118, 120-22 (Mentor, 1961) (arguing that the national
government could not become more powerful than state governments since states possess a
'greater degree of influence" over their citizens' daily lives). See also Federalist No. 45 (Madison)
in Clinton Rssiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 288, 290 (Mentor, 1961) (stating that state
governments "will have the advantage of the federal government"). See also Jesse H. Choper,
The Scope of National Power VIs-i-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 Yale
L. J. 1552, 1560-77 (1977) (discussing how Congress and the President are best equipped to
resolve issues of federalism); D. Bruce La Pierre, Political Accountability in the National Political
Process-The Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 577, 577
(1985) (stating that resolution of federalism issues should be left to the national political proc-
ess); Dana, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 22-24 (cited in note 4) (noting that state and local officials have a
great deal of control over candidates for federal office). Others argue even further that federal-
ism as a value-as distinct from managerial decentralization-serves no useful purpose deserv-
ing protection by either the political or judicial branches. Edward L. Rubin and Malcolm Feeley,
Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 903, 951-52 (1994). For
purposes of this Article, I will accept the more traditional view that federalism remains an
important value to be honored in some way in U.S. political discourse.
11. State and local politicians began to complain about unfunded federal mandates in the
late 1970s and early 1980s. See Edward I. Koch, The Mandate Millstone, 61 Pub. Interest 42, 57
(Fall 1980) (coining the phrase "mandate millstone"). These complaints were fueled by a series of
academic articles on the subject. See, for example, Catherine Lovell and Charles Tobin, The
Mandate Issue, 41 Pub. Admin. Rev. 318, 318-319 (1981) (discussing unfunded federal mandates
on state and local governments); Max Neiman, et al., The Definitional Challenge and Mandate
Typology, in Catherine Lovell, et al., Federal and State Mandating on Local Government-Issues
and Impacts, Report to the National Science Foundation 1 (1979) (discussing unfunded federal
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1990s as part of the backlash against regulation by the national gov-
ernment.12  Acceptance of this message by Congress and President
Clinton led to the passage of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995 ("JMRA"),13 which established procedural barriers to the future
enactment of unfunded federal mandates.
Part III provides an essential foundation for the analysis by
defining the term "unfunded federal mandate" as a whole and by ref-
erence to its component parts. This definitional analysis suggests that
the term lacks sufficient clarity and precision to lend independent
utility to the federalism debate. Moreover, the analysis reveals that
the term has been used too broadly to challenge actions that are not
appropriately labeled as "unfunded," "federal," or "mandates." This
implies that if these programs pose a problem, it is one of much
smaller dimension than opponents have suggested.
mandates); Martha Derthick, Preserving Federalism: Congress, the States, and the Supreme
Court, The Brookings Review 32, 35-36 (Winter/Spring 1986) (discussing Congress's increasing
dependence upon states to administer government programs); Timothy J. Conlan, And the Beat
Goes On: Intergovernmental Mandates and Preemption in an Era of Deregulation, 21 Publius:
The Journal of Federalism 43 (Summer 1991) ("Intergovernmental Mandates") (discussing
unfunded federal regulations enacted during the 101st Congress). For an analysis of the
response to this issue by the Reagan Administration and by Congress in the 1980s, see U.S.
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Federal Regulation of State and Local
Governments: the Mixed Record of the 1980s 1-5 (U.S. G.P.O., 1993) ("Federal Regulation")
(recommending that the federal government institute a moratorium on unfunded mandates in
order to review the balance between federal, state, and local governments). For a survey of the
status of the debate by the end of the Reagan Administration, see Michael Fix and Daphne A.
Kenyon, Introduction, in Michael Fix and Daphne A. Kenyon, eds., Coping With Mandates: What
Are the Alternatives 4-7 (The Urban Institute, 1990).
12. Some have decried the abuse of the debate by groups opposed to all governmental
activity. See, for example, Jeffrey Tryens, Unfunded Mandates: Clarifying the Debate 7 (Center
for Policy Alternatives, 1994) (noting that while the unfunded mandate debate began as a
dispute between state, local, and federal governments, it is "increasingly used to attack all
governmental activity"); Thomas H. Stanton, One Nation Indivisible: An Analysis of Legislation
to Reduce the Impact of Federal Policies on State and Local Governments 13 (1988) (issue paper
prepared for the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, on file with
the author) (alleging that early anti-mandate bills in Congress were designed to relieve states
and cities of regulatory burdens, not to obtain additional funds for compliance). The suggested
linkage of federalism to anti-government regulation parallels similar connections during the late-
19th and early 20th centuries. See Shapiro, Federalism at 30 (cited in note 1). Many opponents
of unfunded mandates deny opposition to underlying programs, however, as opposed to the
methods and unfunded nature of regulation:
Many of the new requirements addressed longstanding social problems. Most also en-
joyed broad support from the general public and from state and local officials. As the
number of requirements proliferated, however, questions began to be raised about the
appropriateness, costs, complexity, effectiveness, and efficiency of intergovernmental
relations.
Federal Regulation at iii (cited in note 11).
13. Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995), codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 602, 658 et seq., 1501 et
seq. (1994, Supp. I).
UNFUNDED FEDERAL MANDATES
The three principal arguments against unfunded federal man-
dates are addressed seriatim in Parts IV through VI in the order most
useful to analysis of the two cross-cutting issues. Part IV examines
the fiscal opposition to unfunded federal mandates. That section
describes and critiques past efforts to estimate their cumulative fiscal
effects on state and local governments and evaluates the results of
these studies in the context of overall intergovernmental fiscal rela-
tions. It concludes that mandate impact studies conducted to date
have been plagued by serious methodological flaws which have led to
overestimates of the costs of compliance. At best, the fiscal case
against unfunded federal mandates remains unproven. Moreover,
even if existing cost estimates are accepted as true, when compared to
all sources of federal aid, the data show that states and localities are
overwhelmingly net fiscal beneficiaries in their relationship with the
federal government. This section also reveals the complexity of inter-
governmental fiscal relations and the futility of trying to assess the
fiscal impact of discrete federal actions on state and local govern-
ments.
Part V addresses the legal opposition to unfunded federal
mandates. This section concludes that the funding of a federal man-
date is not relevant to its validity on Tenth Amendment or other
constitutional grounds. This supports the conclusion that the idea of
unfunded federal mandates is not a useful tool to assess the legality or
wisdom of federal actions from the perspective of federalism.
However, the analysis lends strong support to the view that, in gen-
eral, the political branches are better equipped than the judiciary to
decide the appropriate role of the national government relative to
states and localities. While the elected branches can weigh the cumu-
lative effects of diverse but related federal tax, spending, and regula-
tory policies, courts can assess only the validity of discrete federal
actions or programs in isolation and in the context of party-defined
litigation.14
Part VI reviews the normative opposition to unfunded federal
mandates. It challenges the assumption that unfunded federal man-
dates are presumptively "bad" rather than legitimate policy choices
concerning who should decide and pay for various aspects of public
14. In addition, analysis of recent cases through the unfunded federal mandates lens pro-
vides perspective on the viability of the Supreme Court's most recent explication of Tenth
Amendment doctrine in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 144 (1992), and in Printz, 65
U.S.L.W. at 4731.
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policy.15 While unfunded federal mandates raise legitimate policy
concerns in some cases, competing issues and concerns support the
use of federal mandates in others. The absence of conclusive norma-
tive arguments for or against unfunded federal mandates underscores
the wisdom of leaving such policy judgments to the political branches.
Moreover, it calls into question Congress's decision to enact procedural
roadblocks to new federal mandates and urges a return to a neutral
legislative approach to the validity of federal intervention in matters
of social and economic policy.
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE UNFUNDED
MANDATE DEBATE
A. The Evolution of the Mandates Issue
The debate over unfunded federal mandates is part of the cyclic
evolution of intergovernmental relations in the United States. 6 While
15. See Fix and Kenyon, Introduction, in Fix and Kenyon, eds., Coping with Mandates at 1,
35 (cited in note 11). Michael Fix and Daphne Kenyon have stated that:
While on the one hand, it is not appropriate for a fiscally strapped, deficit-plagued federal
government to use its regulatory powers to accomplish objectives that should be achieved
via the budget, on the other hand, the federal government should not be held hostage to
the states whenever it attempts to accomplish goals of clear national importance.
Id. See also Tryens, Unfunded Mandates at 3 (cited in note 12) (quoting Ohio Governor George
Voinovich as saying: "A mandate to one lawmaker is good public policy... to another"). See also
Kelly, State Mandates at 4 (cited in note 3) (stating that "[a]ny time the mandated activity can
clearly be shown to serve the greater interest of the state and its citizens and its cost can be
equitably shared, it is probably justified").
16. See Steinzor, 81 Minn. L. Rev. at 114-29 (cited in note 4) (reviewing the history of
unfunded federal mandates); Daniel M. Kolkey, The Constitutional Cycles of Federalism, 32
Idaho L. Rev. 495, 495 (1996) (noting that the United States "has experienced a constitutional
cycle every sixty-five to seventy years... which may be marked by a renewed appreciation for
federalism"); Henry J. Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword, 86 Yale L. J. 1019, 1019-34 (1977)
(reviewing the historical context of federalism). Federal/state relations in the United States are
commonly divided into a series of periods: the era of "dual sovereignty" (through the Civil War)
in which the federal and state governments each acted separately within their own spheres of
authority with little or no interference from the other level; state assertions of authority to
"nullify" federal laws in the pre-Civil War period; the dramatic constitutional expansion of the
power of the national government through the Civil War amendments and others that followed
in the early 20th century; the period of cooperative federalism during which the federal and state
governments acted in concert often with the aid of federal funding and other incentives; the age
of regulatory federalism, in which the federal government has passed laws and regulations with
which state and local governments must comply; and President Reagan's "new federalism," char-
acterized by devolution of authority back to state and local governments. See Peterson, The Price
of Federalism at 6-14, 50-79 (cited in note 8) (discussing early federalism's reliance on dual
sovereignty and the rise of modern federalism); David R. Beam, On the Origins of the Mandate
Issue, in Michael Fix and Daphne A. Kenyon, eds., Coping with Mandates: What Are the
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this round in the polemic is distinguished by its focus on fiscal issues,
policy objections to unfunded mandates transcend fiscal concerns and
raise issues of federalism that have resounded for over two centuries.
17
From the New Deal through the Great Society, Congress en-
listed states and cities in joint programs to address diverse social and
economic issues, usually fueled by federal funding.18 While state and
local discretion under these programs was constrained by regulatory
conditions attached to federal funds, 9 little intergovernmental tension
Alternatives? 23, 24-25 (The Urban Institute, 1990) (discussing modern regulatory federalism,
which is characterized by state and local hostility to "sweeping, costly, and sometimes untested
federal program requirements"); George Anastaplo, The Amendments to the Constitution: A
Commentary 169-93 (Johns Hopkins U., 1995) (discussing the enactment of several amendments
to the Constitution which have had the effect of increasing the power of the federal government
at the expense of state and local governments). In reality, the past three decades have been
characterized by a political mixture of, or periodic oscillation between, regulatory and "new"
federalism. See notes 31-33 and accompanying text (explaining that the "new federalism"
initiative was only partially successful and that regulatory federalism continued both during and
after the Reagan administration).
17. This was recognized by the ACIR:
[I]ncreasing federal regulation of state and local governments, the lack of adequate con-
stitutional protection for state and local authority in the decisions of the federal courts,
and the increasingly crowded policy agenda of the federal government have contributed
to a serious and growing imbalance in the federal system. This imbalance makes it diffi-
cult for the federal government to establish genuinely national priorities and to resolve
major national problems. This imbalance also weakens the ability of state and local gov-
ernments to respond to the needs of their citizens.
Federal Regulation at 4 (cited in note 11).
State and local mandate opposition stems not only from high fiscal costs, but from distortion
of local priorities and erosion of state and local autonomy and initiative; unnecessary, ineffective,
and inefficient use of scarce resources; and distortion of political accountability. Id. at iii; U.S.
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Federally Induced Costs Affecting State
and Local Governments 12-17 (U.S. G.P.O., 1994) ("Federally Induced Costs"). See Fix and
Kenyon, Introduction, in Fix and Kenyon, eds., Coping with Mandates at 4-7 (cited in note 11)
(identifying as the underlying concerns of unfunded mandates the distribution of intergovern-
mental resources; the distribution of responsibility; the effectiveness of regulation; and values
and goals). See also Beam, Origins, in Fix and Kenyon, eds., Coping with Mandates at 23 (cited
in note 16) (citing "coequal concerns about status" and a "lack of respect for the position of states
and localities as constitutional entities within the federal system" as well as the effectiveness of
federal programs).
18. See generally Peterson, The Price of Federalism at 52-56 (cited in note 8) (describing
early efforts by the federal government to involve state and local governments in spending
programs); Fix and Kenyon, Introduction, in Fix and Kenyon, eds., Coping with Mandates at 1-2
(cited in note 11) (noting the change in federal-state-local relations from one of cooperation,
based on "well-established financial grants-in-aid programs" to one of "conflict and compulsion").
Federal grants-in-aid to state and local governments grew from $8.5 billion in fiscal year ("FT')
1940 to $165.9 billion in FY 1994 (in constant FY 1987 dollars). Executive Office of the President
of the United States, Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government,
Fiscal Year 1996 Historical Tables 175-76 tbl. 12.1 (U.S. G.P.O., 1995) ("FY96 Historical Tables").
19. See Peterson, The Price of Federalism at 56 (cited in note 8) (discussing the number of
regulations that accompany federal grants-in-aid to states). Grant conditions typically are
categorized into several types, including direct programmatic conditions governing the manner in
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resulted because recipients perceived that conditions were tied to
fiscal and programmatic accountability20 and because the programs
enjoyed widespread public support.21 States and cities enjoyed addi-
tional benefits and increased flexibility beginning in 1972 via general
revenue sharing, under which they received national funds with no
programmatic and few general conditions,22 and through block grants
that provided more state and local discretion in the use of program-
matic federal funds.23
By the late 1970s, state and local acceptance of this relation-
ship began to change. Critics complained that the increased burdens
of federal regulation, coupled with decreased federal aid, were crip-
pling state and local governments. 24 Empirical studies of federal/state
relations did indeed show a dramatic growth in the raw number of
which funds are spent on a specific program, matching grant requirements under which recipi-
ents must spend a specified amount of their own funds, crossover sanctions under which funds
for one program (such as highways) are tied to compliance with another program (such as clean
air), and cross-cutting requirements (such as minimum wage or equal opportunity) that apply to
all or many federal aid programs. Federally Induced Costs at 21-22 (cited in note 17). Grant
conditions are also characterized as vertical (program-specific) or horizontal (cross-cutting).
Lovell and Tobin, 41 Pub. Admin. at 319 (cited in note 11).
20. Federal Regulation at 7 (cited in note 11).
21. Id. at9.
22. State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-512, 86 Stat. 919 (1972),
codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 6017A, 6687 (1994). This reflected President Nixon's
philosophy of devolution of authority from the national to state and local governments. Peterson,
The Price of Federalism at 61 (cited in note 8).
23. These included the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
383, 88 Stat. 633 (1974), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301 et seq. (1994), and the
Comprehensive Employment Training Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-203, 87 Stat. 839 (1973),
codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. (1994), both of which were accompanied by a
large decrease in regulations and conditions attached to federal grant aid. Peterson, The Price of
Federalism at 61 (cited in note 8). See generally U.S. General Accounting Office, Accounting and
Information Management Division, Block Grants: Issues in Designing Accountability Provisions
1 (U.S. G.P.O., 1995) ("Block Grants") (stating that "[in contrast to categorical programs that are
consolidated, block grants provide significant additional discretion for states and localities to
define and implement federal programs in light of local needs and conditions."). The General
Accounting Office noted that federal grants fall into three general categories:
Of the three kinds of grants-in-aid--categorical, block, and general purpose fiscal
assistance-block grants lie in the grey, middle area. Categorical programs feature nar-
rowly prescribed, federally-determined program objectives, processes, and administra-
tion. At the opposite end of the fiscal spectrum-general-purpose fiscal assis-
tance-recipients are free to spend grant funds in the manner they choose with few, if
any, federally imposed programmatic or administrative requirements.
Block Grants at 3 (cited in this note). See also U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations, Characteristics of Federal Grant-in-aid Programs to State and Local Governments:
Grants Funded FY 1993 (U.S. G.P.O., 1994) ("Characteristics of Federal Grant-in-aid Programs").
24. Koch, 61 Pub. Int. at 42-44 (cited in note 11); Fix and Kenyon, Introduction, in Fix and
Kenyon, eds., Coping with Mandates at 2 (cited in note 11); Beam, Origins, in Fix and Kenyon,
eds., Coping with Mandates at 23, 25 (cited in note 16); Zelinsky, 46 Vand. L. Rev. at 60-61 (cited
in note 4); Shapiro, Federalism at 5 (cited in note 1).
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federal mandates applicable to state and local governments,25 but were
inconclusive on the connection to be drawn between the increases in
these programs and federal spending.26
The federal response to these complaints during the 1980s was
schizophrenic. Changes in tax policy enacted in 1981 and 198627 and
the growing federal debt that followed 28 put pressure on Congress and
25. A series of studies conducted by the ACIR and others documented the increase in
regulatory federalism. See Federally Induced Costs at 1 (cited in note 17) (illustrating the
growth of federal intergovernmental regulations); Federal Regulation at iii, 1-3 (cited in note 11)
(discussing the expansion of federally mandated burdens on state and local governments); U.S.
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Regulatory Federalism: Policy, Process,
Impact and Reform (1984) ("Regulatory Federalism") (documenting the growth of federal
mandates); Lovell and Tobin, 41 Pub. Admin. Rev. at 320 tbl. 2 (cited in note 11) (illustrating the
increase in federal mandates). In particular, the ACIR studies found a significant increase in
congressional use of direct orders, partial preemptions under which minimum federal require-
ments applied to federal programs undertaken voluntarily by states, and cross-cutting and
crossover grant conditions. Federal Regulation at 7-9, 44-56 (cited in note 11). Virtually no such
federal mandates were enacted from 1931-1960, compared with a dramatic rise in these methods
from 1961-1990. Id. at 46 fig. 4-1.
As discussed in Part IV, however, counting the raw number of purported federal mandates is,
at best, an imprecise undertaking. For example, does a federal regulation setting ten public
drinking water standards establish one or ten new mandates? Does a new set of regulations
consisting of ten sections and a hundred subsections constitute one, ten, or one hundred new
mandates? Obviously, "counting" mandate numbers is less important than the nature of and the
burdeni imposed by the federal actions. This requires a detailed understanding of the details of
each alleged mandate. See Federally Induced Costs at 3 (cited in note 17) (noting that the
number of mandates depends heavily on the definition of mandate used and that mandate
"counts" vary widely as a result). See also Part II.A.
26. In fact, the increased number of federal mandates identified by ACIR studies appears
independent of trends in federal grants-in-aid to state and local governments. The phenomenon
of increased federal regulation was identified before federal funding began to fall, Lovell and
Tobin, 41 Pub. Admin. Rev. at 318 (cited in note 11), and continued through the period of
decreased federal funding in the early-to-mid 1980s despite attempted reforms by the Reagan
Administration. Federal Regulation at iii (cited in note 11). Increased federal regulation per-
sisted during the late 1980s and early 1990s despite the subsequent renewal of federal funding
increases. Intergovernmental Mandates at 44 (cited in note 11). This suggests that Congress
has increasingly chosen to apply federal laws and regulations to state and local governments for
policy reasons that are independent of funding trends, but that federal funding to help states and
cities comply with these mandates has fluctuated as political winds have shifted. On the other
hand, the continuing federal budget crisis, whether perceived or real, clearly limits Congress's
ability to solve the issue with a major influx of new fiscal assistance to cities and states.
27. According to one commentator, the most significant change enacted during the 1980s
was the implementation of tax indexing, under which individual income tax brackets were
indexed to inflation, which in turn eliminated the large automatic growth in federal revenues
that had occurred since World War H. Peterson, The Price of Federalism at 76-78 (cited in note
8). Now, in order to increase revenues, Congress and the President must take the politically
difficult affirmative step of raising tax rates, rather than relying on "bracket creep" as they had
in the past. Id. at 78-79.
28. The total federal debt, as distinguished from annual budget deficits, roughly tripled in
nominal dollars from over $290 billion in 1960 to over $909 billion in 1980, more than tripled
again from over $909 billion in 1980 to over $3.2 trillion in 1990, and continued to grow to over
$4.6 trillion by 1994. FY96 Historical Tables at 89 tbl. 7.1 (cited in note 18). This trend is even
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the White House to reduce intergovernmental transfers. Federal
grants to state and local governments declined during the 1980s, but
recovered and rose to historic highs by the early 1990s. 29 However,
Congress eliminated general revenue sharing, first for states and later
for municipalities. 3° Thus, in some respects intergovernmental ten-
sion was exacerbated during the 1980s, both by declining federal aid
and by reduced flexibility in the use of that aid.
At the same time, President Reagan promised with his "New
Federalism" to devolve authority to state and local governments and
to alleviate the burdens of federal regulation on both lower levels of
government and the private sector. 1 During the early 1980s, the
more evident when the federal debt is adjusted for inflation. In constant 1987 dollars, debt held
by the public grew by just 10% from 1960 to 1980 from $908 billion to just over $1 trillion, but
more than doubled during the 1980s. Executive Office of the President of the United States,
Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1996
Analytical Perspectives 187 tbl. 13-1 (U.S. G.P.O., 1995) ("FY96 Analytical Perspectives"). Thus,
regardless of partisan debate over who is to blame, the rate of increase in the federal debt clearly
has grown over the past decade and a half. Perhaps a more useful perspective is to measure the
federal debt in relation to the economy at large. As a percentage of gross domestic product
("GDP"), the federal debt actually dropped from 57.6% in 1960 to 34.4% in 1980, then grew back
to 58.5% in 1990, and continued its climb to 70% by 1994. FY96 Historical Tables at 89 tbl. 7.1
(cited in note 18).
29. In constant 1987 dollars, federal grants-in-aid dropped from $127.6 billion in 1980 to
$113 billion in 1985, grew slightly to $119.5 billion in 1990, and climbed to an all-time high of
$165.9 billion by 1994. FY96 Analytical Perspectives at 169 tbl. 11-2 (cited in note 28). See
Lillian Rymarowicz and Dennis Zimmerman, Federal Budget and Tax Policy and the State-Local
Sector: Retrenchment in the 1980s 1-5 (U.S. Cong. Research Service, 1988) (discussing the levels
of federal grants-in-aid); Peterson, The Price of Federalism at 62-72 (cited in note 8) (discussing
the growth of grants-in-aid); Characteristics of Federal Grant-in-aid Programs at 7 tbl. 2 and fig.
2 (cited in note 23) (illustrating this growth of grant programs). As discussed in Part IV, this
trend cannot be understood fully on the basis of raw dollar figures since the amount of funds
available to states and cities for services that benefit the public at large depends on the percent-
age of federal dollars tied to individual entitlements, which has grown dramatically in recent
years.
30. General unrestricted funding to states was eliminated under President Carter in 1978,
and similar funding to cities was terminated in 1986 under President Reagan. Rymarowicz and
Zimmerman, Federal Budget and Tax Policy at 7-8 (cited in note 29).
31. While both President Nixon and President Reagan favored an enhanced state and local
role relative to the national government, the contrast between their two approaches is striking.
President Nixon promoted state and local autonomy over federal programs while providing
increased funding for those efforts. President Reagan supported devolution of authority to state
and local governments while drastically reducing federal support for those programs, reflecting
either more general disapproval of the governmental programs themselves or a belief that
transfer of fiscal responsibility should accompany devolution of authority. See generally
Peterson, The Price of Federalism at 60-61, 68-69 (cited in note 8) (discussing the contrasting
views of Nixon and Reagan); Federal Regulation at 17 (cited in note 11) (stating that "[u]nlike
Nixon, who hoped to rationalize active government, Reagan has tried on the whole to restrain
domestic government") (emphasis added) (quoting Timothy J. Conlan, New Federalism:
Intergovernmental Reform from Nixon to Reagan 99 (The Brookings Institution, 1988)). In his
1981 Inaugural Address, President Reagan said: "Government is not the solution to our problem.
Government is the Problem." Federal Regulation at 17 (cited in note 11).
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President and Congress launched initiatives to redress state and local
discontent with federal regulation.32 Despite the elimination of gen-
eral revenue sharing, more flexibility in the use of federal funds was
provided through new block grant programs, although many enjoyed
short lives and others were rejected by Congress. 33
State and local advocates believed these reforms had only
modest impacts, however, citing the steady and continuing growth of
federal mandates even after the purported reforms3 4 Some bills
designed to protect state and local governments did not pass;3 5 and
while state and local officials took solace that federal regulations were
vulnerable to Tenth Amendment challenges under National League of
32. See Federal Regulation at 17-42 (cited in note 11) (discussing the Reagan
Administration's attempts to relieve states from federal intrusion). Legislative reforms included
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980), codified as
amended at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 et seq. (1994) (requiring efforts to reduce paperwork burdens on
governmental and private targets of federal regulation); the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980), codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq. (1994) (requiring
federal agencies to adopt and publish regulatory agendas and regulatory flexibility analyses
identifying the need for new regulations and efforts to minimize resulting economic impacts); and
the State and Local Government Cost Estimate Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-108, 95 Stat. 1510
(1981), codified at 2 U.S.C. § 653 (1994) (requiring estimates by the Congressional Budget Office
("CBO") of the costs of proposed congressional legislation on state and local governments before
adoption). Administrative reforms included Executive Order 12291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981)
(requiring review and clearance of federal regulations by the Office of Management and Budget
based on a review of cost-effectiveness, cost-benefit, and other analyses), and Executive Order
12612 on Federalism, 3 C.F.R. 252 (1987) (establishing criteria for new proposed rules or legisla-
tion that would significantly affect state and local functions and responsibilities).
33. Federal Regulation at 11, 51-52 (cited in note 11); U.S. Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations, Federal Grant Programs in Fiscal Year 1992, Their Numbers,
Sizes, and Fragmentation Indexes in Historical Perspective 1-2 (U.S. G.P.O., 1993) ("Federal
Grants 1992").
34. Federal Regulation at 1-3, 44-47 (cited in note 11) (finding an ongoing increase in
federal regulatory burdens during the 1980s and concluding that "deregulatory initiatives were
more than counterbalanced by the accumulation of new requirements"). See U.S. Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Federal Mandate Relief for State, Local, and Tribal
Governments 4-9 (U.S. G.P.O., 1995) ("Federal Mandate Relief') (concluding that pending
mandate relief legislation would not adequately protect state and local governments from new
unfunded mandates or other cost-inducing legislation); Federally Induced Costs at 1, 4 (cited in
note 17) (discussing the growing number of federal mandates and early federal regulatory relief
initiatives); Intergovernmental Mandates at 50-56 (cited in note 11) (discussing the increasing
imposition of federal regulatory mandates upon state and local governments in the 1980s);
Shapiro, Federalism at 5 (cited in note 1) (stating that during the Reagan administration, the
much heralded philosophy of "new federalism" was seldom put into practice); Steinzor, 81 Minn.
L. Rev. at 119-20 (cited in note 4) (noting that while the "Reagan revolution" was successful in
"cutting grants and dismantling democracy," it was less successful in reducing the number of
regulations imposed upon states).
35. See Stanton, One Nation Indivisible at 2-3, 13 (cited in note 12).
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Cities v. Usery ("NLCs"),6 the symbolic if not real impact 7 of this
decision was eliminated when it was overruled in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 8 to the dismay of state and
local advocates. 39 These factors set the stage for a renewed debate in
the early 1990s, when state and local officials identified unfunded
federal mandates as among their top priorities. 40
To support their claims of abuse by the federal bureaucracy,
states and localities commissioned reports to assess the costs of un-
funded federal mandates to individual jurisdictions 41 and to cities and
counties in the aggregate. 42  While the validity and significance of
36. 426 U.S. 833, 833 (1976) ("NLCs"), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 528 (1985). See notes 263-75 and accompanying text.
37. As noted by Professor La Pierre, the actual impact of NLCs on the validity of federal
regulation of states and cities was minimal to nonexistent. La Pierre, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 579-
80 (cited in note 10).
38. 469 U.S. 528, 528 (1985). See notes 277-80 and accompanying text.
39. See Federal Regulation at iv, 74-82 (cited in note 11) (decrying Garcia and recommend-
ing that it be revisited by the Supreme Court); Derthick, The Brookings Review at 33 (cited in
note 11) (stating that Garcia raised "fresh doubt about the value of federalism" within the
Supreme Court).
40. In a survey conducted by the National League of Cities in 1994, unfunded mandates
ranked among officials' greatest concerns, along with economic conditions and crime, and as the
"most deteriorated" condition in the previous five years. National League of Cities, The State of
America's Cities: The Tenth Annual Opinion Survey of Municipal Elected Officials 1-2, 7, 9, 11
(1994) ("State of America's Cities"). Twenty-two percent of respondents agreed with the state-
ment: "If President Clinton were to convene a summit of municipal officials to discuss the future
of cities and towns, he would most likely hear more about unfunded mandates than any other is-
sue." Id. at 23. At the same time, state and local revenue collection declined due to a national
recession and the state and local tax revolts of the late 1980s and early 1990s. See Peterson, The
Price of Federalism at 1-5 (cited in note 8) (describing the fiscal crisis in California in 1991 and
1992); Federally Induced Costs at 1-2 (cited in note 17) (discussing state efforts to limit unfunded
mandates). The fact that the mandates issue has persisted well after recovery from the
recession, with state and local finances now generally quite sound, indicates that state and local
dissatisfaction has roots in deeper, nonfiscal concerns. See Federally Induced Costs at 4 (cited in
note 17) (discussing issues that have made unfunded mandates a top priority for state and local
governments). See also Part VI.
41. See Janet M. Kelly, A Comprehensive Guide to Studies on State and Federal Mandates
to Localities (National League of Cities, 1994) (providing a comprehensive annotated bibliogra-
phy of state and local mandate cost-estimating studies). Among the most widely cited of these
studies are: Paying for Federal Environmental Mandates: A Looming Crisis for Cities and
Counties (Municipality of Anchorage, 1992) ("Anchorage Study"); Cumulative Burden of
Environmental Regulation (City of Phoenix, 1992) ("Phoenix Study"); Putting Federalism to Work
for America: Tackling the Problem of Unfunded Mandates and Burdensome Regulations (City of
Chicago and Roosevelt U., 1992) ("Chicago Study"); Environmental Legislation: The Increasing
Costs of Regulatory Compliance to the City of Columbus (City of Columbus, 1992) ("Columbus
Study"); Ohio Metropolitan Area Cost Report for Environmental Compliance (Ohio Municipal
League, 1992) ("Ohio Study").
42. Price Waterhouse, Impact of Unfunded Federal Mandates on U.S. Cities: A 314-City
Survey (U.S. Conference 'of Mayors, 1993) ("Price Waterhouse City Report"); Price Waterhouse,
Unfunded Federal Mandates Survey, Executive Summary (National Association of Counties,
1993) ("Price Waterhouse County Report"). The reports were unveiled on "NUMDAY' ("No more
unfunded mandates day"), October 27, 1993. See Jaber, 45 Emory L. J. at 281-82 (cited in note 4)
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these reports remain hotly debated,43 they were used to great political
effect by state and local advocates." During the 103d Congress alone,
a total of thirty-nine mandate relief bills were introduced. Some
would have prohibited federal mandates absent full funding45 or made
compliance with such mandates optional,46 while other bills suggested
less drastic approaches. 47 At least one bill proposed a constitutional
amendment to prohibit unfunded mandates.48 While no such bill
passed during the 103d Congress, political opposition to mandates
mounted, which led President Clinton to sign two less ambitious
Executive Orders.
49
B. The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 and the Future of the
Debate Over Unfunded Federal Mandates
When Republicans gained control of Congress in the November
1994 elections, many renewed their calls for devolution of authority
from the national to state and local governments and introduced dras-
tic proposals to cut federal programs.50 Not surprisingly, therefore,
(discussing the background of NUMDAY). No similar nationwide survey has been attempted for
states.
43. See Part IV.
44. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Resources Division, Report to Edolphus
Towns, Chairman, Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations of the
House Committee on Government Operations 21 app. V (U.S. G.P.O., 1994) ("Towns Report")
(identifying and characterizing federal mandate relief bills). The ACIR has identified 34 man-
date relief bills, perhaps reflecting a narrower definition of relevant bills. Federally Induced
Costs at 2 (cited in note 17).
45. H.R. 140, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (January 6, 1993); S. 993, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (May
20, 1993).
46. H.R. 3429, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (November 11, 1993).
47. See Towns Report at 21 app. V (cited in note 44) (outlining various federal mandate
relief proposals). According to the ACIR, twelve bills would have revised the fiscal note (cost-
estimating) process; seven would have linked funding to enforceability; two would have required
supermajority votes to enact new mandates; and three would have reimbursed state and local
governments for the costs of compliance with federal mandates. Federally Induced Costs at 5
(cited in note 17).
48. H.J.R. 282, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (October 26, 1993). See Paul Gilimor and Fred
Eames, Reconstruction of Federalism: A Constitutional Amendment to Prohibit Unfunded
Mandates, 31 Harv. J. Leg. 395, 410-13 (1994) (calling for a constitutional amendment address-
ing the "unfunded mandate problem"); Zelinsky, 46 Vand. L. Rev. at 1356-58 (cited in note 4)
(suggesting a constitutional solution rather than "palliative remedies").
49. See Executive Order 12866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993) (requiring additional consultation with
state and local officials); Executive Order 12875, 3 C.F.R. 669 (1993) (seeking to limit new
intergovernmental mandates in federal regulations).
50. See Peterson, The Price of Federalism at xi (cited in note 8) (discussing House
Republicans' calls for reduced federal government involvement in "education, transportation,
manpower training, housing, energy, and crime control"); Steinzor, 81 Minn. L. Rev. at 123-24
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one of the first laws to pass the 104th Congress was the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 ("UMRA").51
The Act has been mischaracterized by some as a prohibition on
the enactment of additional unfunded federal mandates. 52 Rather,
JMRA "establishes procedural roadblocks to the enactment of [these
programs]."53 It expands the cost-estimating duties imposed on the
Congressional Budget Office ("CBO") by the State and Local Cost
Estimate Act of 1981,14 which in turn provides more information to
Congress when it acts to impose costs on states and cities.55 More
pointedly, the Act creates procedures in both the House and the
Senate whereby bills that would impose unfunded mandates on states
and cities are subject to a point of order, which may be waived by
majority vote.56 This process demands a deliberate vote acknowledg-
(cited in note 4) (describing the Republican "Contract with America"). This coupling of devolu-
tion with reduced federal funding is more consistent with President Reagan's devolution of
authority and fiscal responsibility than with President Nixon's earlier efforts to transfer respon-
sibility while maintaining federal financial aid. See note 31 and accompanying text.
51. Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995), codified at scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. (1994,
Supp. 1).
52. See Peterson, The Price of Federalism at xi (cited in note 8) (stating that "Congress has
passed a law forbidding the imposition of additional unfunded mandates on state and local
government").
53. Jaber, 45 Emory L. J. at 282 (cited in note 4). See Printz, 65 U.S.L.W. at 4748-49
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the "roadblocks" UMRA places upon legislation imposing
unfunded mandates).
54. See note 32 and accompanying text. Under UMRA, the CBO must determine whether
the "direct cost' of all "Federal intergovernmental mandates" in a bill will exceed $50 million
(adjusted annually for inflation) in any of the five years following the effective date of any such
mandate, and if so, prepare estimates of the total amount of the "direct cost" of compliance as
well as budgetary and appropriations authority included to fund such costs, unless the CBO
determines that such cost estimates are not feasible. 2 U.S.C. § 658c(a) (1994, Supp. I).
Obviously, the definitions of "direct costs" and "Federal intergovernmental mandates" are
critical. See Part III. Similar requirements are imposed with respect to private sector mandates.
2 U.S.C. § 658c(b). These requirements are not relevant here, however.
Supplemental statements are also required "to the greatest extent practicable" when bills are
amended in committee or on the floor of one House of Congress in a manner that adds to or alters
the costs of proposed mandates. Id. § 658c(d).
Previously, the threshold for CBO analysis was $200 million under the 1981 law. Hearings
on S. 563, S. 648, S. 993, S. 1592, and S. 1606 before the Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1994) (statement of Robert D. Reischauer, Director,
Congressional Budget Office) ("Reischauer Testimony").
55. For a discussion of the immense difficulties in deriving accurate and meaningful cost
estimates, see Part IV.
56. No bill may be considered unless the requisite CBO cost estimate has been published
and either the direct costs are below the $50 million threshold or specific funding for the man-
date is assured. 2 U.S.C. § 658d(a) (1994, Supp. I). The House may defeat such a point of order,
but debate is limited to ten minutes per side. 2 U.S.C. § 658e(b)(4) (1994, Supp. 1). According to
some, the practical effect of the Act is to give the Speaker of the House broad power to block
unfunded mandate bills, because points of order ruled on by the Chair are rarely appealed to the
full House. Jaber, 45 Emory L. J. at 282 n.8 (cited in note 4).
1152
1997] UNFUNDED FEDERAL MANDATES 1153
ing that a bill constitutes an unfunded mandate before the merits of
the bill are debated. 7 Thus, although the Act does not prohibit new
unfunded mandates, 58 its procedural roadblocks are formidable and
may succeed in restricting future federal regulations affecting state
and local governments. 59 On the other hand, UMRA is far less potent
than some of the absolute prohibitions proposed in the 103d
Congress.
60
Because of its compromise nature and uncertain impact,
UMRA likely will not end the debate over unfunded federal mandates
any more than the reforms instituted in the 1980s.61 Either state and
57. UMRA also imposes procedural requirements on federal agencies that impose new
mandates on state and local governments via regulation. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1538 (1994, Supp. I).
These duties include cost estimates, cost-benefit analyses, evaluation of the availability of federal
funds, consultation with state and local representatives, and an express command to choose the
"least costly, most cost-effective or least burdensome alternative that achieves the objectives of
the rule," consistent with the statute under which the rule is enacted. Id. § 1535.
58. Ironically, the procedural safeguards included in UMRA are consistent with the notion
that states are afforded structural protection in the national government via state representation
in Congress and other means, as advocated by the majority in Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-52, rather
than the availability of substantive judicial review under the Tenth Amendment as suggested by
the Garcia dissent, id. at 557-75, 580-88 (Powell, O'Connor, JJ., dissenting), and the majority in
NLCs, 426 U.S. at 833. In essence, UMRA requires a more deliberate and informed choice by
Congress when it passes a mandate that affects state and local government function and fiscal
policy. See Zelinsky, 46 Vand. L. Rev. at 1356-59 (cited in note 4) (calling for constitutional
rather than "palliative" remedies to unfunded mandates, which he views as more consistent with
the structural protection theory).
59. See Denise D. Fort, The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995: Where Will the New
Federalism Take Environmental Policy?, 35 Nat. Resources J. 727, 727 (1995) (stating that the
"ultimate effect will presumably be fewer federal requirements, with states and tribes left to
determine for themselves whether or not to regulate activities"). Apparently, during the first
year in which UMRA was in effect, the number of new congressional mandates with significant
fiscal impacts on state and local governments was small. Printz, 65 U.S.L.W. at 4749 n.20
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Congressional Budget Office, The Experience of the Congressional
Budget Office During the First Year of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 13-15 (U.S. G.P.O.,
1997) ("CBO Experience with UMRA")). Although the dissent in Printz cited this study as proof
that "the Act will play an important role in curbing the behavior about which the majority
expresses concern," id. at 4749, this conclusion may be premature. During this first year,
Congress was comprised of the same members who enacted the law and who logically continued
to question federal intrusion into state and local domains. It is not clear that future Congresses
will be so restrained. In fact, the CBO concluded: "Whether UMRA can be credited with these
outcomes is an open question." CBO Experience with UMRA at 15 (cited in this note).
60. See notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
61. See Steinzor, 81 Minn. L. Rev. at at 99, 130-31 (cited in note 4) (stating that "[tihere is
every reason to expect that the UMRA will prove a disappointment.., and the .quest [for
unfunded mandate reform] will continue"); Dana, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 2 (cited in note 4) (noting
that despite the passage of UMRA, the "campaign against unfunded mandates will continue");
Jaber, 45 Emory L. J. at 282-83 (cited in note 4) (predicting that unfunded mandate reform
proposals will "continue to be debated"); Peterson, The Price of Federalism at 47 (cited in note 8)
(noting that "[d]espite the passage of the unfunded mandate law, legislative theory expects the
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local advocates will be dissatisfied with procedural remedies and push
for stronger relief or UMRA will succeed in blocking new federal
mandates, thereby provoking a dissent from the would-be beneficiar-
ies of those programs.
III. THE INTRACTABLE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION
Definitions are critical to a proper understanding of the un-
funded mandate issue. Most legal and nonlegal evaluations of un-
funded mandates, however, recognize serious definitional difficulties
that impede accurate and consistent analysis. 62 Available cost esti-
mates and other data and analyses are based on inconsistent defini-
tions, or worse still, no definitions at all.6s This raises serious ques-
tions about whether unfunded federal mandates can be defined with
sufficient precision to be useful to the discourse about federalism.
To obtain a useful understanding of unfunded federal man-
dates, the phrase should be dissected into its component parts, i.e.,
"mandates," "federal mandates," and "unfunded federal mandates." A
precise definition of each component, however, and hence the term as
a whole, turns out to be surprisingly elusive.
mandate issue to continue"). But see Leckrone, 71 Ind. L. J. at 1040-44 (cited in note 4)
(predicting that UMRA will "effectively repeal" environmental requirements).
62. See Steinzor, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 103-11 (cited in note 4) (attempting to define unfunded
mandates); Zelinsky, 46 Vand. L. Rev. at 1364-67 (cited in note 4) (discussing the difficulties
faced in attempting to define an "unfunded mandate"); Jaber, 45 Emory L. J. at 85-92 (cited in
note 4) (setting forth a definition of "unfunded federal mandates"); Dana, 69 S. Cal. Rev. at 5-10
(cited in note 4) (discussing the legal status of unfunded environmental mandates); Fix and
Kenyon, Introduction, in Fix and Kenyon, eds., Coping With Mandates at 1, 3-4 (cited in note 11)
(discussing various types of unfunded mandates and distinguishing them from mere conditions of
assistance); Federally Induced Costs at 2-3 (cited in note 17) (noting that federal efforts to
estimate the total number of mandates are difficult because there is no generally accepted
definition of a "federal mandate"); Lovell and Tobin, 41 Pub. Admin. Rev. at 319-20 (cited in note
11) (distinguishing among various types of mandates that fall within the broad definition of
"unfunded mandates"); Leckrone, 71 Ind. L. J. at 1031-35 (cited in note 4) (defining "unfunded
mandates"). Many problems in defining unfunded federal mandates are similar to those in
defining unfunded state mandates. Thus, state mandate definitions will be considered here as
well. See Janet M. Kelly, Estimating Mandate Costs, Processes and Outcomes 1-8 (National
League of Cities, 1993) (developing an operating definition of state mandates).
63. In the National League of Cities Survey, for example, city officials were asked to
provide opinions regarding unfunded federal mandates without offering a definition of the term.
National League of Cities, The State of America's Cities at 38-41, 44-46 (cited in note 40)
(incorporating the phrase "unfunded federal mandates" in survey questions with no definition or
explanation of the term). Using one set of definitions, the ACIR counted 36 existing federal
mandates on state and local governments, while the National League of Cities counted 185. See
Federally Induced Costs at 3 (cited in note 17) (discussing the number of existing unfunded
federal mandates).
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A. Wfhat is a Mandate?
The strict legal meaning of a "mandate" is limited to a judicial
decree. Black's Law Dictionary defines it as a "command, order, or
direction, written or oral, which [a] court is authorized to give and [a]
person is bound to obey."6 4 Clearly, the unfunded mandate debate also
includes legislative and administrative mandates. Even beyond the
judicial context, however, a strict definition of "mandate" retains the
idea that the issuer has legal authority to impose, and the recipient
bears a legal duty to obey, the dictates of the mandate, presumably
under the compulsion of formal legal enforcement.65 Suggestions,
inducements, indirect impacts, and other actions that leave the recipi-
ent with some choice of whether to comply do not fit this definition.
In their seminal description of the issue, Lovell and Tobin
define mandates as "responsibilities, procedures, or activities that are
imposed by one sphere of government on another by constitutional,
legislative, administrative, executive, or judicial action."66 Assuming
that "imposed" bears the same idea of legal compulsion as "order or
command," this definition is consistent with the idea that a mandate
requires compliance on threat of legal sanction. However, Lovell and
Tobin interpret their definition to include conditions of aid67 and
constraints as well as affirmative duties, for example, including con-
straints on revenue generation and expenditures.68
64. Black's Law Dictionary 962 (West, 6th ed. 1990).
65. The dictionary definition of mandate is "any authoritative order or command." The
Random House Dictionary of the English Language (Random House, College ed. 1969). This
definition retains the notion of authority to issue and duty to obey. See Kelly, Estimating
Mandate Costs at 7 (cited in note 62) (suggesting that the proper test of a mandate is whether
the recipient can resist or whether the recipient is subject to noncompliance penalties); Steinzor,
81 Minn. L. Rev. at 105 (cited in note 4) (suggesting that a mandate is an enforceable duty, not a
voluntary undertaking).
66. Lovell and Tobin, 41 Pub. Admin. Rev. at 319 (cited in note 11). Similarly, Professor
Zelinsky defines an intergovernmental mandate as "a requirement imposed on a subordinate
level of government to provide a public service that otherwise would not be furnished or to
provide a public service in a more costly fashion." Zelinsky, 46 Vand. L. Rev. at 1366 (cited in
note 4).
67. Lovell and Tobin, 41 Pub. Admin. Rev. at 319 (cited in note 11). The only justification
given for this apparent contradiction is that the impacts of such grant conditions had not been
studied. Id.
68. Id. Lovell and Tobin's typology also distinguishes between "programmatic" mandates,
which direct lower levels of government "what to do," and "procedural" mandates, which dictate
"how to do it." Id. A procedural "how to" mandate (so long as it bears the requisite criteria of
authority to issue and duty to comply) is no less of a mandate than a programmatic "what to do"
command. Id. See Zelinsky, 46 Vand. L. Rev. at 1365 (cited in note 4) (categorizing mandates as
either requiring new services or increasing existing services at a higher cost). In contrast,
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The ACIR, in an effort to shun the "pejorative" term
"mandates," recently proposed to use the purportedly more neutral
term "federally induced costs.69 This effort, however, resulted in a
definition even broader than that suggested by Lovell and Tobin:
According to common usage, mandates encompass any federal statutory, regu-
latory, or judicial instruction that (1) directs state or local governments to un-
dertake a specific action or to perform an existing function in a particular way,
(2) imposes additional financial burdens on states and localities, or (3) reduces
state and local revenue sources.70
This language is broader than Lovell and Tobin's definition through
its vague inclusion of federal actions that "impose[ ] additional finan-
cial burdens on states and localities."71 From this expanded concept,
ACIR derives the following list of federal policies that impose fiscal
impacts on state and local governments: (1) direct mandates; (2) grant
conditions; (3) full and partial preemptions; (4) tax policy provisions;
(5) incidental and implied federal policy impacts; and (6) federal expo-
sure of states and localities to legal and financial liabilities.72 The
extent to which each category properly qualifies as a mandate will be
examined in turn.73
1. Direct Orders
Direct orders include legally enforceable requirements imposed
by the Constitution,74 statutes, regulations, or judicial orders. Direct
orders come in a variety of forms and have a diversity of impacts.
Some apply the same rules of conduct to state and local governments
Professor Caminker distinguishes between "ministerial mandates" in which Congress prescribes
fully the applicable rules of conduct and "bounded discretion mandates" in which state officials
are afforded "some degree of discretion" Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and
Subordinancy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 Colum.
L. Rev. 1001, 1011 (1995).
69. Federally Induced Costs at 3 (cited in note 17). While more jargonistic than rhetorical,
I am not sure that the proposed new term is less pejorative than the old.
70. Id. at2.
71. In addition, the ACIR language more expressly includes procedural "how to" and
programmatic "what to do" mandates, as well as federal actions that reduce state and local
revenue sources.
72. Id. at3.
73. There is no magic to the use of this particular list of "mandates," but it is useful for
purposes of analysis because it is recent and highly inclusive.
74. As discussed in Part III.B, however, it is questionable whether constitutional mandates
properly can be assailed as "federal" mandates, that is, mandates imposed by the national
government on state and local governments.
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that are applied to private parties engaged in similar conduct. 75 Other
orders might apply differently to state and local governments, such as
requirements governing municipal sewage or solid waste disposal.
Still others require states or cities to take regulatory actions vis-a-vis
private parties, i.e., to act in a governmental capacity.
76
Direct orders most clearly meet the definition of a mandate.
They include requirements that are compulsory and enforceable and
are issued by institutions, including legislatures, courts, and agencies,
with the legal authority to do so.
77
2. Conditions of Aid
Conditions of federal aid, although issued under proper author-
ity, are not compulsory because receipt of the aid itself, and hence
compliance with the accompanying conditions or regulations, is volun-
tary.78 Nevertheless, anti-mandate advocates suggest that at least
some grant conditions should be considered unfunded federal man-
dates. The validity of these arguments is significant because "a closer
examination of intergovernmental regulations reveals the great ma-
75. See note 286 and accompanying text. The California Supreme Court found that laws of
general applicability do not constitute "mandates" under the applicable reimbursement provision
of the California Constitution. County of Los Angeles v. State of California, 43 Cal. 3d 46, 729
P.2d 202, 212 (1987). See Zelinsky, 46 Vand. L. Rev. at 1365 (cited in note 4) (discussing the
holding and reasoning of the California Supreme Court in County of Los Angeles). This conclu-
sion, however, was based on the court's reading of the intent of the voters who adopted the
provision. County of Los Angeles, 729 P.2d at 212.
76. See New York, 505 U.S. at 177-80 (discussing the power of Congress to require states to
regulate the actions of private citizens). These variations result in different treatment under the
Tenth Amendment. See Printz, 65 U.S.L.W. at 4739-41 (distinguishing between constitutional
and unconstitutional direct orders upon state and local governments). See also Part V.B.
77. Classification of a federal action as a "direct order mandate," however, does not neces-
sarily answer questions about the mandate's validity on either legal or policy grounds. Valid
public policies may be served by federal mandates, and federal reimbursement may be unneces-
sary or unwise on economic or other policy grounds. See Part VI.
78, Jaber, 45 Emory L. J. at 290 (cited in note 4). Largely for this reason, a wide range of
grant conditions have been upheld under the Spending Clause. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. See
Part V.C. See generally Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 Colum. L.
Rev. 1911, 1924-32 (1995) (discussing the Supreme Court's Spending Clause decisions); David E.
Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 Duke L. J. 1, 54-109 (1994) (discussing recent Spending Clause
decisions by the Supreme Court); Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the
Constitution, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 1103, 1125-55 (1987) (discussing limits on the power of the federal
government to attach conditions to grants).
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jority of them to be conditions of assistance and not unfunded man-
dates."
79
State and local officials claim that some federal grant programs
are so large and so entrenched that it is fiscally and politically impos-
sible to turn them down 80 and, therefore, that some grant conditions
should be considered mandates. Undoubtedly it is difficult for a state
to withdraw from massive federal programs such as Medicaid. This
argument, however, proves too much. If the funds provided by a fed-
eral program are so substantial that states or cities find them irresist-
ible, these governments still make a rational but voluntary choice to
accept the funds and participate in the program. If compliance costs
were too high relative to the aid received, the program would no
longer seem irresistible. Potential recipients would decline the grants
and spend the funds which would otherwise be used to comply with
grant conditions as the state or locality saw fit. Thus, from a defini-
tional perspective, aid conditions remain voluntary, not mandatory.
States and cities also complain about the "bait and switch"
nature of some federal programs. Congress "baits" states into partici-
pation in a cooperative program, causing them to spend funds on
activities in which they were not previously involved, to incur start-up
costs, to abandon similar state programs in favor of the federal model,
and to create public reliance on the federal program. 81 Congress then
"switches" by either increasing state and local compliance costs or
79. Fix and Kenyon, Introduction, in Fix and Kenyon, eds., Coping with Mandates at 3
(cited in note 11) (emphasis in original). See CBO Experience with UMRA at 7 (cited in note 59)
(stating that most costs in bills analyzed under UMRA have involved aid conditions).
80. This concept was first expressed by the ACIR:
Although this legalistic approach [of excluding voluntary aid conditions] seemed plausi-
ble when federal aid constituted a small and highly compartmentalized part of state and
local revenues, it overlooks current realities. Many grant conditions have become far
more integral to state and local activities-and far less subject to voluntary forbear-
ance-than originally suggested by the contractual model.
Federally Induced Costs at 20 (cited in note 17). See also Rosenthal, 39 Stan. L. Rev. at 1104,
1135 (cited in note 78) (suggesting that duress may be the main reason state and local govern-
ments consent to conditional grants). However, other ACIR reports appear inconsistent on this
issue. See U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Federal Statutory
Preemption of State and Local Authority: History, Inventory, and Issues 11 (U.S. G.P.O., 1993)
("Federal Statutory Preemption") (noting that "[t]he term mandate is used often without precise
definition and is mistakenly applied to restraints and conditions of aid") (emphasis in original).
As Janet Kelly has explained, sometimes officials find the program to include an "irresistible
condition," especially once a state or local constituency for the program is created. Kelly,
Estimating Mandate Costs at 3 (cited in note 62). See Gillmor and Eames, 31 Harv. J. Leg. at
399 (cited in note 48) (noting that spending conditions are coercive, especially where unrelated to
purposes of the grant). Nevertheless, Dr. Kelly believes that aid conditions should not be
considered mandates. Kelly, Estimating Mandate Costs at 3 (cited in note 62).
81. See Federally Induced Costs at 20-21 (cited in note 17) (discussing the use of "bait and
switch" techniques by Congress).
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conditions while maintaining federal funding levels constant or reduc-
ing federal funding while maintaining program requirements.82 It is
difficult not to sympathize with this complaint. It does not, however,
alter the voluntary nature of the federal program. A state remains
free to withdraw from the program if the increased or altered condi-
tions are not acceptable from a cost-benefit or policy perspective.83
Finally, states and cities complain that some types of aid condi-
tions are inherently more coercive and less justified than others and
are therefore more like mandates than aid conditions. In particular,
they cite the congressional increase in use of crossover sanctions and
cross-cutting regulations,84 which are arguably more coercive than
conditions tied directly to the funded program.85 Again, however,
82. Id.
83. Moreover, at least some of the examples cited in support of the "bait and switch" com-
plaint are disingenuous. For example, the ACIR identified the Water Resources Development
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-662, 100 Stat. 4082 (1986), codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2201-
2329 (1994), as imposing unfunded federal mandates because it reduced the federal share of joint
water projects. Federally Induced Costs at 15 (cited in note 17). Reforms in federal water
legislation, however, replaced a program of massive federal subsidies for water projects with one
based on mandatory cost-sharing tied to state and local benefits, and beneficiaries remain free to
decline participation on a project-by-project basis. See Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to
Watershed Protection, 25 Envir. L. 973, 1036-37 (1995) (discussing the Water Resources
Development Act of 1986). These changes in federal water policy constituted reductions in
federal subsidies rather than increases in federal mandates. Similarly, states complain that
Congress expanded Medicaid costs by mandating coverage for poor children between ages 7 and
19, for low-income elderly individuals, and for persons with mental disabilities. Federally
Induced Costs at 21 (cited in note 17). These program expansions, however, did not change the
federal share of total Medicaid costs from 55%. Id. Thus, for every 45 cents spent by states on
new coverage, the federal government contributed 55 cents. Again, states remain free to
withdraw from the program. In none of the examples of "bait and switch" cited by state and local
advocates did a voluntary program later become mandatory.
84. Federal Regulation at 3, 46-47 (cited in note 11);' Federally Induced Costs at 21-22
(cited in note 17). For a description of the different types of federal grant conditions, see note 19
and accompanying text.
85. Federally Induced Costs at 21 (cited in note 17) (noting that "[o]ver the last two dec-
ades, the Congress has used this mechanism to require state and local governments to take
actions that the federal government lacked the constitutional authority to order directly"). The
ACIR cites in particular highway fund conditions, such as speed limits and minimum drinking
ages, similar to those challenged unsuccessfully in South Dakota u. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 203
(1987); the Hatch Political Activity Act, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939), codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 595 (1994) (prohibiting political activities by state officials); the National Environmental
Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (1970), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et
seq. (1994) (requiring environmental impact statements for major federal actions, including
federal funding of state and local projects that may have a significant impact on the environ-
ment); the Davis-Bacon Act, ch. 411, 46 Stat. 1494 (1931), codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. §§
276a et seq. (1994) (requiring aid recipients to pay workers prevailing wages); and the
Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973), codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq. (1994) (requiring protection of threatened and endangered species and
their habitats).
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these requirements remain conditions of aid voluntarily received,
rather than legally enforceable mandates. While the propriety of such
conditions can be debated,5 from a definitional perspective they can-
not be treated as mandates.
3. Full and Partial Preemption
Congress may preempt state and local authority under the
Supremacy Clause,87 so long as it has authority to act in the field.85
While the increasing use of federal preemption has been a major
source of intergovernmental tensions89 and clearly impairs state and
local autonomy, it is difficult to see how preemption can be viewed as a
compulsory mandate. Yet federal preemptions are counted along with
direct orders in a number of mandate studies.9° State and local advo-
cates suggest two ways in which preemption statutes should be viewed
as mandates. First, some researchers suggest that preemption is a
form of negative mandate, i.e., one that dictates what states and cities
cannot do rather than what they must do.91 To the extent that pre-
emptions "alter the balance of power in the federal system"92 but
86. See Part VI. Some commentators note that Congress's ability to induce state conduct
under the spending power effectively swallows any limits on Congress's power to regulate
directly under the Commerce Clause. See, for example, Baker, 95 Colum. L. Rev. at 1913-16,
1933 (cited in note 78) (arguing that the Supreme Court should adopt a test imposing a stricter
limit on the spending power).
87. U.S. Const., Art. VI.
88. See Part IV.D.
89. See Federally Induced Costs at 3-4 (cited in note 17) (describing the tensions created by
the increased use of unfunded mandates). The ACIR found that more than half of all federal
preemption statutes enacted since 1789 have been passed since 1969. Federal Statutory
Preemption at iii (cited in note 80). For more detailed data on the numbers and purposes of
federal preemption statutes, see id. at 7-9.
90. See Federal Regulation at 52-53 (cited in note 11) (counting federal preemption
statutes as "instruments of regulatory federalism"); Federally Induced Costs at 22-23 (cited in
note 17) (discussing the effects of federal preemption on state and local governments). The ACIR
notes that "[flederal preemptions limit the discretion of state and local voters and sometimes
impose additional costs on state and local governments." Federal Statutory Preemption at 6
(cited in note 80).
91. Dr. Kelly suggests in the state-local context that the broadest definition of a mandate
would be "any action on the part of any unit of state government that inhibits the decision
making ability of any unit of local government." Kelly, Estimating Mandate Costs at I (cited in
note 62). Dr. Kelly acknowledges that this notion would be so broad that it could be applied to
almost any action by the larger level of government. Id. See Federally Induced Costs at 22-23
(cited in note 17) (noting that even preemptions that impose no direct costs may be objectionable
because they are intrusive); Federal Statutory Preemption at 9 (cited in note 80) (noting that
many federal mandates are a subset of preemptions "although preemptions and mandates are
often not clearly distinguished in discussions of federal action").
92. Federal Statutory Preemption at 6 (cited in note 80).
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impose no fiscal costs on lower levels of government,3 they may raise
the same or similar issues of state and local autonomy, efficiency, and
political accountability as affirmative mandates. However, viewing
the definition of mandate this broadly would merge the mandate issue
with all issues of federalism, thus rendering it useless as a new ana-
lytical tool. Moreover, a mandate that prohibits state or local action
but imposes no direct costs is not relevant to the debate over unfunded
mandates. 9
4
Second, it is argued that direct costs are imposed on states and
cities through partial or conditional preemption under which the
federal government establishes minimum standards for programs that
are delegated to state or local governments.95 Such programs con-
strain decision making and impose direct compliance costs. However,
defining partial preemptions as mandates either is of no use to the
debate or is inaccurate. If adoption of a regulatory program is manda-
tory, definitionally it becomes a direct order. 6 The majority of partial
preemptions are optional, however, because they confer discretion to
adopt the program or leave it to the federal government.9 7 Compliance
is voluntary rather than mandatory, as with conditions of aid.98 While
a state or city loses some autonomy if it declines to implement a fed-
eral program, or if the federal government reassumes a program due
93. Some preemptions do affect state and local finances by reducing or prohibiting funding
sources. See Federally Induced Costs at 22-23 (cited in note 17) (discussing preemptions which
increase costs for state and local governments). These types of actions are discussed in Part
III.4.
94. Stated differently, calling all federal actions that "affect" state and local power man-
dates, even in the absence of any fiscal impact, would add absolutely nothing to the legal and
policy debate about federalism.
95. Federally Induced Costs at 23 (cited in note 17) (citing as examples several federal
health and environmental programs); Federal Statutory Preemption at 23-23 (cited in note 80)
(discussing the effects of total and partial preemption upon state and local governments).
96. See New York, 505 U.S. at 161-66 (prohibiting such direct commandeering of state
regulatory resources); Printz, 65 U.S.L.W. at 4741 (concluding "categorically" that the federal
government cannot compel states to "enact or administer" federal regulatory programs).
97. See Federally Induced Costs at 23 (cited in note 17) (noting that, legally, such pro-
grams are voluntary and states often opt out of the programs).
98. See Steinzor, 81 Minn. L. Rev. at 102 n.5 (cited in note 4) (noting that the "alternative
to accepting a voluntary delegation is federal preemption of state law"). Indeed, in many cases
the only "penalty" a state faces for violation of program conditions is withdrawal of federal grant
funding. Thus, partial preemptions are identical to conditions of aid. For example, the only
sanction for state noncompliance with the nonpoint source pollution provisions of the Clean
Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972), codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et
seq. (1994), is withdrawal of EPA grant funding. Id. § 1329(h). Even the more draconian
sanction of program withdrawal, see id. § 1342(c) (providing for withdrawal from a permitting
program upon state noncompliance with program requirements), would constitute full preemp-
tion rather than a federal mandate.
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to violation of program conditions, definitionally this is no different
from full preemption. 99
4. Tax Policy Provisions
Federal tax policy can adversely affect state and local finances
in ways that are considered by some to constitute unfunded man-
dates.100 Congress can impair state and local revenue generation by
preempting a particular source of taxation'01 or through other aspects
of federal tax, policy such as rules regarding the deductibility of state
and local taxes from federal income taxes and taxation of interest on
state and local debt.
0 2
While federal tax policy can affect state and local finances
substantially, it often has reciprocal impacts on federal finances as
well.103 For example, state and local use of tax-exempt bonds ("TEBs")
grew rapidly from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s. 0 4 While lowering
the cost of state and local borrowing,105 TEBs caused large federal
revenue losses.0 6 Congress increased restrictions on TEB use to slow
99. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 268 (1981)
(upholding a partial preemption program against Tenth Amendment challenge).
100. See Federally Induced Costs at 22-24 (cited in note 17) (including federal tax policy in
discussions of unfunded mandates).
101. Id. at 22-23 (citing, for example, federal preemption of taxes on air travel and prohibi-
tions against discriminatory taxes on railroad property). Some areas of revenue collection are re-
served to the national government by the Constitution. See, for example, U.S. Const., Art. I, §
10, cl. 2 (prohibiting state imposts or duties on exports absent consent of Congress).
102. See, for example, South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 527 (1988) (upholding a
federal tax measure eliminating the deductibility of unregistered state and local bearer bonds).
See Public Finance Network, Tax-exempt Financing: A Primer 1-10 (1994) ("Tax-exempt
Financing') (discussing federal tax rules regarding state and local debt).
103. The reciprocal impacts of state and federal tax authority have been debated since the
Constitutional Convention. See, for example, Federalist Nos. 31, 32 (Hamilton), in Clinton
Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 193-201 (Mentor, 1961); New York v. United States, 326 U.S.
572, 574-78 (1946) ("New York (Tax)") (dismissing the notion that states are absolutely immune
from all types of federal taxation); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431-35 (1819)
(stating that "the power to tax is the power to destroy" and holding that Maryland could not
impose a tax upon the Bank of the United States).
104. Rymarowicz and Zimmerman, Federal Budget and Tax Policy at 18 (cited in note 29)
(listing an annual growth rate of 14.6%).
105. TEBs reduce borrowing costs because investors can receive higher net returns at a
given interest rate if they do not have to pay federal income taxes on the proceeds. Hence, states
and cities can raise capital at lower interest rates than if the bond income were subject to federal
taxes. As a result, TEBs lower state and local borrowing costs by approximately 25%. Tax-
exempt Financing at I (cited in note 102).
106. Id. at 18 (noting that federal revenue losses from the use of TEBs grew from $10.7
billion in fiscal year 1980 to $21 billion by fiscal year 1988).
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these losses and to curtail the use of TEBs to subsidize private activi-
ties.07
State and local governments view restrictions on tax-exempt
borrowing as "an unwarranted infringement on their right to conduct
their financial affairs free from federal interference. This is not sur-
prising since these revenue bonds generate benefits to the issuing
jurisdiction and entail almost no cost to State and local taxpayers.los
It is inappropriate, however, to define these restrictions, or changes in
the deductibility of state and local taxes, as unfunded mandates. The
Sixteenth Amendment gave the federal government authority to tax
income regardless of the impact on individual states or on states at
large.' °9 As such, Congress never had any obligation to provide for
tax-exempt bonds or the deductibility of state and local taxes.
Instead, as a matter of policy, Congress elected to adopt tax provisions
to subsidize state and local revenue generation. Withdrawal of such
favors, while undoubtedly affecting state and local revenues, consti-
tutes the reduction or elimination of federal subsidies rather than the
imposition of federal mandates."0
It is more debatable whether the national government impairs
state and local finances through preemption of revenue sources.
Although a preemptive tax prevents lower levels of government from
taxing that same revenue source, the state or city is free to impose
new or increased taxes on other sources with no resulting revenue
loss."' Even if a real fiscal impact does result, however, the assertion
of valid taxing authority to raise revenues for national use cannot be
defined as a mandate any more than other forms of federal preemp-
107. The use of TEBs was curtailed during the mid-1980s. Rymarowicz and Zimmerman,
Federal Budget and Tax Policy at 21-22 (cited in note 29). This trend, however, reversed in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. Tax-exempt Financing at 11 (cited in note 102). Part of this reversal
stemmed from lower interest rates and state and local desire to retire high-interest bonds early
in order to replace them with lower-interest instruments. Id. For a comprehensive analysis of
the change in federal laws governing TEBs, see id. at 11 app. A (outlining a chronology of federal
tax laws affecting TEBs).
108. Rymarowicz and Zimmerman, Federal Budget and Tax Policy at 22 (cited in note 29).
109. The Sixteenth Amendment provides that: "The Congress shall have power to lay and
collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the
several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." U.S. Const., Amend. XVI.
110. This is not to say that federal tax policy is irrelevant to the unfunded mandate debate.
As discussed in Part IV, a proper evaluation of the unfunded federal mandate issue requires a
comparison of the overall fiscal relationship between the federal, state, and local governments.
111. The same is not true in the context of state mandates on municipal governments, which
at times involve overall revenue caps. See Kelly, State Mandates at 16-17 (cited in note 3)
(discussing financial restrictions on many municipalities imposed by states that limit the ability
of municipalities to raise revenue).
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tion. Federal taxes do not require lower levels of government to do
anything; they merely prevent them from taxing certain revenue
sources or from taxing them fully. If a state wants to tax that particu-
lar revenue source for policy-as opposed to revenue-purposes,
federal tax preemption will have some effect on state autonomy. As
with other forms of preemption, however, defining the federal tax as a
"mandate" is disingenuous.
5. Incidental and Implied Federal Policy Impacts
Including any federal action that "imposes additional financial
burdens on states and localities"112 in the definition of unfunded man-
dates encompasses a potentially wide range of federal actions. For
example, the ACIR includes governmental costs that states and cities
incur due to the location of federal installations" as well as the effects
of federal immigration policies that create fiscal impacts on communi-
ties.1 4 In one study of federal mandate costs, Tennessee even included
lost sales tax revenues resulting from the use of federal food stamps.",5
This concept of mandates has even been expanded to include
112. Federally Induced Costs at 2 (cited in note 17).
113. Id. at 3. For example, the location of a military base might result in increased state
and local expenditures on roads, schools, and other services. This is ironic because, as shown by
the recent nationwide debate over military base closures, states fight to retain large federal
installations because they provide jobs and other economic benefits. This is just one example,
discussed further below, of how the net "costs" or "benefits" of a federal action cannot be captured
simply by identifying direct fiscal costs. Similarly, a bill recently considered by Congress and
analyzed by the CBO pursuant to UMRA, which would have required the establishment of a
temporary nuclear waste facility in Nevada, might have increased the state's emergency plan-
ning costs. CBO Experience with UMRA at 11 (cited in note 59).
114. Federally Induced Costs at 3 (cited in note 17). See also Padavan v. United States, 82
F.3d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1996) (rejecting a claim, as nonjusticiable, that the federal government must
reimburse state and local governments for costs imposed by immigration policy); Chiles v. United
States, 69 F.3d 1094, 1096-97 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, Chiles v. United States, 116 S. Ct.
1674, 1674, 134 L. Ed. 2d 777, 777 (1996) (holding there could be no judicial review of congres-
sional actions unless a "specific constitutional limit on the spending power has been exceeded").
Liberal federal immigration policies, or incomplete enforcement of immigration prohibitions,
can increase the numbers of legal and illegal immigrants in a state. When states and cities must
provide these new residents with police, fire, education, or health services, the resulting costs are
attributed to unfunded federal mandates. Because almost any federal policy can have some
impact on national population or population distribution among states, however, defining
demand-inducing federal policy decisions as mandates would be almost universally inclusive.
Ironically, states and cities often crave federal spending or other policies that will induce growth
in their regions. Implicitly, however, such impacts are favored locally only when they generate
more economic and tax benefits than the service costs they incur. Thus, even if these impacts
can be properly considered federal mandates, they raise difficult accounting and policy issues.
115. John Kincaid, The Financial Effects of Federal Mandates 9 (1994) (memorandum to
members of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, on file with author)
("Kincaid Memorandum").
UNFUNDED FEDERAL MANDATES
"[a]dministrative failures to act, including delays in regulations and
the issuance of orders... when they significantly impede the ability of
state and local governments to implement direct orders or affirmative
requirements.11116 The increased costs of some basic state and local
services, such as police protection and public education, even if not
truly voluntary, cannot be considered federally imposed mandates
because they are conducted as part of the basic responsibilities of state
and local government.
1 7
If a service is provided voluntarily, it cannot categorically be
labeled a mandate. In some cases, however, the obligation to provide
public services derives from Fourteenth Amendment principles of
equal protection, because a state or city may be precluded from dis-
criminating in its provision of benefits or services."8  A judicially
enforced constitutional requirement that services be provided to
additional persons does constitute a mandate. However, as discussed
in Part II.B, to the extent that equal service is required by the
Constitution, the mandate is imposed directly by the people, not by
the federal government. But such mandates already would be in-
cluded in the definition of direct orders. Thus, the idea of indirect
impacts complicates but adds nothing useful to the mandate defini-
tion.
6. Federal Statutory Liabilities
Finally, federal statutory liabilities sometimes are identified as
unfunded federal mandates. The most common examples are the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
116. Steinzor, 81 Minn. L. Rev. at 110-11 (cited in note 4). It is hard to see how a failure to
act can be a mandate. Moreover, regulatory delays can benefit as well as impede state and local
implementation of environmental requirements.
117. Indeed, it is federal interference with the exercise of such duties that gives rise to many
debates about federalism. A state or city could choose to eliminate such services and face the
wrath of its citizens. However, it is direct accountability to the state or local electorate, not a
federal mandate, that gives rise to such services.
Indirect impacts do flow from state and local activities that are mandated by direct order
such as the requirement that cities provide a minimum of secondary treatment for all sewage ef-
fluent, the demand for which will increase due to growth-inducing or population-enlarging
federal actions. However, provision of such services constitutes a direct order mandate whether
or not demand is increased due to independent federal policies.
118. See, for example, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969), overruled in part by
Edelman v. Jordan, 45 U.S. 651, 651 (1974) (invalidating a one-year residency requirement for
welfare benefits on equal protection grounds).
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Act ("CERCLA")119 and citizen suits under other environmental stat-
utes.10 Federally imposed or federally defined statutory liability poses
special problems for defining mandates.
Liability for civil penalties and other noncompliance sanctions
can readily be dismissed as an independent category of mandates.
Citizen suits under federal environmental laws, for example, allow
citizens to sue governmental as well as private parties for noncompli-
ance with federal statutory and regulatory requirements. 121 The
" liability" provisions of these statutes are really civil sanctions avail-
able to remedy noncompliance with underlying regulatory require-
ments; the compliance costs themselves were dictated by direct order
mandates. To the extent that a state or city incurs additional costs in
the form of civil penalties necessary to remedy noncompliance, those
costs should not be viewed as federal mandates, as they could have
been avoided through compliance with the statute and regulations.
As a separate category, then, liability mandates should be
limited to statutory requirements to compensate a third party, includ-
ing the federal government, for costs or damages incurred as a result
of the defendant's conduct. Such compensation liability is distin-
guishable from direct order mandates in many ways. Direct order
mandates require parties to engage in affirmative conduct and thereby
to incur implementation costs which they would otherwise avoid. The
primary purpose of the mandate is to promote a public good or to
prevent a public or private harm, with the effect of imposing compli-
ance costs on the recipient of the mandate. A liability requirement, on
the other hand, typically requires Party A to compensate Party B for
some affirmative act already conducted by A or for some legal duty
avoided or neglected by A. While courts and legislatures often con-
sider related public policy issues in deciding the degree to which such
liability is imposed, the primary purpose of liability is to compensate
B for the harm caused by A's act or omission.
Nevertheless, statutory liability schemes appear to meet the
twin criteria of authority to issue and legal duty to comply that are the
marks of a mandate. While the duty involved is to compensate a third
119. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et
seq. (1994). Superfund liability was also included in the cost surveys conducted for the U.S.
Conference of Mayors and the National Association of Counties. See Price Waterhouse City
Report at B-1 (cited in note 42) (discussing the effect of Superfund liability on municipal govern-
ments).
120. See Federally Induced Costs at 25 (cited in note 17) (including citizen suits as unfunded
mandates).
121. See, for example, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994) (outlining citizen suit procedures under the
Clean Water Act). Under these provisions, citizens may sue federal, state, or local governments.
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party, rather than to spend money to conduct a specified activity, the
obligation is compulsory rather than voluntary and is subject to legal
sanctions for noncompliance. Therefore, they properly qualify as
mandates.122
7. Conclusion
Of the six categories of federal action proffered by the ACIR,
only direct orders and compensation liability are properly defined as
mandates. Grant conditions are accepted voluntarily, not mandated.
Preemption and elements of tax policy constitute the exercise of fed-
eral authority, not mandated exercises of state or local power.
Indirect impacts either involve activities undertaken voluntarily by
states and cities or result from actions that already would be defined
as direct order mandates.
B. What is a Federal Mandate?
For the two categories of action properly defined as mandates,
the next issue is whether those requirements are "federar' for pur-
poses of the unfunded federal mandate debate. Some dictates do not
meet this criterion. Thus no legitimate issues of federalism are raised.
1. Constitutional Mandates
First, state and local governments include constitutional man-
dates among their complaints. 123  Because the Constitution was
adopted directly by the people and not by the states or the federal
government, 124 constitutional requirements are not "imposed by" the
122. As with direct orders, meeting the definition of mandate does not necessarily mean
that statutory liability schemes are illegitimate or require federal compensation. These policy is-
sues will be explored in Part VI.
123. For example, the ACIR cited judicially-imposed conditions designed to enforce consti-
tutional requirements, such as school desegregation and minimum standards for state prisons
and mental institutions, as unfunded federal mandates. Federally Induced Costs at 24 (cited in
note 17).
124. Shapiro, Federalism at 14-17 (cited in note 1). This is a corollary of the fact that all
political authority in the United States ultimately is derived from the people, rather than either
the federal or state governments. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1863, 131
L. Ed. 2d 881, 911 (1995) (observing that "the Framers, in perhaps their most important contri-
bution, conceived of a Federal Government directly responsible to the people, possessed of direct
power over the people, and chosen directly, not by States, but by the people"). See Amar, 96 Yale
L. J. at 1427, 1441 (cited in note 2) (noting that "true sovereignty" lies in the people of the United
States); Anastaplo, The Amendments to the Constitution at 10, 100 (cited in note 16) (observing
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federal government. To the extent that the Constitution imposes
"responsibilities, procedures, or activities,"15 they were mandated by
the people, not by the federal government which was itself created by
the same collective act of constitutional adoption.
12
However, because constitutional dictates are stated in basic if
not vague terms and are subject to judicial interpretation and some-
times legislative implementation,127 the "source" of a particular man-
date is open to debate. While the legal authority of Congress and
federal judges to implement and enforce constitutional rights no
longer is open to serious debate,"2 requirements that go beyond the
text of the Constitution itself are arguably, at least in part, definable
as mandates imposed by Congress and the courts. 29 This poses diffi-
cult questions in light of the basic argument that mandates are pre-
sumptively invalid, invalid absent funding, or bad policy. On the one
hand, why should the national public pay a state or local government
to obey the requirements of the Constitution, and why should
Congress and the courts not have adequate authority to ensure com-
pliance with these most basic national requirements?3 ° On the other
hand, is there a point beyond which such mandates, whether imposed
by Congress or by federal judges, lose legal sanction or demand federal
funding for compliance? If so, should this stretching point be based on
the magnitude of implementation costs as suggested by the unfunded
that the Constitution, unlike the Articles of Confederation, identifies the power of the federal
government as coming from the people of the United States, not the states). Constitutional
amendments, in turn, are adopted either directly by the people in Convention or by the state
legislatures. U.S. Const., Art. V.
125. Federally Induced Costs at 2 (cited in note 17).
126. Similarly, except when "making" common law, which is relatively inapplicable in the
unfunded mandates context, judges are not independent sources of mandates. Rather, federal
judges typically interpret, implement, and enforce underlying constitutional requirements.
To the extent that judges implement and enforce federal statutes other than those that
implement and enforce constitutional duties, the source of the mandate remains "federal,"
whether judicial, legislative, or both.
127. The greatest example of congressional authority is contained in the Civil War
amendments. See, for example, U.S. Const., Amend. XIII, § 2 (providing that Congress may
enforce the Thirteenth Amendment by enacting "appropriate legislation"); U.S. Const., Amend.
XIV, § 5 (providing that Congress may enforce the Fourteenth Amendment by "appropriate
legislation"); U.S. Const., Amend. XV, § 2 (stating that Congress may enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment by "appropriate legislation").
128. See notes 306-07 and accompanying text.
129. This is not to say that such requirements necessarily lack legal validity or require
federal funding. It merely indicates that such requirements may qualify as federal mandates,
the legality and wisdom of which will be assessed in Parts V and VI.
130. See Ray D. Whitman and Roger H. Bezdek, Federal Reimbursement for Mandates on
State and Local Governments, Pub. Budgeting & Finance 47, 55 (Spring 1989) (arguing that state
and local compliance with constitutional obligations should not require reimbursement).
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federal mandate debate or on the degree to which the mandate strays
substantively beyond the constitutional text?
Furthermore, because the federal government is one of enu-
merated powers, 13 1 all federal legislation must be derived from some
source of constitutional authority. As a result, every law Congress
passes could in one sense be classified as an act necessary to imple-
ment and enforce a constitutional dictate. But Congress's authority
under the Commerce Clause 132 and the Necessary and Proper Clause 33
is so broad 34 that this argument would encompass virtually the full
range of federal legislation. At the other extreme, Section 2 of the
Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment give Congress express legislative implement-
ing authority, conferring special status on actions taken under those
authorities.
Thus, some dividing line is needed between constitutional
mandates imposed on states and cities by the people through ratifica-
tion of the Constitution or a constitutional amendment and extracon-
stitutional requirements imposed by Congress-hence federal man-
dates-through the exercise of discretionary power.'3 5  The former
should include constitutional provisions that directly define duties and
responsibilities of states and their subdivisions, whether via affirma-
tive mandate or by prohibition, 36 and provisions that guarantee indi-
131. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626, 633 (1995); Shapiro,
Federalism at 58 (cited in note 1).
132. "The Congress shall have Power... [to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
133. "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
134. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 112 (1941) (holding that Congress's power to
regulate commerce extends to regulation of all goods within the "stream of commerce").
135. Of course, because the people elect senators and representatives, one could justify
legislative mandates as an exercise of the people's direct control over government. See
Anastaplo, The Amendments to the Constitution at 100 (cited in note 16) (arguing that citizens of
the United States "may determine the powers and limitations upon the States, no matter what
the people of any particular state may prefer"). This argument proves too much, however, as it
would exclude from the mandate definition any law passed by Congress.
136. Examples would include U.S. Const., Art. I, § 4 (requiring states to prescribe the time,
place, and manner of congressional elections, although subject to congressional regulation); U.S.
Const., Art. I, § 10 (prohibiting states from entering treaties or alliances; granting letters of
marque and reprisal; coining or printing money; passing bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, or
laws impairing contracts; granting titles of nobility; laying imposts or duties; etc.); U.S. Const.,
Art. IV § 1 (requiring states to give "Full Faith and Credit" to acts, proceedings, and judicial
decisions of other states); U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 2 (granting to citizens of each state all privileges
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vidual rights against governmental power. The latter should include
legislation which is passed as a legitimate exercise of congressional
authority under Article I, section 8, but that goes beyond directly
defined constitutional rights and responsibilities.
2. Compensation Liability Mandates
The second category of mandates that may or may not be de-
fined as "federal" are compensation liability mandates. 13 7 To the ex-
tent that Congress imposes entirely new or significantly expanded
principles or levels of compensation liability applicable to states and
cities, the requirement can be defined as a federal mandate. In many
cases, however, Congress merely codifies liability requirements other-
wise dictated by common law. 138 Thus, it is difficult to extend the
notion of federal mandates to those statutes where liability already
existed.
A similar problem is raised by federal mandates that parallel
state or local requirements. If a federal statute imposes entirely new
requirements beyond those existing in any smaller jurisdiction, they
should be defined as federal mandates. In many cases, however, fed-
eral law is patterned after similar, but not necessarily consistent,
state laws. 3 9 In others, federal law addresses problems already coV-
and immunities available in other states); and U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2 (recognizing the suprem-
acy of federal law).
137. The ACIR limits its definition to federal statutory liability mandates. It may be even
more difficult to define the source of liability imposed by federal judges. This issue, for example,
may turn on whether a federal judge in a diversity case applies state common law or federal
common law. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that except in
"matters governed by the Constitution or by Acts of Congress," courts should apply state sub-
stantive law); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 365-68 (1943) (recognizing that
federal common law applied in a dispute relating to commercial paper issued by the federal
government).
138. CERCLA, for example, the most frequently cited example of an unfunded statutory
mandate, see note 119 and accompanying text, does not establish entirely new principles of
liability for the release of hazardous substances. Rather, under CERCLA, federal judges apply
common law principles of strict, joint, and several liability, although the magnitude of liability
under the statute undoubtedly is greater than at common law. See O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d
176, 178-79 (1st Cir. 1989) (applying the Restatement (Second) of Torts). While Congress, in
enacting CERCLA, intended federal judges to establish a uniform approach to existing principles
of liability, id., similar or identical liability may have resulted under the common law. See New
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1049, 1051 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding liability alterna-
tively under CERCLA and under common law nuisance). This raises serious problems in
defining the extent to which the liability imposed by the statute is federal, codification of existing
common law, or a combination of the two.
139. The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat.
445 (1977), codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201 et seq. (1994), for example, was patterned
after similar preexisting requirements in Pennsylvania and other states. John C. Dernbach,
Pennsylvania's Implementation of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act: An
1170
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ered by state laws, but in different ways. 140 Sometimes state law is
stricter than federal law and therefore is the real source of mandates
on local government.14 ' Thus, defining requirements as federal, state,
or mixed mandates may be extremely difficult.
C. What is an Unfunded Federal Mandate?
The debate over unfunded federal mandates focuses on the
absence of federal funding to comply with federal mandates. Defining
the degree to which a mandate is "unfunded," however, is surprisingly
difficult and plagues researchers who attempt to calculate the "costs"
of state and federal mandates.142
First, while federal mandates are identified categorically as
"unfunded," the degree of funding attached to federal programs can
range from none to full funding to overfunding such as when the costs
of compliance with the condition are smaller than the aid itself.'4'
Assessment of How "Cooperative Federalism" Can Make State Regulatory Programs More
Effective, 19 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 903, 906 (1986).
140. For example, state laws may require cities to treat their sewage, but different or incre-
mental requirements are imposed by the federal Clean Water Act. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq.
(1994) (discussing these requirements).
141. For example, Columbus, Ohio's mandate cost study, discussed in note 41, attributed
solid waste disposal costs to federal mandates, but the ACIR found that the state appears to be
the major source of the mandate because state solid waste requirements are stricter than
minimum federal standards. Kincaid Memorandum at 5 (cited in note 115).
142. See Reischauer Testimony at 1-3 (cited in note 54) (describing CBO's problems in
implementing the State and Local Government Cost Estimating Act of 1981); Kim Cawley and
Teri Gullo, Congressional Budget Office, Comments on Draft Report on ACIR Federal Mandates
Financial Task Force 1-2 (1994) (memorandum to Phillip Dearborn, on file with author) ("CBO
Memorandum") (commenting on the draft report of the ACIR regarding cost estimating proce-
dures); Kincaid Memorandum at 1-9 (cited in note 115) (discussing recent studies of mandate
costs and listing issues concerning the methodology and results of these studies); Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works, Analysis of the Unfunded Mandates Surveys
Conducted by the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the National Association of Counties 8-18 (1994)
(staff report to members of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works) ("Senate
EPW Report") (critiquing the Price Waterhouse studies); Kelly, Estimating Mandate Costs at 35-
42 (cited in note 62) (providing a detailed evaluation of cost estimating methods and problems);
Federal Mandate Relief at 39-43 (cited in note 34) (analyzing the difficulties of estimating
compliance costs); Steinzor, 81 Minn. L. Rev. at 108-09 (cited in note 4) (discussing when a
mandate is considered "unfunded").
143. See, for example, Zelinsky, 46 Vand. L. Rev. at 1366 (cited in note 4) (noting that a
"mandate is unfunded if the higher level of government fails to reimburse fully the lower level for
the costs imposed on it") (emphasis added). For example, Clean Water Act requirements are
identified as one of the largest sources of unfunded federal mandates. Price Waterhouse City
Report at 4 (cited in note 42). Yet, federal sewage treatment mandates have ranged, depending
on the community and the years in which the project was built, from unfunded to almost entirely
funded. Because states were given package grants to finance needed sewage treatment im-
provements in their states, 33 U.S.C. § 1285 (1994), with discretion to decide which communities
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Thus, a mandate cannot simply be defined as "unfunded" without a
careful analysis of the degree of funding provided to a particular
mandate recipient or to the category of recipients collectively.
Moreover, the federal government provides fiscal assistance to
states and cities in ways other than funding for individual mandates.
The fiscal impact of unfunded mandates can be evaluated at the level
of single regulatory or statutory provisions, entire statutes and regu-
latory programs, related statutes or programs, or the full fiscal rela-
tionship between the federal government and the mandate recipient.
The results depend on the breadth of the analysis. Individual man-
dates may be separately funded. However, compliance may also be
funded through a broader grant covering compliance with the whole
statute,'4 through grants for related programs or other aspects of the
same program, or through other sources of federal funding,45 includ-
were eligible for grants, id. § 1284(a)(3) (providing that grants issued by the Environmental
Protection Agency can only be provided to projects listed on a state priority list), historically
some communities received federal funding to comply with the treatment mandate, while others
did not. Depending on the year in which a grant was issued, the percentage of federal funding
varied from 55% to 85%. Id. § 1282(a). Currently, municipal sewage financing is subsidized
through federally capitalized state revolving loan funds. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. (1994). The
revolving loan fund program was added in 1987 in an effort to defederalize sewage treatment fi-
nancing. Robert W. Adler, Jessica C. Landman, and Diane M. Cameron, The Clean Water Act:
Twenty Years Later 14, 112 (Island, 1993) (stating that "the federal government invested $56
billion in municipal sewage treatment from 1972 to 1989').
144. Returning to the Clean Water Act example, specific obligations of state agencies may
not be funded separately, but states are eligible to receive a number of programmatic grants to
implement the Act. See, for example, 33 U.S.C. § 1255 (1994) (providing research and develop-
ment grants to participating states); id. § 1256 (creating pollution control program grants); id. §
1285(g) (providing for management assistance grants); id. § 1285G) (creating a water quality
management grant program); id. § 1329(h) (providing nonpoint source pollution program grants);
id. § 1329(i) (providing groundwater protection grants); id. § 1381 (creating state revolving loan
program grants). In addition, the Act provides for a number of more specific regional or subpro-
grammatic grant programs for which individual states may be eligible. See id. § 1257 (providing
for mine pollution demonstration grants); § 1257a (abandoned mine demonstration grants); id.
§§ 1258, 1268 (creating a grant program for the Great Lakes area); id. § 1263 (creating'a grant
program for native villages in Alaska); id. § 1266 (providing for a demonstration project involving
the Hudson River); id. § 1267 (creating a grant program to improve pollution levels in the
Chesapeake Bay); id. § 1269 (creating a pollution prevention program for the Long Island Sound);
id. § 1270 (establishing a comprehensive pollution prevention plan for Lake Champlain); id. §
1324 (establishing a grant program to prevent pollution in publicly owned lakes in all states); id.
§ 1330 (creating the National Estuary program); id. § 1345(g) (creating a grant program to
promote the safe and beneficial management or use of sewage sludge); id. § 1377(c) (creating a
grant program for the construction of sewage treatment plants by Indian Tribes). Given this
diversity of potential and sometimes fungible federal funding sources, it is difficult to determine
the extent to which a particular mandate in a particular state is funded or unfunded.
145. In the sewage treatment example, additional funding is available from sources such as
the Farmers Home Administration. Id. § 1281b. Project financing may be subsidized further
through federal loan guarantees. Id. § 1293. For water quality programs as a whole, the GAO
counted over 72 federal programs under which roughly $5 billion in federal aid is offered to
support water quality programs nationally. Much of this support is provided by agencies other
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ing block grants.14 6 Indeed, the fungibility of federal and state dollars
has been identified as one major problem with the use of block
grants.1 4 7  Even more broadly, because the federal government pro-
vides fiscal assistance to states and cities through such undesignated
means as federal tax subsidies, the use of which may be less restricted
and therefore fungible,148 it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine
precisely whether any particular federal mandate is funded.
Second, the full costs of mandates should not be attributed to
the mandating government when the underlying activity may have
been required or conducted anyway, but in a possibly different way
with possibly different costs. An appropriate measure of unfunded
mandates would count only incremental costs imposed on a jurisdic-
tion by the higher level of government.14 9  However, often it can be
extremely difficult to identify which costs would be incurred in the
absence of intergovernmental regulation. 150
than the EPA and under statues other than the Clean Water Act. U.S. General Accounting
Office, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Water Quality: A Catalog of
Related Federal Programs 1 (U.S. G.P.O., 1996).
146. See generally Block Grants at 2-3 (cited in note 23) (discussing proposed accountability
provisions to be included in future federal block grants to states). Indeed, ironically, mandate
recipients often prefer broad block grant funding to categorical grants because it increases
flexibility in the use of available federal funds. See Shapiro, Federalism at 60 (cited in note 1)
(noting that block grants "were a local politician's dream--'free' money to be spent on whatever
legal purpose one wanted without having to tax the local voters"). It is somewhat inconsistent to
request that funding be provided in flexible block form and later to complain that individual
mandates are unfunded.
147. Shapiro, Federalism at 17 (cited in note 1).
148. See Peterson, The Price of Federalism at 132-33 (cited in note 8) (observing that funds
to states and cities may be fungible even if restricted since restricted funds free up other state
and local dollars for other purposes).
149. See Congressional Budget Office, A Preliminary Analysis of Unfunded Federal
Mandates and the Cost of the Safe Drinking Water Act 16 (U.S. G.P.O., 1994) ("CBO SDWA
Analysis") (noting that the "true cost of a federal mandate is the additional expenditures that it
requires municipalities to make"). The CBO criticized both the Environmental Protection
Agency and others whose estimated costs of compliance with the Safe Drinking Water Act
included total rather than incremental costs. Id. at 18. Obviously, most communities would
have some form of drinking water treatment absent any federal or state mandates.
150. See id. at 16 (stating that "[ulnfortunately, the data to estimate what municipalities
would have done in the absence of federal mandates do not exist"). See also id. at 26 (noting that
communities face rising drinking water costs for many reasons, including aging systems and
rising populations); Kincaid Memorandum at 5-6 (cited in note 115) (contrasting costs imposed by
states with costs imposed by federal requirements); Senate EPW Report at 4-5, 16 (cited in note
142) (criticizing the Price Waterhouse survey for failing to identify costs that would be incurred
absent federal mandates); Kelly, Estimating Mandate Costs at 5 (cited in note 62) (observing that
it is difficult to sort out federal and state roles in costs imposed on local governments); Kelly,
State Mandates at 67 (cited in note 3) (stating that total cost figures overestimate mandate costs,
but marginal cost estimates are imprecise); Towns Report at 9 app. I (cited in note 44) (noting
that some estimates combine costs of federal and state requirements); Reischauer Testimony at
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Third, calculation of the degree to which existing and proposed
mandates are unfunded' 51 raises a series of detailed definitional and
accounting issues which combine to make estimates of mandate costs
uncertain and highly variable. 5 2 For example, one must decide
whether to include only direct implementation costs or indirect and
structural costs as well;15 whether and how to deduct cost savings or
revenue gains; 54 how to account for benefits that are difficult to put in
20 (cited in note 54) (stating that "even for existing costs, there is often no clear and consistent
basis for identifying how much of a locality's spending is the result of a specific federal mandate
rather than a cost it would have incurred in any event').
An early survey by Lovell and Tobin found that less than half of all federal and state man-
dates introduced entirely new activities to the jurisdiction, meaning that the rest were imple-
mented at least in part before adoption of the mandate. Lovell and Tobin, 41 Pub. Admin. Rev.
at 322-23 (cited in note 11). Moreover, the study found that more than half of all mandates
would be continued even after the mandate was withdrawn, because the "values behind some of
the mandates apparently have become internalized and organization structures, support
systems, and budget lines have been developed around the mandated activities." Id.
151. These methodological problems, already perplexing in estimating existing mandate
costs, are exacerbated when state and federal fiscal analysts are asked to predict the costs of
proposed mandates to inform the legislature before it decides whether to act. A proposed bill
usually changes throughout the legislative process, resulting in a moving target for cost estima-
tors. Fix and Kenyon, Introduction, in Fix and Kenyon, eds., Coping with Mandates at 17 (cited
in note 11); Federal Mandate Relief at 41 (cited in note 34) (discussing the need for cost esti-
mates at various legislative stages); Federally Induced Costs at 8 (cited in note 17). Moreover,
legislation is often stated in vague terms, with ultimate implementation costs depending on
detailed agency regulations and other actions. Reischauer Testimony at 5, 7 (cited in note 54)
(describing the uncertainty surrounding "estimates or educated guesses" and noting that
estimations are difficult when the implementation of legislative programs is left to administra-
tive discretion); Fix and Kenyon, Introduction, in Fix and Kenyon, eds., Coping with Mandates at
17 (cited in note 11).
152. These issues are explored in more detail in Part IV.
153. Direct costs would include new capital or operating costs and new or incremental
personnel costs. Indirect costs might include lost revenues, such as Tennessee's claim that the
use of federal food stamps resulted in lost sales tax income, see Kincaid Memorandum at 9 (cited
in note 115) (discussing this claim), job losses, or structural changes such as the creation of new
governmental institutions to implement new programs. See U.S. Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations Federal Mandates Financial Task Force, Study Guide 2-3 (1994)
(provided to Task Force members, on file with author) ("Study Guide") (defining several catego-
ries of costs that could be included in an analysis of unfunded federal mandates); Reischauer
Testimony at 2 (cited in note 54) (observing that the CBO does not address secondary effects such
as job losses); Kelly, Estimating Mandate Costs at 27 (cited in note 62) (distinguishing between
marginal costs, 'opportunity costs (revenue losses), total costs, and cumulative costs); Federal
Mandate Relief at 40 (cited in note 34) (noting the difficulty of estimating indirect effects).
154. For example, a new health care prevention program might create implementation costs
that are offset by remedial health care savings. Funding spent on new or improved local infra-
structure might stimulate economic development or enhance property values, and therefore
increase state and local revenues. See Study Guide at 3 (cited in note 153) (stating that it would
be "reasonable" to offset cost savings against mandate costs); Federal Mandate Relief at 40 (cited
in note 34) (stating that identified savings should be subtracted from the costs of mandates);
Federally Induced Costs at 8 (cited in note 17) (proposing that the public and private benefits of
federal requirements could be used to offset the costs imposed by these requirements). The CBO
had difficulty aggregating costs and savings in the first year of UMRA. CBO Experience with
UMRA at 12 (cited in note 59).
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monetary terms;155 how to set the time period for which mandate costs
are determined, the assumed interest rate for financing, and the dis-
count rate for calculating present value;156 and how to address large
differences in costs between jurisdictions.
157
Thus, it is extremely difficult to calculate the extent to which a
federal mandate is "unfunded," partially funded, fully funded, or over-
funded. Even assuming that it is possible to estimate fairly and accu-
rately the degree to which individual federal mandates are unfunded,
this calculus may belie the overall fiscal relationship between the
federal, state, and local governments. This relationship is defined not
only by individual mandates and mandate-specific grants, but by
broader program grants, block grants, and general fiscal assistance
via loans, loan guarantees, tax-exempt bonds, and other elements of
federal tax policy.
D. Conclusion
Because it is extremely difficult to construct a precise, consis-
tent definition of the phrase "unfunded federal mandates" or even any
of its component words, the concept has dubious utility as a tool to
resolve important issues of federalism. Even if these terms can be
defined with sufficient precision to be useful, the number of federal
actions that legitimately should be considered unfunded federal man-
dates is considerably smaller than many suggest. Finally, as explored
in more detail in Part IV, the fiscal impacts of individual mandates,
even if amenable to precise determination, cannot be assessed in isola-
tion from overall intergovernmental relationships.
155. Examples include enhanced environmental quality or increased quality of life due to
health care improvements. See Federal Mandate Relief at 40 (cited in note 34) (stating that it is
not feasible to net out benefits); Federally Induced Costs at 7-8 (cited in note 17) (noting that
present cost estimates are inadequate because they often do not take into account offsetting
benefits and cost-recovery mechanisms); Whitman and Bezdek, Pub. Budgeting & Finance at 52
(cited in note 130) (observing that it is very difficult to estimate spillover costs, i.e., benefits
avoided by the mandates); CBO Memorandum at 4 (cited in note 142) (stating that estimating
costs but not benefits "misses the point" and provides "a very skewed view of the impact of the
federal actions on state and local governments").
156. See CBO SDWA Analysis at 19 n.20 (cited in note 149) (discussing the effect of choos-
ing different interest rates); Federal Mandate Relief at 40-41 (cited in note 34) (discussing the
choice of time periods and the need to address financing and amortization costs).
157. Reischauer Testimony at 6 (cited in note 54) (noting as an example that the costs of
handicapped voter access requirements range from zero to large amounts depending on the
locale); Federal Mandate Relief at 3 (cited in note 34) (concluding that information on differential
effects is not readily available); CBO Memorandum at 4 (cited in note 142) (finding that it is
almost never possible for the CBO to provide city-specific costs).
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IV. FISCAL OPPOSITION TO UNFUNDED FEDERAL MANDATES
Many commentators agree that the goals of individual federal
mandates are laudable and independently justifiable. 158 However, the
same sources claim that the cumulative impact of mandates, coupled
with declines in federal funding, impose a substantial and unjustified
fiscal burden on state and local governments. 159 A key problem is
whether such impacts can be measured accurately, and if so, what the
results mean.
A. Existing Mandate Impact Estimates
1. Qualitative Impact Studies
Some studies try to assess the burden of unfunded federal
mandates by counting the increase in the raw number of federal man-
dates passed in recent years. The ACIR concluded that efforts by the
Reagan Administration to curtail federal regulation of states and
cities failed because the number of federal regulatory statutes passed
during the 1980s actually rose when compared with earlier decades. 160
While such statistics do prove that the federal government increas-
ingly has regulated states and cities, they do little to estimate the fis-
cal impact of federal regulations on states and cities.
158. See, for example, Michael Fix, Observations on Mandating, in Michael Fix and Daphne
A. Kenyon, eds., Coping with Mandates, What are the Alternatives? 35 (The Urban Institute,
1990) (noting that without mandates, less progress would have been made on important national
goals); Federal Mandate Relief at 4 (cited in note 34) (arguing that while federal mandates have
provided several "important benefits to the nation," they have become too burdensome and
expensive); Kelly, State Mandates at 4 (cited in note 3) (observing that mandates are justified if
the activity mandated can be shown to serve the interests of a state and if the cost of the activity
mandated can be shared equitably); Federally Induced Costs at 3 (cited in note 17) (stating that
"[flew citizens disagree" with the policy objectives behind many mandate programs).
159. Kelly, Estimating Mandate Costs at 11 (cited in note 62); Kelly, State Mandates, at 1-2
(cited in note 3); Towns Report at 8 app. I (cited in note 44). The degree of impacts is "the heart
of the issue. If the impact is negligible, it is not worth a lot of political attention and energy. If it
is a fifth or more of a state or local government budget, it is a serious challenge to federalism"
Federally Induced Costs at 7 (cited in note 17).
160. Federal Regulation at iii, 1-3, 46 (cited in note 11) (quantifying the growth in the raw
number of federal regulatory statutes from 1931-1990). This report also found qualitatively that
the newer federal regulatory statutes employed more coercive techniques than in the past. Id. at
3, 47 (characterizing the composition of federal regulatory statutes by method). Other ACIR
reports present similar statistics. See, for example, Federal Mandate Relief at 4 (cited in note




The number of mandates "counted" in some studies varies
depending on how researchers defined "mandate."'161 Largely subjec-
tive or semantic judgments are involved in identifying how many
mandates are included in a single statute or regulation.162 In addition,
the number of mandates enacted is a poor indicator of fiscal impact.
One mandate may require expensive new nationwide requirements,
while ten others may impose only small incremental costs to a few
jurisdictions. One mandate may impose new costs, while another may
simply codify the existing practices of most jurisdictions. One man-
date may be unfunded, while another may be accompanied by partial
or full funding. Thus, studies that simply count the number of federal
mandates do not gauge the cumulative fiscal impact of federal man-
dates.
2. Quantitative Fiscal Impact Studies
State and local officials complain that the federal government
should, but does not, calculate the incremental and cumulative costs
imposed by federal mandates. 163 Some predictive estimates are pro-
vided by the fiscal notes prepared by the CBO, first under the State
and Local Government Cost Estimate Act of 1981164 and now under the
UMRA of 1995.165 However, the CBO estimates are prepared when a
bill is introduced, and real compliance costs vary depending on imple-
mentation methods and differences among jurisdictions. 166 As a result,
estimates of the total costs imposed by unfunded federal mandates
vary dramatically.167 Moreover, cost estimates can be dominated by
single programs. 168
161. For example, the National Conference of State Legislators ("NCSL") identified a much
larger number of federal mandates than the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations by using a more inclusive definition of mandate. Federally Induced Costs at 1 (cited in
note 17).
162. See note 25 and accompanying text.
163. See, for example, Federally Induced Costs at 7 (cited in note 17) (discussing the debate
surrounding incremental costs imposed by unfunded federal mandates); Federal Regulation at
iii, 4 (cited in note 11) (concluding that the "cumulative financial costs" of unfunded federal
mandates have not been accurately measured).
164. See note 32 and accompanying text.
165. See Part II.B.
166. Id. See Reischauer Testimony at 3-8 (cited in note 54) (observing that CBO cost
estimates are subject to considerable uncertainties); CBO Memorandum at 1-6 (cited in note 142).
(indicating the views of CBO officials that CBO cost estimates are difficult and uncertain). See
also Part IV.
167. Tryens, Unfunded Mandates at 16 (cited in note 12) (listing varying estimates of the to-
tal costs imposed by unfunded mandates ranging from $8.9 to 12.7 billion using CBO figures to
V
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A large number of studies have attempted to identify the actual
costs of state and local compliance with federal mandates. 169 Some
address only certain types of federal programs. Others cover all
federal mandates within one jurisdiction. Only two purport to be
nationwide in scope.
In 1979 the Urban Institute conducted the first limited analy-
sis of mandate costs. 170 Based on a survey of local officials and finan-
cial records, the study measured the incremental costs of complying
with six regulatory programs 171 compared with expenditures before the
federal requirements were imposed172 in six municipalities and one
county around the country. 73 Average incremental costs' 74 were esti-
mated at twenty-five dollars per capita, with a low of six dollars in
Burlington, Vermont, to a high of over fifty-one dollars per person in
Newark, New Jersey. 75 Whether this level of costs is burdensome
relative to the benefits received' 76 is somewhat subjective, and the
study did not evaluate the full extent to which requirements were
an estimate of $100 billion per year by the Cato Institute); Federally Induced Costs at 7 (cited in
note 17).
168. For example, increased Social Security payments accounted for over half of the post-
1983 costs identified by the CBO. Federal Regulation at 65 (cited in note 11).
169. For the most complete list of such studies, see Janet M. Kelly, A Comprehensive Guide
to Studies on State and Federal Mandates to Localities 1 (National League of Cities, 1994) (listing
studies attempting to identify the actual cost of compliance).
170. The results of the study are described by one of its authors in Fix, Observations, in Fix
and Kenyon, eds., Coping with Mandates at 35-38 (cited in note 158) (citing Thomas Muller,
Michael Fix, and Daphne A. Kenyon, The Impact of Selected Federal Actions on Municipal
Outlays, in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Special Study on Economic Change, Vol.
5, Government Regulation: Achieving Social and Economic Balance 368 (U.S. G.P.O., 1980)).
171. The study addressed requirements of the Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat.
816 (1972), codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (1994); the Unemployment
Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-566, 90 Stat. 2667 (1976), codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§
850 et seq. (1994); the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142,
89 Stat. 774 (1975), codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. (1994); transit accessibility
requirements; and the minimum wage requirements of the Davis-Bacon Act, ch. 411, 46 Stat.
1494 (1931), codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. § 276a (1994). These programs were cited by
municipal officials as particularly costly. Fix, Observations, in Fix and Kenyon, eds., Coping with
Mandates at 35 (cited in note 158).
172. The baseline for incremental costs was calculated based on the existing level of service
deemed appropriate in each jurisdiction. Thus, City A and City B could have equal total compli-
ance costs but very different incremental costs. Fix, Observations, in Fix and Kenyon, eds.,
Coping with Mandates at 35 (cited in note 158).
173. The cities studied, chosen for geographic diversity and differences in per-capita income
and tax burdens, were: Burlington, Vermont; Alexandria, Virginia; Cincinnati, Ohio; Dallas,
Texas; Seattle, Washington; and Newark, New Jersey. The urban county studied was Fairfax
County, Virginia. Id.
174. Incremental costs of compliance with specific programs varied dramatically based on
the level of existing services, demographic conditions, and other factors. Id.
175. Id. at 35-36.




funded through federal grants, loans, and other sources. 7 7 However,
at least one later review judged these costs to be "substantial.'' 178
A study by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") in
1988 estimated the total municipal costs of compliance with twenty-
two of the most significant federal environmental requirements based
on a sample of 270 local governments. 179 According to this study, total
capital compliance costs for all U.S. cities' 8° exceeded $22 billion, with
estimated annual operating costs of almost $2.8 billion.181 The EPA's
survey provided some objective indicia of the burden imposed by these
requirements. For example, about 15% of all jurisdictions, all with
populations below 2,500, were expected to double environmental
service fees to comply with the federal laws; another 29% were ex-
pected to increase fees by 50% to 100%; and many jurisdictions were
expected to find it difficult to finance the requirements through bonds
or loans. 8 2 As with the Urban Institute Study, however, the EPA
study made no effort to quantify fiscal or other economic benefits of
compliance.
Impelled by the desire to identify and publicize the full costs of
compliance with unfunded mandates and by the absence of estimates
from other sources, many states and cities conducted their own cost
surveys during the late 1980s and early 1990s.183 Some of these stud-
ies identified significant costs, which in turn were used to great politi-
cal effect during the public debate that preceded passage of the
UMRA. In perhaps the most publicized of the surveys, the city of
Columbus, Ohio, estimated that its cost of compliance with federal
environmental mandates would exceed one billion dollars in ten
years.&I Other studies produced similarly dramatic figures. For
177. The study noted that the costs incurred were "roughly comparable" to the average fed-
eral revenue-sharing given to these cities in 1978. Id. at 36. However, the study does not appear
to have accounted, for example, for federal sewage treatment grants to subsidize local Clean
Water Act compliance.
178. Federal Regulation at 60 (cited in note 11). Total capital and operating costs for the six
cities was $61.6 million. Id. at 60 tbl. 5-2.
179. Id. at 60-61 (citing Jasbinder Singh, -et al., Municipal Sector Study: Impacts of
Environmental Regulations on Municipalities iii (United States Environmental Protection
Agency, 1988) (prepared for the Sector Study Steering Committee of the EPA)).
180. Although 270 jurisdictions were used in the survey, nationwide costs were estimated by
extrapolation. Id.
181. Both figures are presented in 1986 dollars. Id. at 61 tbl. 5-3.
182. Id. at 61.
183. Kelly, State Mandates at 16 (cited in note 3). Some of these studies addressed un-
funded state mandates, others unfunded federal mandates, and others both. Id.
184. Columbus Study at 1 (cited in note 41).
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example, a study conducted in Anchorage, Alaska estimated the costs
of compliance with federal environmental mandates at $430 million
between 1991 and 2000.185
The only two nationwide studies of federal mandate costs were
conducted by Price Waterhouse for the U.S. Conference of Mayors 186
and the National Association of Counties. 187 These studies estimated
total compliance costs for what were perceived to be the most costly
federal mandates to the nation's cities and counties. Based on un-
audited survey responses from 314 cities, extrapolated to all U.S.
cities, the city report estimated national compliance costs of $6.5
billion for 1993 and $54 billion for the five years 1994 through 1998
for the ten federal mandates considered. 188 Price Waterhouse esti-
mated that these costs comprise an average of 11.7% of locally raised
city revenues. 189 Based on unaudited survey responses from 128 coun-
ties, extrapolated to all U.S. counties, the county report estimated
national compliance costs of $4.8 billion for 1993 and $33.7 billion for
the five years 1994 through 1998, for the twelve federal mandates
considered. 190 Price Waterhouse estimated that these costs comprise
an average of 12.3% of locally raised county revenues. 9'
Taken at face value, these data present a compelling case that
federal mandates impose significant burdens on state and local gov-
ernments. Unfortunately, too many readers did take these data at
face value with little critical analysis of their credibility and with little
185. Anchorage Study at 1 (cited in note 41). See note 192 and accompanying text for criti-
cisms of the Anchorage study.
186. Price Waterhouse City Report at 1 (cited in note 42).
187. Price Waterhouse County Report at I (cited in note 42).
188. Price Waterhouse City Report at 1-2 (cited in note 42). The mandates assessed in-
cluded those relating to underground storage tanks, the Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816 (1972), codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (1994); the Clean Air Act, Pub.
L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1960), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. (1994); the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976),
codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq. (1994); the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f et seq. (1994);
asbestos abatement; lead paint abatement; the Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-
205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973), codified as amended at scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. (1994); the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990), codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (1994); and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676,
52 Stat. 1060 (1938), codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (1994). Price Waterhouse
City Report at 1 (cited in note 42). Program-specific costs are presented in Table 1, and city-
specific costs in Table 2. Id. at 2.
189. Price Waterhouse City Report at 2 (cited in note 42).
190. Price Waterhouse County Report at 1-2 (cited in note 42). The mandates assessed
included the same as those used for the cities plus requirements relating to arbitrage and
immigration laws. Id. at 1. Program-specific costs are presented in Table 1; county-specific costs
are included in Table 2. Id.
191. Id. at 2.
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understanding of their significance in terms of overall intergovern-
mental fiscal relationships.192 Analysis of these two critical issues is
presented below.
B. The Limitations of Mandate Impact Estimates
As discussed in Part III.C, accurate estimates of existing man-
date compliance costs 193 are difficult to obtain and subject to consider-
able uncertainty, even using the best available methods. 94 In addi-
tion, because many of the studies identified above have been heavily
192. The General Accounting Office, for example, prepared a report for a congressional
committee in which it made no attempt to verify the accuracy of state and local mandate data or
the validity of specific examples in which states and cities claimed that specific federal regula-
tions were unreasonable. Towns Report at 1 (cited in note 44). The ACIR continues to cite the
Price Waterhouse surveys as if they were accurate despite acknowledging serious flaws in
methodology. See Federally Induced Costs at 12-14 (cited in note 17) (discussing criticisms of the
Price Waterhouse City and County Reports but also quoting statistics from these studies). Many
legal and other scholarly articles also cite these studies with no critical evaluation of their
accuracy. See, for example, Markell, 44 Syracuse L. Rev. at 885-91 nn. 5 & 16 (cited in note 4)
(acknowledging a few of the many potential problems with existing mandate impact studies in
footnotes, but otherwise appearing to accept their validity at face value); Steinzor, 81 Minn. L.
Rev. at 103 (cited in note 4) (assuming without analysis that unfunded federal mandates raise
"legitimate problems"); Leckrone, 71 Ind. L. J. at 1035-38 (cited in note 4) (citing impact studies
without critical evaluation).
193. Some mandate cost estimates, such as the fiscal notes prepared by the CBO, are
prospective in nature and are designed to inform the legislative process as bills are considered.
The predictive nature of such estimates raises special problems given that raw legislation can be
implemented in various ways with divergent cost implications. Because the purpose of this
section is to assess the actual cumulative fiscal burdens imposed by existing federal mandates,
only those methods and studies addressing existing costs will be addressed.
194. See generally CBO SDWA Analysis at 16-20 (cited in note 149) (noting that the "true
cost of a federal mandate" is measured by the additional expenditures that it requires munici-
palities to make and that these additional costs are difficult to measure); Reischauer Testimony
at 3-8 (cited in note 54) (noting the uncertainties of mandate compliance cost estimation);
Kincaid Memorandum at 2-3 (cited in note 115) (discussing the potential issues that arise in
attempting to measure the cost of unfunded mandates); Senate EPW Report at 5-6 (cited in note
142) (discussing the difficulty of determining the costs of unfunded mandates); Kelly, Estimating
Mandate Costs at 27-30 (cited in note 62) (outlining different cost measures used in assessing
federal mandate costs); Fix and Kenyon, Introduction, in Fix and Kenyon, eds., Coping with
Mandates at 8-10 (cited in note 11) (discussing the technical difficulties of cost estimation);
Federal Mandate Relief at 7-8 (cited in note 34) (noting that accurate measures of the costs and
benefits of federal mandates do not exist); Kelly, State Mandates at 1-4 (cited in note 3)
(discussing the inadequacy of current mandate definitions); Towns Report at 3 (cited in note 44)
(observing that precise estimates of the costs of federal mandates are "difficult to sort out");
Tryens, Unfunded Mandates at 13-16 (cited in note 12) (noting that "very little effort" has been
made to obtain accurate estimates of the cost of unfunded federal mandates); Federally Induced
Costs at 7 (cited in note 17) (observing that there are no accurate estimates of the total annual
cost of unfunded mandates); Federal Regulation at 1-5 (cited in note 11) (discussing the need for
more accurate measures of federal mandate costs).
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criticized for using inappropriate-and in some cases bi-
ased-methods, they should be viewed with serious caution.
Existing mandate compliance costs are difficult to calculate for
several reasons. Costs should be attributed to a mandate only to the
extent that the mandate results in net incremental costs. Thus, actual
costs imposed by a mandate must be net of funding provided by the
mandating source. 195 Moreover, some mandate expenditures result in
direct cost savings to the jurisdiction196 and indirect economic or other
benefits as well. At least the former should be subtracted from
mandate cost estimates. 197 Further, studies should count only costs
beyond those that would be incurred absent the mandate. 19 Other
potentially significant uncertainties result from the use of different
assumptions, such as interest rates and financing costs for capital
expenditures.199
Studies seeking to assess regional or nationwide costs must
rely on survey methods because it is not feasible to collect cost data
from every affected jurisdiction. Survey data, however, pose serious
195. Senate EPW Report at 11 (cited in note 142) (noting that Price Waterhouse did not net
out federal funding). This calculation may be extremely difficult because funding for any given
program may derive from multiple sources.
196. For example, expenditures on a health prevention program may reduce overall
Medicaid or Medicare expenses. Potentially, the direct savings from a mandate may exceed
program costs.
197. Tryens, Unfunded Mandates at 5 (cited in note 12). Subtracting indirect benefits, such
as the nonquantifiable benefits of clean air, may be less justified. Part of the unfunded federal
mandate debate involves issues of autonomy, that is, who should decide whether it is good public
policy to spend more public and private funds to receive a given level of benefits. See Part VI.
198. CBO SDWA Analysis at 16 (cited in note 149) (observing that the "true cost of a federal
mandate is the additional expenditures that it requires municipalities to make"); Reischauer
Testimony at 20 (cited in note 54) (noting that the aggregate cost of a particular federal mandate
to states and localities is the most important consideration in measuring mandates); Kelly,
Estimating Mandate Costs at 27 (cited in note 62) (distinguishing between marginal or incre-
mental costs and opportunity costs (revenue losses where taxing sources are precluded), total
costs for entirely new programs, and cumulative costs); Kelly, State Mandates at 67 (cited in note
3) (stating that total costs overestimate impacts when existing resources can be used). This
presents several problems. Unless the program is entirely new, data on how much would have
been spent absent the mandate often are inadequate or nonexistent. CBO SDWA Analysis at 16
(cited in note 149) (stating that "[u]nfortunately, the data to estimate what municipalities would
have done in the absence of federal mandates do not exist"); Reischauer Testimony at 20 (cited in
note 54) (observing that "[tihere is often no clear and consistent basis for identifying how much of
a locality's spending is the result of a specific federal mandate rather than a cost it would have
incurred in any event"); Senate EPW Report at 16 (cited in note 142) (noting that many studies
do not take into account the cost of any activities that would be undertaken even if a federal
mandate did not exist). Often, it is difficult to discern which costs result from mandates imposed
by multiple levels of government. Kincaid Memorandum at 1 (cited in note 115); Senate EPW
Report at 4-6 (cited in note 142); Towns Report at 9 app. I (cited in note 44).
199. CBO SDWA Analysis at 19 n.20 (cited in note 149); Towns Report at 9 app. I (cited in
note 44).
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problems of bias and extrapolation.2°° Because compliance costs can
vary considerably, it is difficult to extrapolate results regionally or
nationally from case studies of one or a small number of jurisdic-
tions.201 Concern about bias is elevated when surveys are sent to all
jurisdictions but responses are received selectively, because those
cities which elected to respond may have characteristics that differ
from the norm.202
Unintentional bias is also injected into surveys when questions
are imprecise or subject to variable interpretation or when researchers
fail to establish clear, uniform methods for data collection and cost
estimates.20 3 More deliberate bias may occur for political reasons,
especially when respondents are told that the results will be used to
promote a particular agenda.2°4 One way to identify response bias is to
require that respondents provide supporting data along with survey
200. CBO SDWA Analysis at 26 (cited in note 149); Senate EPW Report at 12-14, 20 (cited
in note 142); Kelly, Estimating Mandate Costs at 28, 41 (cited in note 62); Kelly, State Mandates
at 27, 68 (cited in note 3).
201. Some cost differences are based on determinate variables such as size or geography
which can be addressed through sound methods of extrapolation. Others are based on less
predictable variables. For example, federal legislation requiring access for handicapped voters
imposed little or no new cost to some cities where access already existed, but significant costs to
others. Reischauer Testimony at 6 (cited in note 54). Moreover, the level of costs imposed
depends significantly on the manner in which a locality chooses to comply with the mandate.
Some locales allowed handicapped voters to change their place of registration to polling places
that were already accessible, while others assumed that ramps must be installed at all locations.
Id. Similarly, air pollution control costs can vary based on existing levels of pollution. Senate
EPW Report at 13-14 (cited in note 142); CBO SDWA Analysis at 26 (cited in note 149).
202. Senate EPW Report at 20 (cited in note 142) (listing the need to avoid self-selection
bias as one of the three basic rules of reliable surveys). Mandate survey expert Dr. Janet Kelly
noted: "When norandom sampling techniques are employed, the results are sus-
pect .... Asking localities to volunteer their cost estimates is better than nothing, but these vol-
unteers are different from those who did not volunteer, and the results are not generally
descriptive of actual mandate costs." Kelly, Estimating Mandate Costs at 35 (cited in note 62).
See also Kelly, State Mandates at 27, 68 (cited in note 3) (discussing survey techniques).
Logically, survey recipients are more likely to devote scarce time in responding if they are
adversely affected by the subject of the questions).
203. Kelly, Estimating Mandate Costs at 41 (cited in note 62); Senate EPW Report at 20
(cited in note 142).
204. CBO Director Dr. Robert Reischauer explained: "The estimates also depend largely on
information from state and local officials, who usually have a strong interest in having costs
appear as high as possible." Reischauer Testimony at 20 (cited in note 54). See Senate EPW
Report at 9 (cited in note 142) (suggesting "tremendous incentives existed for cities and counties
to inflate or exaggerate costs"). Dr. Kelly observed:
[I]n New York, when local leaders were assured confidentiality in their survey responses,
they reported that mandates were not a significant issue for them and did not impose a
fiscal burden on their localities. But since the issue of mandates was a 'hot' topic of the
day, they complained about them on the hope that the state might boost its level of state-
shared revenue.
Kelly, State Mandates at 8 (cited in note 3).
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responses and to audit or otherwise verify independently the accuracy
of the calculations and accompanying raw data.2 5
As a result of all of these uncertainties and sources of potential
bias, Dr. Kelly has noted that past mandate cost estimates, especially
those that focused on multiple mandates, produced poor, unreliable
results.2 6 To minimize bias, extrapolation, and other uncertainties,
she recommends the use of (1) stratified, nonrandom sampling meth-
ods guided by expertise to ensure a representative sampling of af-
fected jurisdictions, and (2) carefully crafted survey questions that
narrowly define programs (rather than simply identifying the law),
give a precise interpretation of the mandate, and employ a single,
detailed methodology to ensure consistent cost estimates. 207
Unfortunately, most of the studies identified above failed to
comply with many of these key indicators of reliability.208 For exam-
ple, the study of federal environmental compliance costs in Columbus,
Ohio, reported extremely high costs for solid waste disposal facilities,
but according to the ACIR, most or all of these costs resulted from
state mandates, which are stricter than those imposed by federal
law.209 A study of the costs of federal mandates in Virginia included a
number of large but discretionary programs such as Medicaid and
AFDC.210
Most pertinent to the overall debate is the credibility of the two
Price Waterhouse Reports, which provide the only nationwide esti-
mates of federal mandate impacts on cities and counties 2ll and which
were so instrumental in the passage of UMRA. These studies have
205. Senate EPW Report at 9-10, 20 (cited in note 142).
206. Kelly, Estimating Mandate Costs at 40-41 (cited in note 62). It is notable in this regard
that Dr. Kelly's three reports on mandate impacts cited in this Article, including the two cited as
criticizing random survey methodology, all were prepared for the National League of Cities. Dr.
Kelly appears to be an eminently objective researcher, and her client, if anything, would be
expected to have an incentive to uphold the credibility of existing cost impact surveys.
207. Id. at 36, 40-41. See Kelly, State Mandates at 27, 68 (cited in note 3) (discussing
several recommendations intended to decrease the risk of uncertainty in mandate cost estima-
tions). Dr. Kelly's recommendations are consistent with those of the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works staff, who cited other survey experts as recommending survey
questions designed to avoid bias and techniques to avoid self-selection bias. Senate EPW Report
at 20 (cited in note 142).
208. See Tryens, Unfunded Mandates at 18 (cited.in note 12) (identifying the inaccurate and
misleading use of information in the city of Anchorage study).
209. Kincaid Memorandum at 5 (cited in note 115). See Tryens, Unfunded Mandates at 12
(cited in note 12) (discussing the more stringent requirements of Ohio's solid and hazardous
waste laws).
210. Tryens, Unfunded Mandates at 8 (cited in note 12).
211. No similar nationwide studies have been conducted to estimate state costs of compli-
ance with federal mandates.
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been the target of pointed criticism by evaluators at the CBO,212 the
ACIR,213 the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee,214 and
the Center for Policy Alternatives.
21 5
Reviewers have found that the Price Waterhouse studies suf-
fered from a number of specific flaws. First, several factors may have
led to inflated cost estimates. Case studies were extrapolated uncriti-
cally to produce national figures.216 The cost figures provided by local
officials were not audited or otherwise verified.21 7 Most responses
provided no supporting data218 and included large, unidentified "other"
costs.219 The surveys provided no precise definitions of the mandates
nor instructions on what costs to report.2 20 The studies reported
capital expenditures incorrectly, resulting in overstated compliance
costs. 22' Finally, survey respondents were told about the overt politi-
212. According to the CBO staff, the Price Waterhouse data "suffer from many limitations
that could result in misleading conclusions." CBO SDWA Analysis at 27 (cited in note 149).
213. The ACIR has concluded that the "level of confidence that can be placed on these [Price
Waterhouse] estimates is unknown." Federally Induced Costs at 12 (cited in note 17) (noting
that survey estimates in general "are by nature preliminary and sometimes highly inaccurate").
214. Senate EPW Report at 142 (cited in note 142).
215. Perhaps the most scathing critique came from the Senate staff:
Given all its flaws, the Price Waterhouse survey is an ineffective tool for measuring the
cost of unfunded mandates. Its estimate of $11.3 billion in unfunded federal mandates
lacks credence. It overestimates the problem by billions of dollars and provides inaccu-
rate and misleading cost figures for specific federal programs. It also does not consider
the enormous benefits of federal mandates.
Senate EPW Report at 21 (cited in note 142).
216. CBO SDWA Analysis at 26, 28 (cited in note 149). For example, the studies extrapo-
lated Clean Air Act compliance costs from New York and Los Angeles, where air quality is poor
and compliance costs are therefore high, to cleaner air cities such as Honolulu. Senate EPW
Report at 13-14 (cited in note 142).
217. The researchers only tested the resulting database for potential anomalies, such as
arithmetical errors. Price Waterhouse City Report at 1-2 (cited in note 42); Price Waterhouse
County Report at 1-2 (cited in note 42).
218. Senate EPW Report at 9-10 (cited in note 142). In an effort to verify independently the
cost data in the reports, the Senate EPW staff requested copies of the raw survey results. Only
20% of the respondents interviewed could describe the specific activities identified, and only 22%
could provide documentation to justify cost estimates. Id. at 12. The Senate staff noted that the
Census Bureau in its surveys refuses to accept any unverified cost estimates. Id. at 10.
219. CBO SDWA Analysis at 27 (cited in note 149).
220. Id. at 28; Senate EPW Report at 20 (cited in note 142). As one example of the danger
created by this omission, one city reported the costs of eliminating Canada Geese to prevent
damage to a municipal golf course as a cost of complying with the Endangered Species Act, Pub.
L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973), codified as amended at scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. (1994).
Canada Geese are not listed as a threatened or endangered species, and killing them to protect
municipal property certainly would not constitute an Endangered Species Act compliance
expense. Tryens, Unfunded Mandates at 11 (cited in note 12).
221. The CBO staff properly annualized and deflated capital costs into present dollars and
indicated that this was a "particular problem" with the Price Waterhouse figures that could
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cal purposes for which the data would be used, leading to bias in favor
of overstating costs.222
Second, the survey did not measure net costs. No effort was
made to identify or subtract offsetting federal funds, either related or
unrelated to the specific programs. 223 No attempt was made to meas-
ure incremental, as opposed to total, mandate compliance costs.
Instead, the surveys assumed that no state or local funds would have
been spent in the studied areas absent the federal mandates.224 No
cost savings were considered, much less other benefits of complying
with the subject federal programs.225
In sum, because so few mandate impact studies have been
conducted and because these studies are either limited, unreliable, or
both, very little good information is available to gauge the actual
incremental costs imposed on state and local governments through
unfunded federal mandates. Those few studies conducted using ap-
propriate methodology were limited in scope, and it is difficult to
extrapolate their results nationally. The two surveys that purported
to measure nationwide compliance costs to cities and counties were
guilty of serious methodological flaws and sources of potential bias,
leaving the resulting estimates highly suspect. No similar studies
have even been attempted with respect to state compliance costs.
While the available studies provide some perspective on the fiscal
burdens imposed by unfunded federal mandates, they do not provide
an adequate basis on which to make national policy decisions.
result in "large differences in the cost of compliance for individual cities and counties." CBO
SDWA Analysis at 27 (cited in note 149).
222. Id. at 28; Senate EPW Report at 9 (cited in note 142) (noting that "tremendous incen-
tives existed for cities and counties to inflate or exaggerate costs").
223. Senate EPW Report at 11 (cited in note 142). According to the Senate staff, only 12% of
survey respondents offset costs using available federal funds. Id. at 12. See Tryens, Unfunded
Mandates at 11 (cited in note 12) (identifying sources of federal funds available to comply with
the ADA and the Brady Bill).
224. Senate EPW Report at 16 (cited in note 142); Tryens, Unfunded Mandates at 11 (cited
in note 12); CBO SDWA Analysis at 26 (cited in note 149). The CBO, for example, noted that
local drinking water costs are climbing for several reasons not related to federal mandates. CBO
SDWA Analysis at 26 (cited in note 149). Phoenix reported as a Clean Water Act requirement
the cost of building new sewer lines necessary to support new growth. Tryens, Unfunded
Mandates at 15 (cited in note 12) (stating that the Price Waterhouse study did not consider the
benefits of compliance with federal mandates).
225. See Federally Induced Costs at 26-27 (cited in note 17).
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C. Mandate Impact Estimates in Context
Even assuming that existing mandate impact studies are accu-
rate, raw cost figures provide very little perspective on the resulting
fiscal burdens imposed on state and local governments. For example,
the Price Waterhouse reports estimate that cities spent $6.5 billion
and counties spent $4.8 billion in 1993 to comply with the federal
mandates covered by those surveys.2 26 What does this mean, however,
in terms of fiscal burdens? What percentage of local budgets does this
consume? How much does it cost per household? Are those costs
justified as matters of national policy, and do the local benefits of
compliance exceed the incremental costs imposed?
Price Waterhouse attempted to provide some context by esti-
mating that its identified compliance costs represented 11.7% and
12.3% of locally generated revenues for cities and counties, respec-
tively.227 However, even these figures appear seriously overstated.
Because cities raise only about 78% of their revenues, 22s unfunded
mandates consume at most about 8% of total local revenues.
Moreover, apparently using a more inclusive definition of local reve-
nues, the ACIR calculated that the percentage was less than half
(5.5%) of what Price Waterhouse claimed.29 According to data in
another ACIR source, the compliance costs identified by Price
Waterhouse comprise just 2.5% of local own-source revenues and
about 1.7% of total local revenues.230
226. See notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
227. See notes 189, 191 and accompanying text.
228. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the
United States, Fiscal Year 1995, Analytical Perspectives 169 tbl. 11-2 (U.S. G.P.O., 1994) ("FY95
Analytical Perspectives").
229. Kincaid Memorandum at 2 (cited in note 115); Federally Induced Costs at 13 (cited in
note 17). The ACIR based its calculation on Census Bureau data on local revenues and hypothe-
sized that the differences might be explained by the sizes of jurisdictions included in the survey
or by the revenue base considered. Federally Induced Costs at 13 (cited in note 17) (considering
only general funds as opposed to all revenues).
230. In 1992, local own-source revenue exceeded $431.5 billion, while total local revenue
including federal and state aid was almost $648 billion. U.S. Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations, Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism 44 tbl. 18 (U.S. G.P.O.,
1994) ("Fiscal Federalism"). The $11.3 billion in costs identified by Price Waterhouse constitute
about 2.5% and 1.7% of these revenues, respectively. These local revenues include such sources
as user charges, utility revenue, etc., in addition to taxes. However, it is not clear why such
revenues should be excluded from an analysis of the impact of unfunded federal mandates on
overall local finances. Because Price Waterhouse included the costs of local utility operations
such as sewage treatment on the cost side of the balance sheet, it seems particularly inappropri-
ate to exclude utility revenues such as sewer fees from the offsetting local revenues.
1997] 1187
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Even these data are misleading, however, because they focus
on only part of the fiscal relationship between the federal, state, and
local governments. In particular, they ignore sources of federal funds
flowing to states and cities for which no mandates are attached or for
which funding exceeds mandate costs. Total federal grants to states
and cities are at an all-time high. In 1993, the year for which Price
Waterhouse calculated costs to cities and counties, the federal gov-
ernment gave states and localities over $214 billion in grants, about
14% of the federal budget.231 In inflation-adjusted 1987 dollars, total
federal grants to states and localities have grown steadily and signifi-
cantly since 1960.232
Despite this steady increase in federal grants, mayors and
governors complain that federal mandates have grown as well and,
therefore, that federal funding has declined as a percentage of their
total budgets. This claim is true only for certain years. Federal con-
tributions to state budgets declined slightly from 21% in 1980 to 18%
in 1990; while the combined federal and state share of city revenues
fell from 30% in 1980 to 22% in 1990. However, as a percentage of
total state and local spending, federal contributions were higher in
1993 than in 1960 or 1970.233 The only years between 1955 and 1993
in which the real value of federal aid to states and cities, measured in
constant 1987 dollars, declined were 1974, 1979-1982, and 1987; in all
other years aid increased, often substantially.
234
These data show that states and cities remain net beneficiaries
of intergovernmental transfers. The federal government still contrib-
utes nearly one-fifth of all state revenues, and the federal and state
governments combined contribute 22% of all local revenues.
235
Depending on which estimates are used, in 1993 local governments
received intergovernmental transfers worth between two and over ten
231. FY95 Analytical Perspectives at 169-70 tbls. 11-2, 11-3 (cited in note 228). By 1996,
the OMB estimates that federal grants will reach nearly $240 billion. FY96 Analytical
Perspectives at 169 tbl. 11-2 (cited in note 28). Ironically, of course, some commentators cite the
same data and the accompanying coercive effects of such massive federal funding in their
arguments to curtail Congress's power under the Spending Clause. Baker, 95 Colum. L. Rev. at
1918-20 (cited in note 78).
232. FY96 Analytical Perspectives at 169 tbl. 11-2 (cited in note 28).
233. Federal grants constituted 15% of state and local expenditures in 1960 and 20% in
1970. Id. The federal share rose dramatically in the 1970s to a record of 28% in 1980, was
reduced again to 20% by 1990, and climbed back to 22% in 1993. Id.
234. Fiscal Federalism at 9 tbl. C, 30 tbl. 10 (cited in note 230).
235. In 1992, the federal government provided localities over $20 billion in direct aid. Id. at
44 tbl. 18. That same year states provided over $201 billion in aid to local governments. Id. at
10 tbl. D, 35 tbl. 14. It is hard to identify what portion of state-local aid was in the form of pass-
throughs from the federal government, which provided states with over $159 billion in aid in
1992. Id. at 44 tbl. 18.
1188 [Vol. 50:1137
1997] UNFUNDED FEDERAL MANDATES 1189
times236 the cost of the unfunded federal mandates estimated by Price
Waterhouse, even assuming those numbers to be accurate. When all
revenue transfers are considered on a nationwide basis, 237 Uncle Sam
is still a cash cow for states and localities, not an unreasonable bur-
den.
These overall figures, of course, convey little about the distri-
bution of federal dollars among programs. The percentage of federal
grants to states and localities earmarked for payments to individuals
(Medicaid, food assistance, family support, housing subsidies, etc.)
grew from 35% in 1960 to 62% in 1994238 while the percentage of these
grants devoted to physical capital declined from 47% in 1960 to 17% in
1994.239 However, the percentage of federal grants devoted to capital
spending declined relative to entitlement programs largely because
entitlement spending increased and not because capital grants
declined in real terms.240
This shift in the emphasis of federal funding provides perhaps
the best empirical argument that unfunded federal mandates, as a
whole, burden state and local finances. While the entitlement pro.:
grams for which federal funding has increased are voluntary from a
strict legal perspective, states have little practical choice but to par-
ticipate. At the same time, states are obligated to comply with regula-
236. If the Price Waterhouse percentages are used, localities received about twice as much
in intergovernmental aid as they spent to comply with the unfunded federal mandates measured
in the studies. Corrected for total revenues (8%), localities received almost three times as much
in aid as they spent to comply with the unfunded federal mandates measured in the studies.
Using the ACIR figures (5.5%), localities received approximately four times as much in aid as
they spent to comply with the unfunded federal mandates measured in the studies. Using my
calculations (1.7% of all local revenues or 2.5% of all local-source revenues), localities received
approximately nine to ten times as much in aid as they spent to comply with the unfunded
federal mandates measured in the studies.
237. Individual jurisdictions may be winners or losers in the game of intergovernmental
transfers depending on the distribution of the costs of federal requirements and the benefits of
federal funding. The distributional impacts of federal policy were discussed above in the context
of the Sixteenth Amendment and are discussed further in Part V.C.
238. The OMB estimated that the percentage of federal funding devoted to individuals
would decline slightly to 61% by 1996, but would climb to 68% by 2000. FY96 Analytical
Perspectives at 167, 169 tbl. 11-2 (cited in note 28).
239. Id. at 169 tbl. 11-2. This decline is expected to continue to 12% by 2000. Id. As a
percent of state and local capital spending, the federal share was 23% in 1990 compared to 25%
in 1960, showing that states and cities typically spend less overall on capital improvements
absent federal dollars. Id.
240. Measured in constant 1987 dollars, federal capital investment grants rose from $13.7
billion in 1960 to $21.9 billion in 1970 and $27.7 billion in 1980. FY96 Historical Tables at 175
tbl. 12.1 (cited in note 18). Capital grants dropped slightly to $22.5 billion in 1982, but have
climbed steadily since, returning to $27.5 billion in 1993 and reaching an all-time high of $30.3
billion in 1994. Id. at 123 tbl. 9.2.
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tory mandates for which the percentage of federal funding has de-
clined. Thus, a smaller percentage of federal dollars is available to
meet the capital and other expenses of compliance with federal regula-
tions.
This argument, however, fails for several reasons. Even sub-
tracting federal funding for entitlements, total direct federal grants to
states and cities in 1993 still far exceeded the potentially inflated
costs of unfunded federal mandates estimated by Price Waterhouse.
241
Second, this analysis is limited because it does not include all benefits
that states and cities receive through federal tax and spending poli-
cies. For example, the above figures do not include the fiscal benefits
that states and cities enjoy through the deductibility of many state
and local taxes and tax-exempt bond authority, which provide cost
savings to these governments in the range of $70 billion each year.
242
If these benefits were added to direct federal grants, the total dollar
value of federal assistance provided to states and cities each year
would be approximately $284 billion.
Moreover, the federal government spends even greater
amounts on direct domestic welfare programs, that is public services
provided directly by federal agencies rather than through state and
local grants or other cooperative programs. In 1993, while the federal
government provided nearly $125 billion to states and localities to
subsidize entitlement programs, it paid out more than $658 billion,
over five times more, in direct benefits.243 Also in 1993, the federal
government spent over $19 billion on direct nondefense capital in-
vestment, in addition to $31 billion in capital grants to states and
localities.2"
Direct federal expenditures provide indirect but real fiscal
benefits to states and cities. Federal, state, and local expenditures on
241. In 1993, federal grants to states and localities for purposes other than entitlements ex-
ceeded $69 billion. Id. at 88 tbl. 6.1. At a minimum, in 1992 over $20 billion were in the form of
direct grants to local, as opposed to state, governments. Fiscal Federalism at 44 tbl.18 (cited in
note 230). This is almost double the $11.3 billion in costs allegedly incurred by cities and coun-
ties in 1993 to comply with the most expensive federal mandates, but does not count any federal
funds that were passed through from the states to their subdivisions.
242. FY96 Analytical Perspectives at 167 (cited in note 28). The specific sources of these
benefits are broken down in Table 5-4. Id. at 50-51 tbl. 5.4. States and cities also benefit from
subsidized federal loans or loan guarantees. However, from an economic perspective the value of
those subsidies is a relatively trivial amount, roughly $100 million in 1995 and 1996. Id. at 167.
For a discussion on the value of bond subsidies, see Rotunda, 57 U. Colo. L. Rev. at 867 (cited in
note 2) (noting that proponents argue TEBs provide a "form of revenue sharing" not subject to
congressional scrutiny).
243. FY96 Historical Tables at 88 tbl. 6.1 (cited in note 18).
244. Id. at 123 tbl. 9.2.
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public goods and services are largely fungible.245 To the extent that
the federal government meets the demand for public goods and serv-
ices in some areas, states and cities are free to spend local revenues on
their own priorities. 246 While incurring high cost shares, states par-
ticipate in entitlement programs because they would otherwise incur
the full economic costs of addressing, or the full social costs of not
addressing, those needs. In this sense, direct federal spending en-
hances rather than impairs state and local fiscal autonomy.
A related distributional argument is that, while states and
cities collectively may be net beneficiaries in intergovernmental rela-
tions, individual communities may face disproportionately high com-
pliance costs and receive disproportionately small amounts of federal
aid.247 Given that total federal assistance exceeds total national man-
date compliance costs, however, this problem could be addressed
through better need-based targeting of federal funds rather than
broad-based assaults on federal regulatory programs.
D. Conclusion
It is extremely difficult to measure the impact of individual
mandates on single jurisdictions and even harder to assess the cumu-
lative fiscal impacts of all unfunded federal mandates on all states
and localities. Thus far, efforts to estimate such impacts have been
plagued by serious methodological problems. This buttresses the
conclusion reached in the definitional analysis that the idea of un-
funded federal mandates has little value in deciding key issues of
federalism.
While available data remain limited and unreliable, the urgent
rhetoric that states and cities are crippled by the costs of unfunded
federal mandates remains, at best, unproven. Moreover, viewed in
light of overall intergovernmental fiscal relations and even using data
that overestimate costs to states and underestimate benefits provided
245. Stanton, One Nation Indivisible at 18 (cited in note 12) (quoting economist Adam Rose,
who noted that there are not really two groups of taxpaying citizens, but the same taxpayers who
belong to both federal and state and local taxpaying subgroups); Peterson, The Price of
Federalism at 132-33 (cited in note 8).
246. This, of course, is true only to the extent that the state or city would have provided the
same public good or service absent a federal program. Thus, the exact percentage of federal
spending that can be considered to provide indirect fiscal benefits to states and cities is uncer-
tain.
247. See note 179 and accompanying text (discussing an EPA study showing disproportion-
ate fiscal impacts on the smallest and largest communities).
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by the national government, the opposite appears to be true. Federal
tax and spending policies in 1993 that resulted in direct or indirect
benefits to states and localities approached one trillion dollars.248 The
$11.3 billion cited by Price Waterhouse as the local cost of compliance
with unfunded federal mandates, even if accurate, is trivial by com-
parison, amounting to just over one percent. Fueled by its authority
to generate and redistribute revenues through income taxes and other
sources,249 to borrow on the credit of the United States,250 and to print
money,251 the federal government serves as an essential, constitution-
ally sanctioned banker to state and local governments. 25
2
It is ironic in this regard that state and local officials complain
that they, but not the federal government, are bound by balanced
budget requirements and other spending limitations.253 States are
able to meet balanced budget requirements, in part, because so many
of the costs of meeting their citizens' needs are subsidized or provided
directly by the federal government. While state and municipal elected
officials criticize the massive federal debt,254 that debt has been in-
curred in part to pay for state and local needs.
These findings suggest that judges cannot properly resolve
issues of federalism based on the impact of discrete programs chal-
lenged in individual lawsuits. It is extremely difficult to calculate the
individual and cumulative fiscal impacts of federal mandates, and
248. This included $214 billion in grants, $70 billion in tax policy benefits, $658 billion in di-
rect payments to individuals, and $19 billion in direct domestic capital expenditures, for a total
of $961 billion. See notes 231, 242-44 and accompanying text.
249. See Part V.C.
250. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
251. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 5. See Peterson, The Price of Federalism at 3 (cited in note 8)
(noting that the federal government can print money, while states risk bankruptcy if they incur
too much debt).
252. See Lovell and Tobin, 41 Pub. Admin. Rev. at 326 (cited in note 11) (quoting Edward K.
Hamilton, Non-Constitutional Management of Constitutional Problems, Daedalus 111, 122
(Winter 1978), who noted the emergence of "federal and state governments as bankers who raise
revenue which is distributed to local governments to deliver services designed by the federal
governments"); David Frohnmayer, A New Look at Federalism: The Theory and Implications of
'Dual Sovereignty" 12 Envir. L. 903, 910 (1982) (concluding that the Sixteenth Amendment
enhancement of federal tax power, along with existing federal authority to incur debt, "lent an
enormous impetus to national efforts in problem areas which formerly had received only state at-
tention, or had not been addressed by government at all").
253. Most states have balanced budget requirements. Thus, the costs of unfunded federal
mandates must be met either by increasing taxes or by reducing expenditures in other areas.
Federally Induced Costs at 16 (cited in note 17). See Fiscal Federalism at 6-7, 14-19 (cited in
note 230) (itemizing state balanced budget and other spending limitations).
254. By 1994 the total federal debt exceeded $4.6 trillion. FY96 Historical Tables at 89 tbl.
7.1 (cited in note 18). By comparison, state and local debt is much smaller. Fiscal Federalism at
12 tbl. F (cited in note 230).
1192
1997] UNFUNDED FEDERAL MANDATES 1193
misleading conclusions are reached by considering such impacts in
isolation from the full intergovernmental fiscal relationship.
V. THE LEGALITY OF UNFUNDED FEDERAL MANDATES AND THE
JuDIcIAL ROLE
Implicit in the debate over unfunded federal mandates is the
argument that some mandates are unconstitutional255 because they
violate the Tenth Amendment 56 and related principles of federalism
embodied in the structure of the Constitution.257  Such arguments
were boosted temporarily by the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in
NLCs; 258 suppressed equally temporarily when that decision was
overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority;
259
and rejuvenated again by New York v. United States26 and most re-
cently by Printz v. United States.261
As one purpose of this Article is to explore whether the concept
of unfunded federal mandates brings independent utility to the feder-
alism debate, it is necessary to discuss the degree to which federal
actions are vulnerable to Tenth Amendment scrutiny because they are
unfunded, as distinct from other grounds. 262 In addition, as suggested
above, the unfunded federal mandates analysis will lend support to
those who argue for a limited judicial role in issues of federalism.
255. Other unfunded federal mandates may be conceded to be constitutional even by the
most strident of anti-mandate advocates, but nevertheless are opposed on fiscal and policy
grounds, discussed in Part VI.
256. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const., Amend. X.
257. See Printz, 65 U.S.L.W. at 4737-38 (discussing the principles of federalism embodied in
the "structure of the Constitution"). Professor Merritt has argued that additional, if not superior,
protection is afforded to states through the Republican Guarantee Clause, U.S. Const., Art. IV.,
§ 4, which provides that "[tihe United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union a
Republican Form of Government." See Merritt, 88 Colum. L. Rev. at 2 (cited in note 9)
(observing that the Republican Guarantee Clause "implies a modest restraint on federal power to
interfere with state autonomy"). Because courts have rejected this argument on justiciability
grounds, see City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 182 n.17 (1980) (holding that the
Guarantee Clause issue is not justiciable); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 218-29 (1962) (finding
that Guarantee Clause claims are nonjusticiable political questions), I will not consider
Republican Guarantee Clause arguments separate from the Tenth Amendment.
258. 426 U.S. at 833.
259. 469 U.S. at 528.
260. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
261. 65 U.S.L.W. at 4731.
262. Some actions may be unlawful because they violate the Tenth Amendment and related
principles of federalism. This does not necessarily mean, however, that they are unlawful
because they are unfunded federal mandates.
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A. Background Principles of Federalism
The Supreme Court in NLCs rejuvenated the quiescent Tenth
Amendment 263 by expressly overruling Maryland v. Wirtz, 264 which
invalidated the applicability of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
("FLSA")65 to state and local governments. 266 NLCs was significant to
the nascent debate over unfunded federal mandates in two ways.
First, it coincided with state and local dissatisfaction with the fiscal
impacts of federal regulations and was cited as a high point of the
anti-mandate movement.267 After NLCs, states and cities mounted a
flurry of largely unsuccessful Tenth Amendment challenges to federal
mandates.
268
Second, the reasoning of NLCs was consistent with the anti-
mandate philosophy. Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Rehnquist
invalidated the applicability of the FLSA because it applied "directly
263. A sedative was administered to the Tenth Amendment during the New Deal, when the
Supreme Court ruled:
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.
There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was more than declara-
tory of the relationship between the national and state governments as it had been es-
tablished by the Constitution before the amendment or that its purpose was other than
to allay fears that the new national government might seek to exercise powers not
granted, and that the states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers.
Darby, 312 U.S. at 124 (upholding the validity of the Fair Labor Standards Act against Tenth
Amendment, Commerce Clause, and other challenges). See Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F.
Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534-35 (1941) (upholding a federal law authorizing the construction
of a dam and reservoir against claims that the law violated the Tenth Amendment); United
States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 733-34 (1931) (concluding that the Tenth Amendment "added
nothing to the [Constitution] as originally ratified"). See also Anastaplo, The Amendments to the
Constitution at 9-10, 92-98 (cited in note 16) (finding that the Tenth Amendment should not
constrain the federal government). Between Darby and NLCs, only a single federal statute was
invalidated by the court on federalism grounds. See Van Alstyne, 83 Mich. L. Rev. at 1713 (cited
in note 9) (noting that the NLCs decision was only the second decision "striking down an act of
Congress on pure federalism grounds in four decades"); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118,
125-31 (1970) (striking federal voting age requirements applied to states). Mitchell was later
superseded by the Twenty-sixth Amendment. Van Alstyne, 83 Mich. L. Rev. at 1713 n.19 (cited
in note 9).
264. 392 U.S. 183, 183 (1968), overruled in part by NLCs, 426 U.S. at 833.
265. 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (1994).
266. NLCs, 426 U.S. at 852-55. In Wirtz, just six years earlier, the Supreme Court had
upheld the validity of the Act as applied to state-run schools and hospitals. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at
188, 192-93, 199.
267. See, for example, Beam, Origins, in Fix and Kenyon, eds., Coping with Mandates at 27
(cited in note 16) (stating that, during the time NLCs was decided, new legal, political, fiscal, and
administrative concerns about mandates were surfacing); Fix, Observations, in Fix and Kenyon,
eds., Coping with Mandates at 33 (cited in note 158) (noting that NLCs embraced state sover-
eignty arguments put forward by proponents).
268. See La Pierre, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 580-85 (cited in note 10) (discussing the line of
cases following the NLCs decision).
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to the States qua States" 269 and because the effect of the amendments
would be to "impermissibly interfere with the integral governmental
functions of these bodies."270 The opinion cited the fiscal impact of the
Act on states and cities, 271 but focused as well on displacement of state
and local decision-making prerogatives. 272 Recognizing the difficulty of
calculating the fiscal impacts of the Act on states and cities, Justice
Rehnquist denied that "particularized assessments of actual impact
are crucial to resolution of the issue presented... ,"273 Instead, he
distinguished Fry v. United States274 not because the wage controls in
that case differed qualitatively from the FLSA, but because the
"degree of intrusion upon the protected area of state sovereignty" was
smaller. 71 Thus, while the case stopped short of invalidating the Act
because it constituted an unfunded federal mandate, the
"impermissible interference" identified by Justice Rehnquist clearly
had a significant fiscal component.
In subsequent cases, the Court attempted to clarify the asser-
tion in NLCs that some, but not all, federal intrusions on state sover-
eignty violated the Tenth Amendment:
First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute regulates the
"States as States." Second, the federal regulation must address matters that
are indisputably "attribute[s] of state sovereignty." And third, it must be ap-
parent that the States' compliance with the federal law would directly impair
their ability "to structure integral operations in areas of traditional govern-
mental functions."
27 6
269. NLCs, 426 U.S. at 847.
270. Id. at 851.
271. Id. at 846.
272. Id. at 846-49.
273. Id. at 851.
274. 421 U.S. 542, 542 (1975) (upholding the applicability of temporary, emergency wage
controls to state employees).
275. In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun, who changed his position and penned the
majority decision overruling NLCs in Garcia, interpreted Justice Rehnquist's NLCs opinion as
establishing a balancing approach in which federal intrusion on state interests would be upheld,
presumably regardless of impacts on state fiscal or decisional integrity, "where the federal
interest is demonstrably greater." NLCs, 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
276. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981)
(citations omitted). See also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 237 (1983) (quoting the test from
Hodel that sets forth the requirements for a successful claim that congressional exercise of the
commerce power is invalid); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 778 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (reiterating the NLCs requirements); United Transportation Union v. Long Island
R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678, 684 (1982), overruled in part by Garcia, 455 U.S. at 678 (applying the
three.prong test of NLCs).
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Again, the extent to which such impairment included fiscal burdens
was not clear. Ultimately, however, the Court in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority found the test to be unwork-
able, based primarily on the difficulty of discerning what state and
local governmental functions are "traditional" or "integral.277 Instead,
the Court largely rejected any judicial role regarding issues of federal-
ism because states and their subdivisions receive structural protection
against undue federal intrusion through representation in the na-
tional political process.
278
Notably for the debate over unfunded federal mandates,
Justice Blackmun in Garcia recognized that the burdens imposed by
individual federal mandates cannot be viewed in fiscal isolation:
. .. Congress has not simply placed a financial burden on the shoulders of
States and localities that operate mass transit systems, but has provided sub-
stantial countervailing financial assistance as well, assistance that may leave
individual mass-transit systems better off than they would have been had
Congress never intervened at all in the area.
279
Justice Blackmun's view appreciates the complexity of federal-state
fiscal relations and the futility of gauging the fiscal impacts of indi-
vidual federal mandates in isolation.20 Because the combined effects
of overall federal tax, spending, and regulatory policy reflect a balance
between a range of competing considerations, the Court concluded
that such judgments were more appropriately left to the political
rather than the judicial process.
Congress, itself composed of representatives from individual
states and their subdivisions, may decide, after weighing arguments
presented by those entities directly, to impose a new mandate in one
bill, but to increase fiscal aid in a separate act. In so doing, it can
consider the combined impacts of related tax, spending, and regula-
tory decisions. By contrast, it is impossible for a federal judge, con-
strained by the narrow focus of a particular case, to consider the fiscal
impacts of a single mandate in an appropriately broad context.2 1
277. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 530-31, 546-47.
278. Id. at 550-54. See note 10 and accompanying text.
279. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 555. Justice Blackmun was quick to note, however, that federal
funding was not required to justify otherwise valid regulation under the Commerce Clause. Id.
at 555 n.21.
280. See Part IV.
281. See Choper, 86 Yale L. J. at 1556, 1592-93 (cited in note 10) (noting that courts are no
more capable, and may be less capable, than the political branches in deciding issues of federal-
ism and objecting to the propriety of federalism decisions in the context of individual litigation).
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Without overruling Garcia, however, the Supreme Court
adopted a different reason to invalidate some types of federal regula-
tion of states in New York v. United States.282 The Court struck provi-
sions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act ("LLRWPA")2
3
that "commandeer" the state's regulatory apparatus by compelling the
state to regulate according to federal requirements.m Justice
O'Connor judged the validity of federal intergovernmental mandates
in a way that at least avoids two of the problems with NLCs.285 First,
by distinguishing federal mandates that commandeer the state regu-
latory structure from mandates that regulate states in the same way
as private parties ("generally applicable" requirements),25 Justice
O'Connor avoided the difficult distinction between "traditional" and
"nontraditional" functions. Second, by prohibiting all federal man-
dates that commandeer the state regulatory apparatus, Justice
O'Connor found no need to evaluate the fiscal or other burdens created
282. 505 U.S. at 144.
283. Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1986), codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b et seq. (1994).
284. New York, 505 U.S. at 175-76. See Kaden, 79 Colum. L. Rev. at 870, 890 (cited in note
4) (arguing that courts should intervene when a federal program "coopts the state's political
process by interfering with legislative and executive direction in a significant way"). This case is
distinguishable from those in which Congress regulates states and cities in the same manner as
private parties and from those in which Congress conditionally preempts state action. Provisions
of the Act that provided financial and other incentives for state compliance, as opposed to
coercive mandates, were upheld. New York, 505 U.S. at 168-75.
285. Justice O'Connor's opinion in New York has been criticized on several plausible
grounds. See, for example, Caminker, 95 Colum. L. Rev. at 1030-50 (cited in note 68). Professor
Caminker finds no textual basis to prohibit commandeering of state judicial as opposed to
executive or administrative functions. Id. at 1034-42. Professor Caminker also rebuts Justice
O'Connor's assertion that the Framers intended to replace, rather than to supplement, national
power over states with national power over individuals. Id. at 1042-50, 1030-40 & n.12. See
Friendly, 86 Yale L. J. at 1019 (cited in note 16) (noting that the Constitution "authorized the
national government to act directly on the people ... rather than solely on the states").
286. Compare South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 510-14 (1988) (upholding bond
registration requirements applicable to both governmental and private bond issuers); Garcia, 469
U.S. at 553-54 (concluding that the FLSA was applicable to both private and governmental
parties); Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 453, 460-63 (1978) (upholding airport fees
that were equally applicable to public and private parties); Parden v. Terminal Railway of the
Alabama State Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184, 197-98 (1964) (holding that public and private rail-
roads were both subject to the Federal Employers' Liability Act, ch. 685, 53 Stat. 1404 (1939),
codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq. (1994)); Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 101-02 (1946)
(upholding emergency price controls for state as well as private timber sales); United States v.
California, 297 U.S. 175, 185 (1936), overruled in part by NLCs, 426 U.S. at 833 (holding that the
Safety Appliance Act, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (1893), codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.
(1994), applies to state as well as to private railroads).
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Most recently, in Printz v. United States, the Supreme Court
applied the principles established in New York to provisions of the
Brady Bill that temporarily required local law enforcement officials to
conduct background checks as a condition of handgun sales, pending
development and implementation of a federal system for such
checks.289 While some lower courts upheld the statute and others
invalidated it without reference to unfunded mandates, some sug-
gested that the "unfunded" nature of the Brady Bill mandate contrib-
uted to its illegality. 290 Writing for the majority in Printz, Justice
287. Instead of relying on the burdens imposed by the mandate, Justice O'Connor justified
her decision on the basis of political accountability, discussed further in Part VI. By requiring
states to enforce federal regulatory decisions, Congress insulates itself from political accountabil-
ity that assures representative government. New York, 505 U.S. at 168-69. Justice O'Connor
concluded that where Congress preempts under the Supremacy Clause:
[lI]t is the Federal Government that makes the decision in full view of the public, and it
will be federal officials that suffer the consequences if the decision turns out to be detri-
mental or unpopular. But where the Federal Government directs the States to regulate,
it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal
officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral
ramifications of their decision.
Id. See Kaden, 79 Colum. L. Rev. at 890 (cited in note 4) (noting that direct commands from the
federal government to local governmental officials reduce accountability of both federal and local
officials); La Pierre, 80 Nw. L. Rev. at 633 (cited in note 10) (finding that courts should protect
state interests in political decision making where Congress is not politically accountable).
288. New York, 505 U.S. at 178 (observing that "[n]o matter how powerful the federal
interest involved, the Constitution does not give Congress the authority to require the States to
regulate").
289. Printz, 65 U.S.L.W. at 4732-33; 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1994). See generally Dyan
Finguerra, Note, The Tenth Amendment Shoots Down the Brady Act, 3 J.L. & Pol'y 637, 637
(1995) (arguing that the Brady Act infringes upon state sovereignty guranteed by the Tenth
Amendment); Jonathan Duncan, Comment, Looks Like a Waiting Period for the Brady Bill:
Tenth Amendment Challenges to a Controversial Unfunded Mandate, 43 U. Kan. L. Rev. 835,
835-40 (1995) (discussing the history of the Tenth Amendment and challenges to the Brady Act);
U.S. General Accounting Office, Gun Control: Implementation of the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act 2-5 (U.S. G.P.O., 1996) (outlining the early constitutional challenges to the Brady
Act).
290. One of the district court opinions overtly addressed the Brady Bill issue as "the consti-
tutionality of federally imposed, unfunded mandates to the states" and ruled that Congress
violated the Tenth Amendment by "requiring the states to carry out an unfunded federal man-
date" Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1507, 1519 (D. Mont. 1994), affirmed and
reversed in part by Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025, 1025 (9th Cir. 1995). But see McGee v.
United States, 863 F. Supp. 321, 327 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (declaring the Act "an unconstitutional
mandate" without referring to the unfunded nature of the Act). The Fifth Circuit, in turn,
suggested the absence of funding as one reason to strike the Brady Bill: 'The Brady Act gives
the States no means by which they can assist in the implementation of federal policy while
leaving unchanged the duties of the CLEOs [chief law enforcement officers] as prescribed in the
States' criminal codes." J.R. Koog v. United States, 79 F.3d 452, 459 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
United States v. Gonzalez, 117 S. Ct. 2507, 2507 (1997). See also In re Brentwood Outpatient,
Ltd. v. Williamson County, Tennessee, 43 F.3d 256, 263-64 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
Williamson County v. Bondholder Comm., 115 S. Ct. 1824, 1824 (1995) (upholding federal
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Scalia also alluded twice to the unfunded mandate issue.29 1 These ref-
erences are dicta, however, because as in New York, the Printz deci-
sion "categorically" prohibits the federal government from compelling
states to enact or to administer a federal regulatory program, whether
or not the mandate is accompanied by federal funding.292 Rather than
changing the focus of the analysis from the nature of the mandate to
the source or extent of funding, Printz simply clarified the scope of the
New York doctrine by ruling that the federal government may not
commandeer state or local officials acting in their official capacities or
disallowance of county's statutory tax additions in bankruptcy proceeding against a Tenth
Amendment challenge, but suggesting that a federal requirement with greater fiscal impact
would raise a constitutional question). The Fifth Circuit, however, invalidated the background
check provisions not only because they were unfunded, but also because it believed that the
provisions commandeered state legislative policy prerogatives and therefore implicated issues of
political accountability, in the same manner as in New York, 505 U.S. at 160-80. Koog, 79 F.3d
at 457-61. The Second and Ninth Circuits, by contrast, found the Brady Bill provisions more
analogous to the statute upheld in FERC, 456 U.S. at 742, in which state officials were merely
required to "consider" provisions of federal law as an exercise of their ministerial duties and not
to adopt federal regulatory requirements as an exercise of legislative or quasi-legislative power.
Frank v. United States, 78 F.3d 815, 826-30 (2d Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded by Frank v.
United States, 117 S. Ct. 2501, 2501 (1997); Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025, 1030-31 (9th
Cir. 1995), reversed by Printz, 65 U.S.L.W. at 4731. See also New York, 505 U.S. at 160-64
(distinguishing FERC on these grounds); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947) (requiring a
state court to enforce a federal statute).
291. First, Justice Scalia noted that "[tihe power of the Federal Government would be aug-
mented immeasurably if it were able to impress into its service--and at no cost to itself-the
police officers of the 50 States." Printz, 65 U.S.L.W. at 4738 (emphasis added). Second, in re-
sponding to the government's argument that the Brady Bill provisions do not pose the same
problems of political accountability as in New York, Justice Scalia wrote: "By forcing state
governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program,
Members of Congress can take credit for 'solving' problems without having to ask their constitu-
ents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes." Id. at 4740. This, of course, is one of the
basic tenets of the case against unfunded mandates. Notably, however, Justice Scalia was
inconsistent in his views of the propriety of weighing the fiscal impacts of federal legislation in
determining its constitutionality. In response to the Government's argument that the Brady Bill
should be upheld because it serves important public purposes while imposing only small burdens
on local officials, Justice Scalia rejected the notion that a "balancing" analysis is relevant to the
validity of this type of mandate. Id. at 4741 (noting that where "it is the whole object of the law
to direct the functioning of the state executive ... such a 'balancing' analysis is inappropriate")
(emphasis omitted). In an ominous reference back to Chief Justice Rehnquist's impact analysis
approach in NLCs, however, and even while acknowledging that it was overruled in Garcia,
Justice Scalia noted that an assessment of impacts "might be relevant if we were evaluating
whether the incidential application to the States of a federal law of general applicability
excessively interfered with the functioning of state governments." Id.
292. Instead, the Court focused most of its analysis properly on whether the challenged
Brady Bill provision was more like the mandate to adopt and implement a federal program that
was struck down in New York or more like the provision for state agencies to "consider" federal
law as a condition of continued state regulation in an otherwise preempted federal area that was
upheld in FERC. Id. at 4739-41.
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the State itself,29 3 and that the federal government may not comman-
deer state or local administrative or legislative process. 294
Under New York and Printz, therefore, it is irrelevant whether
a mandate is funded or not. A compulsory mandate that comman-
deers a state or local legislative or regulatory apparatus is invalid
whether funded or unfunded. This supports the conclusion that the
unfunded federal mandate terminology adds little or nothing to the
legal discourse on federalism. With this background, it is appropriate
to evaluate the legal status and the unfunded federal mandate impli-
cations of each of the ACIR's six categories of federally induced
costs.
29 5
B. Direct Order Mandates
Under New York, only a small category of direct order man-
dates are unlawful on federalism grounds. Mandates that compel
states and presumably localities to take regulatory action violate
principles of federalism. However, it is not the unfunded nature of the
mandate that renders it constitutionally infirm. Thus, under New
York, the concept of unfunded federal mandates provides no inde-
pendent legal basis for the curtailment of national power.296
Lower federal courts have honored the distinction between
federal mandates that regulate states directly and those that
"commandeer the state regulatory apparatus." To date, aside from the
Brady Bill cases, only two federal courts have invalidated federal
statutes based on the reasoning of New York. 297 By contrast, many
293. The Printz majority rejected the dissent's suggestion that the Brady Bill was distin-
guishable from the LLRWPA because the former commandeered only individual local officials,
while the latter was directed at the states themselves. Id. at 4739-40.
294. Id. at 4739-41 (rejecting the distinction that the statute at issue in New York compelled
legislative action while the Brady Bill required only ministerial compliance with a final federal
directive); id. at 4739-40 (noting that whether or not a "policymaking component" is involved is
irrelevant).
295. The definitional and fiscal analysis suggested that, if the concept of unfunded federal
mandates is useful at all, it should be limited more narrowly than many suggest. However, for
those who may view this analysis as parsimonious, I will explore legal arguments with respect to
all asserted categories of unfunded federal mandates.
296. It could be argued that unfunded federal mandates pose problems of accountability
similar to those that led the Court to ban commandeering in New York. New York, 505 U.S. at
144. This argument is presented and refuted in Part VI.
297. Board of Natural Resources of the State of Washington v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937, 946-47
(9th Cir. 1993) (invalidating provision of the Forest Resources Conservation and Shortage Relief
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-382, Title IV, 104 Stat. 714 (1990), codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 620-620j
(1994), because the state was required to issue regulations implementing a ban on the export of
timber harvested from state public lands); ACORN v. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387, 1393-94 (5th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, ACORN v. Foster, 117 S. Ct. 2532, 2532 (1997) (invalidating the provision of
1200 [Vol. 50:1137
1997] UNFUNDED FEDERAL MANDATES 1201
courts have upheld federal mandates against challenges that they vio-
lated the commandeering prohibition of New York.298 Moreover, for
the most part courts have adhered to the qualification in New York
the Lead Contamination Control Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-572, 102 Stat. 2884 (1988), codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 300j et seq. (1994), which required states to establish remedial action programs for
lead contamination removal from school and daycare drinking water systems). For a discussion
of the validity of Washington v. Brown, in the context of incidental fiscal impacts, see Part V.F.
298. See Commonwealth of Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 869 (4th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, Virginia v. Browner, 117 S. Ct. 764, 764 (1997) (upholding Clean Air Act conditions based
on the spending power and partial preemption, and absent an affirmative mandate). See also
State of Missouri v. United States, 918 F. Supp. 1320, 1330-34 (E.D. Mo. 1996), vacated and
remanded by Missouri v. United States, 109 F.3d 440, 440 (8th Cir. 1997) (upholding Clean Air
Act sanctions as a constitutional exercise of the Commerce Clause power, of the Spending Clause
power, and of the threat of preemption); Kelley v. United States, 69 F.3d 1503, 1508-10 (10th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, Kelley v. Department of Justice, 116 S. Ct. 1566, 1566 (1996) (upholding a
federal statute preempting state regulation of intrastate motor activity against the theory that it
commanded states not to regulate even when no affirmative federal regulation existed); Blount v.
SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, Blount v. SEC, 116 S. Ct. 1351, 1351 (1996)
(upholding a regulation prohibiting municipal securities professionals from contributing to
political campaigns of state officials from whom they solicit or obtain business because it does not
compel states to regulate directly); Voting Rights Coalition v. Wilson, 60 F.3d 1411, 1415 (9th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, Wilson v. Voting Rights Coalition, 116 S. Ct. 815 (1996) (upholding the
affirmative regulatory mandate in the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-
31, 107 Stat. 77 (1993), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg et seq. (1994 & Supp I.),
based on specific constitutional authority under U.S. Const., Art. I, § 4 which "empowers
Congress to impose on the states precisely the burden at issue"). See also Association of
Community Orgs. for Reform Now v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 794-96 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding the
constitutionality of the National Voter Registration Act because the act did not directly alter
voter qualifications fixed by Illinois); Condon v. Reno, 913 F. Supp. 946, 964-67 (D.S.C. 1995)
(upholding the National Voter Registration Act because the act does not require states to adopt
legislation, although states may do so); Association of Community Orgs. for Reform Now v. Miller,
912 F. Supp. 976, 983-85 (W.D. Mich. 1995) (denying a motion for summary judgment regarding
claims that the National Voter Registration Act violated the Tenth Amendment by requiring
Michigan to comply with its terms); In re Brentwood Outpatient, Ltd., 43 F.3d at 265 (upholding
disallowance of county tax collection in bankruptcy proceeding when no affirmative state action
was mandated); Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma v. State of Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1432-36 (10th Cir.
1994), vacated and remanded by Oklahoma v. Ponca Tribe, 116 S. Ct. 1410, 1410 (1996)
(upholding the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988),
codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994), against a Tenth Amendment challenge
because states are merely required to negotiate in good faith, not to enter into agreements);
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273, 281 (8th Cir. 1993) (upholding the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act against Tenth Amendment claims because the Act does not force
states to enter into agreements with Indian tribes); Kentucky Division, Horsemen's Benevolent &
Protective Ass'n, Inc. v. Turf way Park Racing Ass'n, Inc., 20 F.3d 1406, 1415-16 (6th Cir. 1994)
(upholding the Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-515, 92 Stat. 1811 (1978),
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3007 (1994); State of Alaska v. Brown, 850 F. Supp. 821, 827-28 (D.
Alaska 1994) (upholding a federal prohibition on the export of Alaskan crude oil transported
through the Trans Alaska Pipeline System when, unlike the timber export in Brown, 992 F.2d at
946-47, no state implementing regulations were required); Zych v. The Unidentified, Wrecked,
and Abandoned Vessel, Believed to be the SB "Seabird" 811 F. Supp. 1300, 1317-21 (N.D. Ill.
1992) (upholding the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-298, 102 Stat. 432
(1988), codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2100) (1994), against the theory that it compels states to
take title to embedded, abandoned shipwrecks and to enforce a federal regulatory program).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1137
that funding is irrelevant to the legality of direct order federal man-
dates.29
Unfortunately, however, Justice Scalia's references to un-
funded mandates by way of dictum in Printzs° could invite more lower
courts to cite the unfunded nature of federal mandates as .a legitimate
basis to invalidate federal legislation. Under New York and Printz,
unfunded mandates that apply to both private and governmental
entities can be constitutional, while funded mandates that comman-
deer state legislative or administrative processes could be unlawful.
Thus, continued use of the unfunded mandate rationale will serve only
to confuse the distinction drawn by Justice O'Connor in New York,
which avoids the troublesome judicial task of weighing the fiscal im-
pacts of federal legislation on state and local governments.
No other category of direct order, other than those that com-
mandeer the state regulatory apparatus, is unlawful as an unfunded
federal mandate. 01 Direct orders to states in the Constitution cannot
be unlawful under the Tenth Amendment, as they reflect express
decisions of the people regarding states' rights and obligations.302
Moreover, under the legislative authority granted to Congress in the
Civil War amendments,303 congressional mandates designed to enforce
individual rights are not subject to Tenth Amendment or other feder-
alism limitations, even if those mandates require significant state
299. See Edgar, 56 F.3d at 794-96 (rejecting a challenge to the National Voter Registration
Act as an unfunded mandate); Condon, 913 F. Supp. at 965 (rejecting a claim that a federal
statute was invalid as an "unfunded mandate" and indicating that the Supreme Court has never
used that reasoning to invalidate a statute).
300. See notes 291-92 and accompanying text.
301. This does not, of course, mean that they cannot be stricken on other grounds. For
example, a federal statute may be invalidated because it is beyond the scope of authority granted
to Congress under the Commerce Clause, even if it is not unlawful as an unfunded federal
mandate. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626, 1634 (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-647, Title XVII, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4844 (1990), codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-924
(1994) While there were Tenth Amendment undercurrents in Lopez, see id. at 1642 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring), the law was invalidated on Commerce Clause grounds.
302. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) (invalidating an Alabama law passed
with intent to discriminate and indicating that "the Tenth Amendment cannot save legislation
prohibited by the subsequently enacted Fourteenth Amendment"); North Carolina State Bd. of
Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971) (stating that "state policy must give way when it operates
to hinder vindication of federal constitutional guarantees").
303. See Anastaplo, Amendments to the Constitution at 168-83 (cited in note 16) (discussing
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments); Shapiro, Federalism at 28, 50-60 (cited
in note 1), (noting that the post-Civil War amendments to the Constitution solidified federal
power and reduced the role of the states in the operation of the federal government); Peterson,
The Price of Federalism at 9 (cited in note 8) (discussing the post-Civil War constitutional
amendments).
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expenditures. 3 4 Thus, constitutional mandates, or mandates adopted
by Congress or federal judges to enforce constitutional requirements,
cannot require federal funding as a condition of their validity.3 05
A slightly more difficult question is raised with respect to
legislative mandates that are authorized by the Constitution but are
not directly required or are not necessary to implement or enforce
direct constitutional requirements or guarantees of individual rights.
However, so long as they constitute a valid exercise of congressional
authority, they do not violate the Tenth Amendment, notwithstanding
any substantial burdens on states, so long as they are enacted pursu-
ant to the Commerce Clause3oc or another source of constitutional
power.30 7 The fact that an even broader category of federal require-
ments can be justified as conditions of aid under the Spending
304. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 55 (1990) (upholding a court-ordered desegregation
plan that required a local government to raise taxes); City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 178-80 (1980)
(upholding the Voting Rights Act of 1965, even in light of NLCs); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,
349 (1879) (upholding the 1875 Civil Rights Act).
305. See Whitman and Bezdek, Pub. Budgeting and Finance at 55 (cited in note 130) ("State
and local governments have an obligation to uphold individual rights guaranteed by the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. These requirements should not be reimbursable mandates;
they are simply a cost of belonging to the nation.").
306. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 555-56 (upholding minimum wage requirements as a valid exercise
of the Commerce Clause); Fry, 421 U.S. at 548 (upholding temporary wage controls from a
Commerce Clause challenge); Parden, 377 U.S. at 184, 190-91 (finding that Congress was
authorized under the Commerce Clause to enact the Federal Employers' Liability Act, ch. 685, 53
Stat. 1404 (1939), codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq. (1994)); California v. Taylor, 353
U.S. 553, 568 (1957) (upholding the Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1934), codified as
amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1994)); Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. at 524 (finding that a
navigation and flood control project undertaken by Congress was a valid exercise of its power to
regulate commerce). For post-New York cases upholding federal mandates so long as they did
not commandeer state regulation, see note 298.
While the Supreme Court's recent decision in Lopez serves as a reminder that federal
Commerce Clause power has some limits and may signal some retreat from the expansive
interpretation of the Commerce Clause over the past half-century, it does not change the analysis
of unfunded federal mandates. The validity of federal regulation still turns on whether it is a
proper exercise of congressional authority and not on whether it is funded or unfunded.
307. U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 1856 (finding that the States do not possess the
power under the Tenth Amendment to create additional qualifications for representatives and
senators); Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199 (1988) (using Article III control
of federal courts to uphold federal procedural rules); Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 229
(1987) (relying upon federal judicial power under the Extradition Clause to require Puerto Rico
to deliver fugitives from justice); Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 403 (1963)
(concluding the Patent Clause of the Constitution confers on Congress the power to grant patent
rights); United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1961) (using congressional power over
veterans to uphold the federal statute); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295
(1958), overruled in part by California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 672 (1978)) (noting that the
power of the federal government to impose reasonable conditions on the use of federal property is
beyond challenge); Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 362 (1945) (finding that the Tenth
Amendment does not place restrictions on the power of the federal government to tax).
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Clause,308 does not mean that direct orders must be funded so long as
they are properly justified as exercises of delegated federal authority.
C. Conditions of Federal Assistance
1. The Spending Clause
Even if considered mandates rather than voluntarily assumed
obligations, conditions of federal assistance are supported by inde-
pendent legal authority under the Spending Clause. 09 Under prevail-
ing Supreme Court jurisprudence, 3 0 federal aid conditions are lawful
so long as they (1) promote the general welfare; (2) are not ambiguous;
(3) are reasonably related to a legitimate federal purpose; and (4) do
not violate any independent constitutional prohibition.31'
While necessary to ensure that the spending power is not
abused, these limitations have not proved particularly onerous, and no
federal spending condition has been invalidated since 1935,312 despite
the fact that most aid conditions were enacted after 1960.313 The
courts properly defer to Congress in deciding what spending is neces-
308. See Part V.C.1.
309. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (stating that "[t]he Congress shall have Power to lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States").
310. For a probing critique of the Supreme Court's understanding of the federal spending
power, see Engdahl, 44 Duke L. J. at 20-37 (cited in note 78).
311. New York, 505 U.S. at 171-72; Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08 (upholding the imposition of a
minimum drinking age as a condition of highway funding).
312. Shapiro, Federalism at 32 n.66 (cited in note 1). In United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1,
68-72 (1935), price supports under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, ch. 25, Title I, 48
Stat. 31 (1933), codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq. (1994), were invalidated, in part
because the Court asserted that Congress's power to tax and spend could not be used to further
goals in areas traditionally reserved to the states. The opinion itself is not inconsistent in this
regard, having decided first that the spending power is independent of other grants of congres-
sional authority as advocated by Hamilton in opposition to Madison's more restrictive view that
spending was proper only in furtherance of otherwise delegated powers. Butler, 297 U.S. at 65-
67. See Rosenthal, 39 Stan. L. Rev. at 1112-13 (cited in note 78); Engdahl, 44 Duke L. J. at 36-37
(cited in note 78) (stating that the Butler decision, while nominally endorsing Hamilton's view of
Congress's spending power, followed Madison's view of Congress's spending power). While some
commentators believe that the spending clause portion of the opinion is dictum, Baker, 95
Colum. L. Rev. at 1927 (cited in note 78), it has now been discredited in any event. See Dole, 483
U.S. at 209-10 (stating that "the constitutional limitations on Congress when exercising its
spending power are less exacting than those on its authority to regulate directly"); Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 475 (1980) (concluding that the spending power is at least as broad as
Congress's direct regulatory powers).
313. See Federal Regulation at 46 fig. 4-1 (cited in note 11) (illustrating that almost all
federal mandates were enacted after 1960).
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sary to promote the general welfare.314  While the requirement that
conditions be unambiguous, a variant on the "clear statement rule,"315
ensures that conditions of aid are understood in advance and hence
are truly voluntary, it does not limit the scope of federal spending
power. It does, however, protect federalism values by ensuring that
the burdens imposed by aid conditions are expressly considered in the
"national political process." And while it has been argued that the
fourth requirement prohibits use of the spending power in areas that
are otherwise beyond the scope of national power under the Tenth
Amendment,316 the Court has ruled that this condition stands for the
"unexceptional proposition that the power may not be used to induce
the States to engage in activities that would themselves be unconsti-
tutional."3 7  Thus, spending clause conditions are upheld routinely
against Tenth Amendment attack.3' s
314. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (concluding that courts should "defer substantially to the judg-
ment of Congress"); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (holding that courts should defer
to Congress "unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of
judgment"). Professor Engdahl argues that federal spending need not even be limited by this
requirement. Engdahl, 44 Duke L. J. at 49-53 (cited in note 78).
315. This principle requires that Congress express its intent clearly when enacting a statute
that impinges on or preempts traditional state powers. See Department of Revenue v. ACF
Industries, 114 S. Ct. 843, 850 (1994) (finding that Congress would have spoken with "clarity and
precision" if it had intended to restrict state power to exempt certain types of property from
taxes); New York, 505 U.S. at 169-72 (noting that the Commerce Clause's limit on the ability of
states to discriminate against interstate commerce may be lifted by "an expression of
'unambiguous intent' "); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991) (applying the "plain
statement rule" to avoid a potential constitutional problem under the Commerce Clause); Will v.
Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1988) (finding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 falls short of
the ordinary rule that if "Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between the
states and the Federal Government, it must make its intention to do so unmistakeably clear in
the language of the statute").
316. Dole, 483 U.S. at 209-10.
317. Id. at 210.
318. See Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 790-91 (1983) (finding the imposition of liability
for misused funds under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965), codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq. (1994), does not
violate the Tenth Amendment); Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 142-43 (1947)
(holding that section 12 of the Hatch Act, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939), codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 601 (1994), does not violate the Tenth Amendment); Davis, 301 U.S. at 640 (finding that
benefits section of Title II of the Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 631, 49 Stat. 620 (1935), codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1994 & Supp. 1), does not contravene Tenth Amendment
limitations); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585 (1937) (holding that an excise tax
imposed by Title IX of the Social Security Act of 1935 does not violate the Tenth Amendment). A
number of commentators have questioned whether this virtually unchecked federal authority
under the Spending Clause is appropriate. See, for example, Baker, 95 Colum. L. Rev. at 1916,
1920 (cited in note 78) (arguing that if the Spending Clause is interpreted to permit Congress to
seek otherwise forbidden aims indirectly through a conditional offer of federal funds, the notion
of a "federal government of enumerated powers" will have no meaning); Rosenthal, 39 Stan. L.
Rev. at 1115-16 (cited in note 78) (arguing that conditional spending could be considered uncon-
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On the other hand, the third limitation, while similarly un-
availing to date as a basis for invalidating spending clause require-
ments, strikes closer to the heart of opposition to aid-condition federal
mandates. State and city frustration with aid conditions stems in part
from the use of cross-cutting requirements and crossover sanctions 19
as opposed to conditions that are tied directly to the program being
funded. Cross-cutting regulations in particular are viewed as coercive
because they apply to all federal grants; thus, avoiding such require-
ments entirely would require a state to forego all federal assistance,
not just funding for a particular program.
3 20
Although the challenge to a minimum federal drinking age
requirement as a condition of federal highway aid in South Dakota v.
Dole was based primarily on an asserted conflict between the
Spending Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment;321 the National
Conference of State Legislatures as amicus curiae urged the Court to
take the opportunity to address the requisite relationship between
federal grant conditions and the specific program being funded.322
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion declined this invitation:
Our cases have not required that we define the outer bounds of the
'germaneness' or 'relatedness' limitation on the imposition of conditions under
the spending power. Ainici urge that we take this occasion to establish that a
condition on federal funds is legitimate only if it relates directly to the purpose
of the expenditure to which it is attached. Because Petitioner has not sought
such a restriction... and because we find any such limitation on conditional
federal grants satisfied in this case in any event, we do not address whether
conditions less directly related to the particular purpose of the expenditure
might be outside the bounds of the spending power.
3 23
stitutional in some instances). Professor Rosenthal, however, appears to be relatively more con-
cerned with the potential for federal spending to coerce individuals to waive their individual
liberties than with the impact of federal spending on states' rights. See id. at 1115-16, 1132
(noting that conditional spending programs placing limits on individual rights would be unconsti-
tutional). Nevertheless, Professor Rosenthal would object to a spending condition that destroyed
"essential attributes of state and local governmental autonomy." Id. at 1133. Others believe that
the federal spending power is, and should be, essentially unlimited. Engdahl, 44 Duke L. J. at
49-53 (cited in note 78).
319. See notes 84-85 and acompanying text.
320. See Federal Regulation at 48 (cited in note 11) (discussing the use of cross-cutting
regulations in new forms of regulatory federalism).
321. 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987). South Dakota argued that Congress's Spending Clause power
must give way to the states' power to regulate alcoholic beverages under the Twenty-first
Amendment, a claim rejected by the Court. Id. at 209. But see id. at 212 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that the Twenty-first Amendment gives states the power to impose minimum age
limits on the purchase of liquor).
322. Id. at 208 n.3.
323. Id.
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In dissent, however, Justice O'Connor opined that conditioning high-
way funding on the establishment of a minimum drinking age was not
"reasonably related to the expenditure of federal funds."324 While
denying any disagreement with the basic legal principles articulated
by the Court,325 Justice O'Connor disagreed with the application of
those principles to this case:
[Congress] is not entitled to insist as a condition of the use of highway funds
that the State impose or change regulations in other areas of the State's social
and economic life because of an attenuated or tangential relationship to high-
way use or safety. Indeed, if the rule were otherwise, the Congress could effec-
tively regulate almost any area of a State's social, political, or economic
life .... 326
Thus, while courts consistently uphold federal aid conditions against
challenges that they are too remote from the purposes of the spend-
ing,327 the Supreme Court has suggested that there may be some limits
to the elasticity of this principle.328
324. Id. at 212 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
325. However, there may be a more fundamental difference between the views posited by
the Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor. While it is easy to overinterpret the significance of
subtle differences in language, Justice O'Connor also used a slightly different formulation of the
third condition in her majority opinion in New York, 505 U.S. at 144. In Dole, Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote that "our cases have suggested (without significant elaboration) that conditions
on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated 'to the federal interest in particular
national projects or programs.'" Id. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 461). In New
York, Justice O'Connor, citing Dole, stated that "[s]uch conditions must ... bear some relation-
ship to the purpose of the federal spending." New York, 505 U.S. at 167. Under the Chief
Justice's language, the spending condition need only be related to a legitimate federal interest in
the project or program as a whole, and it is not even clear that the federal interest must relate to
the same federal program. Under Justice O'Connor's test, the conditions must be related to the
purpose of the spending. See also Baker, 95 Colum. L. Rev. at 1960-61 (cited in note 78)
(discussing O'Connor's call for a "clear fit" between the funding condition and the federal interest
in Dole).
326. Dole, 483 U.S. at 215 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). As further evidence of her discomfort
with the extent to which the Spending Clause has been stretched, Justice O'Connor cited with
approval Butler, 297 U.S. at 66, the last case in which the Supreme Court invalidated an aid
condition. See note 314.
327. Dole, 483 U.S. at 206 (upholding a program tying federal highway aid to state drinking
age requirements); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453-55 (upholding a program which tied public works
funding to minority business setasides); Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. at 129-30, 142-45
(upholding a requirement that state officials provided with federal highway funds refrain from
political activities under the Hatch Political Activity Act); Browner, 80 F.3d at 881-82 (upholding
a program which tied federal highway funds to air pollution compliance).
328. But see Engdahl, 44 Duke L. J. at 54-62 (cited in note 78) (presenting a compelling
argument that germaneness should be irrelevant to the spending power analysis).
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While the Court has upheld aid conditions tied to even the
largest federal spending programs, 29 Chief Justice Rehnquist sug-
gested in Dole that in some circumstances federal financial induce-
ments may be so coercive as to pass the point where pressure turns
into compulsion. He declined to rule on that basis in Dole, however,
because only a small percentage of state highway funds were at
stake.30 Chief Justice Rehnquist's suggestion raises similar empirical
and analytical problems as his analogous idea in NLCs. 3 31 Weighing
the fiscal effects and the coercive impact of a particular aid condition
is extremely difficult given the complexity of the federal-state-local
fiscal relationship. Funding in one program, such as education, may
be tied to compliance with another federal law such as the Civil Rights
Act, which itself is independently funded.3 32 Moreover, the costs of
compliance with one program may be offset by a wide range of fiscal
benefits provided by unrelated aspects of federal tax and spending
policy. Thus, the degree of impact-hence coercion--of the combined
funding and regulatory regime may be difficult to discern and poten-
tially misleading. The degree of coercion imposed by a particular
program also may vary from state to state, depending on relative
social and economic needs and conditions as well as on each state's
independent capacity to address the need without federal aid.
As with direct order mandates, these problems lend support to
the view that such complex interactions are best resolved by the po-
litical rather than the judicial branches.3 33 The legality of aid condi-
329. See, for example, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312-318 (1980) (upholding aid condi-
tions in the Medicaid program); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566-69 (1974) (upholding conditions
placed upon education funding); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 415-19 (1970) (upholding
federal conditions placed upon state receipt of AFDC funds); Davis, 301 U.S. at 640 (upholding
conditions placed upon Social Security funding). In Harris, 448 U.S. at 309, the Court ruled that
aid conditions no longer apply once funding specifically tied to that condition is withdrawn,
providing at least some redress for the "bait and switch" complaints raised by some anti-mandate
advocates. See notes 81-83 and accompanying text. However, this constraint appears to apply
relatively narrowly to those cases in which federal funding is withdrawn for a specific activity, as
opposed to cases where Congress merely "depart[s] from the original design." Harris, 448 U.S. at
309. See also Engdahl, 44 Duke L. J. at 78-83 (cited in note 78) (rejecting the coercion rationale).
330. Only about five percent of state highway funds were implicated by the federal aid
condition. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
331. See notes 273-75 and accompanying text.
332. See, for example, Lau, 414 U.S. at 566-69 (noting that schools receiving federal funds
must comply with the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964),
codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a et seq. (1994 & Supp. 1)).
333. Some who question the breadth of the spending power also note that the limits of this
authority are difficult to assess due to the paucity of judicial precedent, which results in turn
from Congress's reluctance to use spending in ways that impair basic elements of state autOn-
omy. Rosenthal, 39 Stan. L. Rev. at 1134 (cited in note 78). This, of course, suggests that the
political process has served as an effective check on potential congressional abuse of the spending
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tions under the Spending Clause, like the legality of direct orders un-
der the Tenth Amendment, should turn on whether they represent a
valid exercise of federal spending power and not on the degree of their
economic impact. Thus, while federal dollars obviously provide the
underpinning for federal quasi-regulatory authority under the
Spending Clause, the idea of spending conditions as unfunded federal
mandates once again adds nothing useful to the legal debate.
2. The Sixteenth Amendment
Opponents of a broadly defined federal spending power argue
that the federal government effectively limits available state revenue
sources through the expansive use of its virtually unchecked taxing
power, particularly after enactment of the Sixteenth Amendment.s34
They argue that when the federal government redistributes federal
tax receipts to the states, it attaches unwanted federal conditions. By
contrast, dollars that the states would otherwise collect if the federal
tax burden on state citizens were lower would be free of such federal
conditions.335
Congress's power to redistribute wealth within and among the
states through federal tax and spending policies,36 however, is amply
supported by the language of the Sixteenth Amendment itself.
Indeed, the significance of the Sixteenth Amendment may be under-
stated or overlooked in debates about the constitutional role of the
federal government. 37 Like the Civil War amendments, the Sixteenth
power. But see id. at 1140-41, 1163 (suggesting that political safeguards may be less effective in
preventing an abuse of federal spending than regulatory power).
334. See Baker, 95 Colum. L. Rev. at 1936-37 (cited in note 78) (noting that the states are
able to tax the income and property of their residents only after the federal government has
taken its share); Rosenthal, 39 Stan. L. Rev. at 1123 (cited in note 78) (finding that federal tax
policy has intruded into areas that Congress could not regulate either directly or through
spending). While it is beyond the scope of this Article to respond to all of Professor Baker's and
other commentators' normative objections to the current scope of the spending power, such
arguments alone cannot overcome the Supreme Court's prevailing-and virtually unchal-
lenged-legal analysis of the Spending Clause. Thus, even if these normative arguments are
sufficiently compelling, a constitutional amendment still might be needed to change the scope of
the spending power.
335. Baker, 95 Colum. L. Rev. at 1936-37 (cited in note 78).
336. The redistributive nature of and justification for unfunded federal mandates are
discussed in Part VI.
337. Virtually nothing has been written about the federalism, as opposed to pure tax-
related, implications of the Sixteenth Amendment. See Frohnmayer, 12 Envir. L. J. at 909 (cited
in note 252 (noting that the Sixteenth Amendment is seldom adequately considered in modern
academic or political discussions). Professor Choper cites the Sixteenth Amendment as one of
many instances in which a judicial decision striking federal action on federalism grounds was
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Amendment reflects a decision by the people to expand the power of
the national government relative to the states.
35
Under the Sixteenth Amendment, the federal government
levies taxes "without apportionment among the several States, and
without regard to any census or enumeration. ' 39 By its express terms,
federal income tax revenues need not be proportionate to state popula-
tion or any other indicator of size. More important, these revenues
need not be spent in proportion to state population. Indeed, elimina-
tion of any apportionment requirement was the main purpose of the
Amendment.
40
Clearly, federal tax and spending policies redistribute wealth
among different segments of the population, usually as a result of
policies chosen deliberately by the political branches of the federal
quickly overridden by political means-in this case by constitutional amendment. Choper, 86
Yale L. J. at 1583 (cited in note 10). However, he did not address the role of the amendment in
enhancing the redistributive powers of the national government. Professor Shapiro notes that
the Amendment "greatly enhanced federal power to raise revenue." Shapiro, Federalism at 29
(cited in note 1). As explained below, however, the real significance of the Amendment lies in its
elimination of any federal requirement to apportion revenues among states, thus greatly
enhancing federal power to redistribute income among states to save federal policy goals. See
notes 339-43. Professor Kornhauser explains the Amendment in the context of a broad range of
constitutional and other policy considerations, but not in the context of federalism. Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income Taxation of Gifts, 25 Conn. L.
Rev. 1, 52 (1992). Professor Rosenthal comes closest by acknowledging that the Amendment and
the accompanying expansion of the federal tax base provided "the means with which to finance a
welfare state and.., a political consensus that it is the responsibility of the federal government
to do so...." Rosenthal, 39 Stan. L. Rev. at 1111 (cited in note 78).
338. See Anastaplo, The Amendments to the Constitution at 187 (cited in note 16) (observing
that the Sixteenth Amendment was primarily intended to increase the power of the federal
government).
339. U.S. Const., Amend. XVI.
340. The Sixteenth Amendment was adopted in response to the decision of the Supreme
Court in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 582-83 (1895), overruled in part
by Baker, 485 U.S. at 505, which ruled that a tax imposed on income derived from municipal
bonds was unconstitutional because it was a tax against the power of the states and that a tax on
rents or income was a "direct tax," which must be apportioned by state population. The
Sixteenth Amendment did not expand the scope of federal taxing power. Rather, it eliminated
the need to apportion the revenues derived from such taxes. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189,
192-93 (1920); Peck v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1918); Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240
U.S. 1, 2-3 (1916). Indeed, the first federal income tax, passed to finance the Civil War, was
upheld in Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1880). See Charles 0. Galvin, Tax
Policy-Past, Present, and Future, 49 SMU L. Rev. 83, 84 (1995) (discussing the first federal
income tax and the Springer decision). This tax was repealed after the Civil War, however, and a
later-enacted income tax was invalidated, amidst sharp division in the Court and the country.
See id. at 86 n.13 (illustrating the extent of this division in the United States). However, the
direct tax was invalid for lack of apportionment and not because income or property fell outside
the proper scope of federal tax power. See Boris I. Bittker, Constitutional Limits on the Taxing
Power of the Federal Government, 41 Tax Law. 3, 4 (1987) (citing the License Tax Cases, 72 U.S.
(5 Wall.) 462, 471 (1866), which held that federal tax power, while limited by rules of apportion-
ment and uniformity, "reaches every subjece' except exports).
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government. 341  In addition, funds are collected and distributed un-
equally among states, both on an absolute and on a per capita basis.3 42
Thus, because federal revenues are collected disproportionately and
federal funds are returned to states disproportionately, some states
are net winners and others are net losers in the overall federal-state-
local fiscal game.343
When Congress offers assistance conditioned on compliance
with federal requirements, it uses its taxing and spending power as a
means of inducing the states to act consistent with national policy. A
state must decide whether it prefers to comply with those federal
conditions or to forego federal funds. Each time it takes the latter
course, it shifts its balance sheet further in the net loss direction,
because the payment of income taxes by its citizens is not likewise
voluntary. To avoid the federal policy, it must send more of its citi-
zens' dollars to Washington than it receives in return. When a state
declines federal funds, it cannot replace them by imposing higher
341. See Peterson, The Price of Federalism at 27 (cited in note 8) (concluding that the fed-
eral government is the "most capable agent of redistribution"). While Pollock was decided on
issues of federalism, tax law commentators explain the result in terms of a conservative Supreme
Court's reaction to Progressive Era efforts to transfer wealth from rich industrialists to poor
agrarian and industrial laborers. Kornhauser, 25 Conn. L. Rev. at 23 (cited in note 337); Galvin,
49 SMU L. Rev. at 86 n.13 (cited in note 340); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality of Money:
American Attitudes Toward Wealth and the Income Tax, 70 Ind. L. J. 119, 136-44 (1994);
Rotunda, 57 U. Colo. L. Rev. at 856-57 (cited in note 2).
342. In calendar year 1993, total individual federal income tax liability ranged from a low of
$968 million in Wyoming to almost $64 billion in California. U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census, StatisticalAbstracts of the United States 342 (U.S. G.P.O., 1996). On a per
capita basis, contributions ranged from $1,170 per person in Mississippi to $3,491 per person in
Connecticut. Id. In fiscal year 1995, in absolute terms, the total distribution of federal funds to
states ranged from $2.5 billion for Wyoming to $152.5 billion for California. U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Federal Expenditures by State for Fiscal Year 1995 at 1 (U.S.
G.P.O., 1995). The distribution of grant funds alone ranged from $560 million in Delaware to
$26.9 billion in California. Id. On a per capita basis, the distribution of federal grant funds
ranged from $534.84 per person in Virginia to $1,856.02 per person in Alaska (almost 3% times
higher). Id. at 34. Total federal spending ranged from $3,898.97 per person in Wisconsin to
$7,830.39 per person in Virginia. Id. Thus, differences in federal spending among the states
cannot be attributed to size alone, but rather reflect redistributive decisions or impacts. The fact
that Virginia ranks last in per capita grant distributions but first in total per capita federal
spending, id. at 51, probably reflects the presence of many federal military and civilian govern-
ment installations and employees in that state.
343. Indeed, when the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified, it was envisioned to redistribute
wealth from rich Northeastern states to debtor states in the South and the West. Galvin, 49
SMU L. Rev. at 87 (cited in note 340).
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taxes without paying an economic price in terms of the overall tax
burden of its populace relative to states that receive federal funds.
344
Anti-mandate advocates are correct that this is a form of eco-
nomic coercion by the federal government vis-a-vis the states, which
raises issues of equity and efficiency discussed in Part VI.345 Legally,
however, the power to redistribute federally generated funds among
states is sanctioned as an instrument of national policy by the
Sixteenth Amendment 346 coupled with the broad authority in the
Spending Clause to provide for the "general welfare" as Congress sees
fit. Specifically, the Sixteenth Amendment granted Congress the
power to collect revenue from a national body of taxpayers without
regard to state proportionality and to spend these funds for the na-
tional welfare.
Similarly, the fact that the federal government may redistrib-
ute wealth among states rebuts the contention that Congress must use
federal tax dollars to subsidize compliance with otherwise legitimate
federal regulations. From a political perspective, state and local
elected officials may prefer federal mandates to be funded so that tax
increases come from Congress and not from them. From a policy
perspective, however, if all federal mandates must be funded through
federal tax dollars, Congress would have less latitude to distribute
federal revenues to meet policy goals. Nationwide costs of compliance
with federal programs would be spread among national taxpayers in
proportion to their contribution to the national taxbase, rather than
among taxpayers within a jurisdiction in proportion to their contribu-
tion to the problem, as represented by differential compliance costs. If
Congress must pay for state or local compliance with federal law, the
citizens of states with lower compliance costs will subsidize com-
pliance by states with higher costs. For policy reasons Congress may
elect to subsidize some states at the expense of others, but under the
Sixteenth Amendment and the Spending Clause it is not required to
do so.
344. In fact, to the extent that a state deliberately chooses to forego federal funds, its citi-
zens further subsidize the citizens of other states, who will then receive a higher percentage of
federal funds relative to the share of revenues they send to Washington.
345. See Baker, 95 Colum. L. Rev. at 1935-38 (cited in note 78). While criticizing the role of
the Sixteenth Amendment in facilitating this federal power, Professor Baker fails to acknowledge
that, by ratifying the Amendment, the states and the public at large effectively legitimized this
federal role.
346. See Donald J. Boudreaux and A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution, An Economic
Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 111, 146 (1993) (noting
that Congress needed the Sixteenth Amendment to fund wealth redistribution directly).
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D. Full and Partial Preemption
Although complaints about federal preemption are raised in
concert with those about unfunded federal mandates,347 they are ana-
lytically distinct. A mandate dictates what a state or city must do,
while a preemption limits what it can do because the national gov-
ernment has chosen to act in the field instead. There can be no legal
challenge based on the idea of unfunded federal mandates when there
is no affirmative federal mandate and hence nothing to fund.
While preemption raises policy issues similar to those in the
debate over unfunded federal mandates such as intrusion on state and
local autonomy, accountability, equity, and efficiency,348 from a legal
perspective, preemption no longer raises serious issues of federalism.
So long as Congress acts within its constitutional authority under the
Supremacy Clause3 49 and does not intrude on domains expressly
reserved to the states, it may preempt entirely in a given field. 35 0
Opponents of unfunded federal mandates more often assail
partial or conditional preemption than full preemption. However,
requirements of federal programs that are assumed voluntarily cannot
be challenged on grounds that they are unfunded. If Congress has the
authority to preempt a field entirely, there is no reason why it cannot
do so partially or conditionally351 New York did nothing to change this
principle.52
347. See Federally Induced Costs at 22-24 (cited in note 17) (describing the manner in which
preemptions may constitute unfunded federal mandates); Federal Regulation at 47 fig. 4-3 (cited
in note 11) (depicting partial preemptions as among federal regulatory instruments).
348. See Part VI.
349. U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.
350. New York, 505 U.S. at 167-68; FERC, 456 U.S. at 765; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 291;
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 695-
96 (1979); Sperry, 373 U.S. at 403; Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist., 357 U.S. at 295; Taylor, 353 U.S. at
560, 568; Case, 327 U.S. at 101-03.
351. FERC, 456 U.S. at 764-65; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 289-90. Hodel cites a number of lower
court rulings upholding the validity of delegated federal programs on this basis. Hodel, 452 U.S.
at 289 n.30 (citing United States v. Helsey, 615 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir. 1979) (upholding the
Airborne Hunting Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-156, 85 Stat. 480 (1970), codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 742j-1 (1994)); Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 36-34 (2d Cir. 1977)
(upholding the Clean Air Act), Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1960), codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. (1994); Sierra Club v. Environmental Protection Agency, 540 F.2d 1114,
1140 (D.C. Cir. 1976), vacated by Montana Power Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 434
U.S. 809, 809 (1977) (upholding the Clean Water Act), Pub L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972),
codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (1994)).
352. New York, 505 U.S. at 167-68. See Kelley, 69 F.3d at 1509 (rejecting an argument that
federal regulation "compels the states not to regulate at all"); Kentucky Div., Horsemen's
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Moreover, from the perspective of unfunded federal mandates,
conditional preemption is no different from conditions of aid through
which Congress induces but does not require states and cities to adopt
federal policies. Rather than using the spending power to entice grant
recipients to implement federal programs,3 53 Congress encourages
states to adopt such programs to avoid full preemption and, therefore,
a complete loss of state or local autonomy in the field. Indeed, it is for
this very reason-to allow some state flexibility rather than complete
federal domination-that such "cooperative federalism" programs are
designed. 54 While anti-mandate advocates argue that Congress's real
goal is to coerce the states into paying to implement national policy,
program assumption remains entirely voluntary. Therefore, Congress
may offer the option of state and local delegation with full, partial, or
no funding attached.
E. Tax Policy Provisions
The national government can impose substantial fiscal impacts
on state and local governments through tax policy. Legally, however,
federal taxes or other aspects of tax policy cannot be challenged on the
grounds that they are unfunded federal mandates.
1. Direct Taxation
Federal tax policy has the clearest effect on states and cities
through direct taxation. For a long time, states and their instrumen-
talities enjoyed substantial immunity from federal taxation. 3-5  This
was fueled by Chief Justice Marshall's famous rhetoric in McCulloch
Benevolent & Protective Ass'n, 20 F.3d at 1415-16 (upholding partial preemption provision under
which federal law applies absent state action).
353. Many partial preemption programs, however, are accompanied by federal grant
funding. See notes 143-45 and accompanying text (discussing Clean Water Act funding pro-
grams).
354. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 264, 289 (observing that "[t]he most that can be said is that the
Surface Mining Act establishes a program of cooperative federalism that allows the States,
within limits established by federal minimum standards, to enact and administer their own
regulatory programs, structured to meet their own particular needs"); FERC, 456 U.S. at 765
n.29 (noting that "[c]ertainly, it is a curious type of federalism that encourages Congress to pro-
empt a field entirely, when its preference is to let the States retain the primary regulatory role").
355. See, for example, Pollock, 157 U.S. at 429, 584-86 (invalidating a federal tax on pro-
ceeds of municipal bonds as a tax against the power of the state); Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) 113, 128 (1871) (invalidating federal tax on the salary of a state judicial officer). For a
more detailed summary of the evolution and later decline of intergovernmental tax immunity,
see Rotunda, 57 U. Colo. L. Rev. at 852-60 (cited in note 2).
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v. Maryland that the "power to tax involves the power to destroy356
and by views of dual federalism357 However, state immunity from
federal taxation was never as broad as federal immunity from state
taxation, for reasons that parallel the "structural protection" theory of
federalism.358
Over time, the Court narrowed the range of state activities that
were immune from federal taxation. 59 Unfortunately, the circum-
356. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 315, 431 (1819). In McCulloch, the Supreme Court up-
held the authority of the national government to create a national bank and rejected the
authority of a state to impose a tax on that bank. Id. at 436-37.
357. See Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 124-26 (concluding that federal taxes on a county judge
impair the separate and independent sovereignty of the states).
358. In McCulloch, the Supreme Court noted that all states are represented in the national
government, but not vice versa:
The people of all the states have created the general government, and have conferred
upon it the general power of taxation. The people of all the states, and the states them-
selves, are represented in congress, and, by their representatives, exercise this power.
When they tax the chartered institutions of the states, they tax their constituents; and
these taxes must be uniform. But when a state taxes the operations of the government of
the United States, it acts upon institutions created, not by their own constituents, but by
people over whom they claim no control. It acts upon the measures of a government cre-
ated by others as well as themselves, for the benefit of others in common with them-
selves. The difference is that which always exists, and always must exist, between the
action of the whole on a part, and the action of a part on the whole-between the laws of
a government declared to be supreme, and those of a government which, when in oppo-
sition to those laws, is not supreme.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 435. See also Baker, 484 U.S. at 512-13 (noting that structural
protection reasoning applies to tax policy); id. at 518 n.11 (stating that federal tax immunity,
arising from the Supremacy Clause, is broader than state tax immunity, which stems from
concerns about state sovereignty); Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 456 (stating that states are
protected from federal taxation through the national political process, which is "uniquely adapted
to accommodating the competing demands" for national revenue and state action); New York v.
United States, 326 U.S. 572, 577 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion) ("New York (Taxy')
(concluding that the "considerations bearing upon taxation by the States of activities or agencies
of the federal government are not correlative with the considerations bearing upon federal
taxation of State agencies or activities" and that "all the States share in the legislative process by
which a tax of general applicability is laid"); Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466,
477-78 (1939) (noting that the immunities of state governments and the federal government from
taxation by the other do not stand on equal footing). But see Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 122-124
(holding that a state judicial officer is immune from federal taxation for reasons similar to
immunity of federal judicial officers from state taxation). Intergovernmental tax immunity was
narrowed substantially over time. Such immunity was eliminated first with respect to federal
taxes on state employees, Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 420-21 (1938), and l&ter with
respect to state taxes on federal employees. Graves, 306 U.S. at 486 (overruling Day, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) at 113, and other cases). Significantly for purposes of the unfunded mandate issue, the
Court in Graves rejected as incorrect or irrelevant the fact that taxes on government employees
might increase costs to the employer government. Graves, 306 U.S. at 483-85 nn.3-4.
359. First, the Court upheld federal taxation of "proprietary" as distinguished from
"essential" or "governmental" state functions or activities. South Carolina v. United States, 199
U.S. 437, 463 (1905); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 371 (1934) (upholding a federal liquor tax);
Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214, 227 (1934) (upholding a federal tax against state-owned
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stances in which federal taxation of state functions could be suspect
were obscured by the split opinions in New York v. United States
(Tax). In an opinion announcing the judgment for the Court, but
joined only by Justice Rutledge, Justice Frankfurter appeared to
support a rule that would uphold all federal taxes on state government
so long as they were not discriminatory and did not tax states
uniquely as states. 360 Chief Justice Stone's concurrence, joined by
Justices Reed, Murphy, and Barton,361 agreed that a "governmental"
versus "proprietary" distinction should be abandoned.3 62 However,
these Justices believed that a federal tax could be stricken, even if
nondiscriminatory, if the tax "unduly interferes with the performance
of the State's functions of government."363
Justice Frankfurter's view is more consistent with the current
law of intergovernmental regulation under Garcia, because the federal
government may regulate states in the same manner as private par-
ties,36 regardless of the resulting burden to state or local govern-
ments.365 States are protected from undue burdens of federal taxation
by the political process and because the resulting burdens are no
greater for states than for private enterprises. It is unlikely that a
nondiscriminatory tax could severely impair state functions and yet
still be politically viable with respect to similarly situated private
parties.
railroads). Later, in upholding a federal tax on the sale of mineral waters from springs owned
and operated by the state, the Court rejected the "governmental" versus "proprietary" distinction
in the context of tax immunity. New York (Tax), 326 U.S. at 572. As discussed earlier, the
concept of "traditional state functions" was revived temporarily in the regulatory context in
NLCs, but was abandoned in Garcia with express reliance on the Court's earlier rejection of the
distinction in the tax context in New York v. United States. See notes 269-80 and accompanying
text.
360. New York (Tax), 326 U.S. at 582.
361. Because it was joined by more Justices, the Supreme Court has since viewed Chief
Justice Stone's opinion as the "majority" view. Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 457-58 n.15.
362. New York (Tax), 326 U.S. at 586 (Stone, J., concurring). The Frankfurter and Stone
opinions, therefore, combined to create a majority of six on this point of law. Justices Douglas
and Black dissented, id. at 590, and Justice Jackson took no part in the decision. Id. at 584.
363. Id. at 588 (Stone, J., concurring).
364. See note 286.
365. Compare New York (Tax), 326 U.S. at 582 (stating Justice Frankfurter's view that
taxes are permissible where applied equally to state and private parties), with Garcia, 469 U.S.
at 546-47 (stating Justice Blackmun's view that permissibility of federal regulation cannot turn
on the distinction between "integral" governmental versus "proprietary" functions). See also New
York, 505 U.S. at 159-60 (stating Justice O'Connor's view that Congress may regulate states
through generally applicable laws). Justice Stone's view is more consistent with the impact
analysis approach in NLCs. Compare New York (Tax), 326 U.S. at 587-88 (stating Justice
Stone's view that taxes should be stricken if they interfere unduly with state functions), with
NLCs, 426 U.S. at 852 (stating Justice Rehnquist's view that federal regulation is invalid if it
interferes with integral state functions).
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Moreover, as with Justice Rehnquist's similar idea in NLCs
that the validity of federal regulation of states should turn on the
qualitative "degree of intrusion upon the protected area of state sover-
eignty,"366 judging the validity of federal taxes based on the resulting
degree of burden is vague and unworkable. While the precise fiscal
impact of a tax may be somewhat easier to determine than the impact
of a regulation, the resulting "burden" on state government is subjec-
tive, variable among jurisdictions, and impossible to determine pre-
cisely. As with regulation or spending, the impacts of federal taxes
cannot be divorced from other components of the federal-state-local
fiscal relationship including the resulting loss of federal revenue
which must then be derived from other sources.3 67 For example, the
burden of a federal tax on a particular jurisdiction must be balanced
against the benefits received. But the receipts of federal taxation are
redistributed among the states through spending programs that may
or may not be related to the source of the revenue.
This calculus becomes impossibly complex when all federal tax
and spending programs are viewed together. In one program, a state
may be required to pay more in taxes than it receives in benefits, but
in another program the opposite may be true. Congress may impose
stiff taxes either for revenue or for policy reasons in one area, but
increase grants or tax benefits in another to reduce the resulting
impacts to states or cities. Therefore, narrow party-defined litigation
challenging a specific tax is an inappropriate context in which to judge
the "burdens" imposed by Congress on states and cities. This complex
analysis, infused with interrelated issues of national policy, is better
left to the national political process than to judicial review.368 Thus,
constitutional challenges to direct taxation mandates are neither sup-
ported by precedent nor appropriate for judicial resolution.
366. See note 275 and accompanying text.
367. See Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 456. The Massachusetts Court stated that:
[A]ny immunity for the protection of state sovereignty is at the expense of the sovereign
power of the National Government to tax. Therefore, when the scope of the States' con-
stitutional immunity is enlarged beyond that necessary to protect the continued ability of
the States to deliver traditional governmental services, the burden of the immunity is
thrown upon the National Government without any corresponding promotion of the con-
stitutionally protected values.
Id.
368. See New York (Tax), 326 U.S. at 581 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting that "[t]he
problem [of measuring the burdens of taxation] cannot escape issues that do not lend themselves
to judgment by criteria and methods of reasoning that are within the professional training and
special competence of judges").
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This is evident in the most recent Supreme Court decision on
the validity of a federal intergovernmental tax. In Massachusetts v.
United States, the Court upheld a flat fee registration tax on civil
aircraft, including state helicopters used for police purposes, against
claims that it impaired "the essential and traditional state function of
operating a police force."36 9  Consistent with Justice Frankfurter's
opinion in New York (Tax), the tax was upheld as nondiscriminatory
against state as opposed to private aircraft.3° Moreover, in a manner
prophetic of the idea's resurrection in the regulatory context in Garcia,
Justice Brennan's majority opinion relied on the fact that states re-
ceive protection against excess taxation through the national political
process. 371 Justice Brennan also rejected the idea that economic im-
pacts via increased costs--even of essential state services-were
sufficient to invalidate the federal tax,372 again consistent with New
York (Tax) and other earlier cases in which intergovernmental tax
immunity was eroded.373
Consistent with the reasoning of Garcia, it is now difficult to
justify the idea that a nondiscriminatory federal tax can be stricken
because it impairs a traditional state function.3 74 If the national po-
litical process is adequate to protect states against excessive nondis-
criminatory regulation by Congress, it should be adequate as well to
protect states against excessive nondiscriminatory taxation. 375
Moreover, just as it is impossible for judges in an isolated piece of
369. 435 U.S. 444, 452 (1978).
370. Id. at 457-58. In addition, this tax was justified as more of a fee than a tax because
aircraft rates were tied reasonably to services rendered. Id. at 463-67.
371. Id. at 456 (noting that the political process is "uniquely adapted to accommodating
competing demands" for national revenue versus state needs). While recognizing the Court's re-
jection of the political process theory in NLCs, which was then still good law, Justice Brennan
opined that it was still relevant to intergovernmental tax cases. Id. at 456-57 n.13.
372. Id. at 459.
373. Nevertheless, Justice Brennan's opinion in Massachusetts clings to the idea that some
residual state tax immunity remains, even in the case of nondiscriminatory taxes, in order
"solely to protect the States from undue interference with their traditional governmental
.functions." Id. at 459. See In re Brentwood Outpatient, Ltd., 43 F.3d at 263-64 (upholding the
federal bankruptcy preemption of a county tax but suggesting a different result if the impact
were greater). This remnant may be explained by the fact that Massachusetts was decided after
NLCs but before Garcia and, thus, was still influenced by the NLCs prohibition against the
impairment of traditional functions. Alternatively, it may be explained by adherence to the
views of the majority of Justices who endorsed Chief Justice Stone's opinion in New York (Tax).
Or perhaps the Court simply wanted to keep its options open in order to address a particularly
egregious abuse of the federal tax power.
374. See Rotunda, 57 U. Colo. L. Rev. at 866-68 (cited in note 2) (arguing for further erosion
of intergovernmental tax immunity).
375. Even Justice Frankfurter would have stricken federal taxes that discriminate against
states, especially by taxing instrumentalities that are unique to state government, such as
statehouses. New York (Tax), 326 U.S. at 582.
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litigation to weigh the competing benefits and burdens of overall na-
tional policy in the context of isolated federal regulations, so is it
impossible with respect to isolated federal taxes.
3 76
2. Indirect Effects of Tax Policy
States and cities argue that federal tax policy adversely affects
their finances indirectly as well. The ACIR, for example, asserted that
Congress impaired state and local revenue generation by eliminating
the tax-exempt status of unregistered bonds,3 77 by eliminating the tax-
exempt status of industrial development bonds issued to fund certain
private activities, and by placing a cap on the total amount of indus-
trial development bonds issued in each state.
3 78
The legal response to this claim is identical to that given for
federal spending because tax-exempt bond authority is really a differ-
ent form of federal grant or subsidy.379 When the federal government
reduces or eliminates taxes on income from state and local bonds, it
lowers state and local interest costs at the expense of lower federal
revenues. 38° The same net result could be obtained via grant rather
376. Baker, 485 U.S. at 505, 527. This decision was written by Justice Brennan and was
decided after and relied expressly on Garcia. Id. It upheld the validity of a federal tax law
eliminating tax exemptions for unregistered bearer bonds. Id. However, while involving
taxation, the statute was upheld as an exercise of federal regulation, not as a direct tax. Id.
Nevertheless, it suggests further that the full reasoning of Garcia should be applied to direct tax
cases as well.
377. This provision was upheld in Baker, 485 U.S. at 505, as a legitimate and nondiscrimi-
natory exercise of federal regulatory power.
378. Federally Induced Costs at 24 (cited in note 17). See also Tax-exempt Financing at 1-5
(cited in note 102) (describing other restrictions on tax-exempt bond authority).
379. See Baker, 485 U.S. at 511 n.6 (suggesting, but not ruling, that exemptions from
federal taxation constitute a subsidy); Rotunda, 55 U. Colo. L. Rev. at 850-51 (cited in note 2)
(arguing that tax.exempt bonds are, in essence, a subsidy); Rosenthal, 39 Stan. L. Rev. at 1123
(cited in note 78) (noting that some conditional tax benefits are in some ways indistinguishable
from conditional grants).
380. Rymarowicz and Zimmerman, Federal Budget and Tax Policy at 18 (cited in note 29).
Of course, some question has been raised about whether the Sixteenth Amendment overruled the
portion of Pollock invalidating federal taxation of state and local bond interest, as opposed to the
portion of the opinion invalidating direct taxes for lack of apportionment. See Evans v. Gore, 253
U.S. 245, 262-64 (1920), overruled in part by OMalley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277, 280-83 (1939)
(citing Pollock in course of invalidating tax on judicial salary); Bittker, 41 Tax Law. at 4 (cited in
note 340) (noting the ambiguity in the Sixteenth Amendment and asking whether the Sixteenth
Amendment overruled Pollock's prohibition on taxing income from state and municipal bonds);
Kornhauser, 25 Conn. L. Rev. at 12 n.42 (cited in note 337) (discussing whether the expansion of
congressional power would now allow Congress to tax state and local bonds as well as the
salaries of local judges). As a textual matter, this doubt appears resolved by the words "from
whatever source derived" and from ratification of the Amendment in the face of contemporaneous
concerns that it would allow taxation of bond income. Rymarowicz and Zimmerman, Federal
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than tax subsidy, possibly with lower transaction costs to the federal
government.5 1
From the state and local perspective, the fiscal benefits of tax-
exempt bonds may be preferable to direct grants because they are not
accompanied by direct and cross-cutting grant conditions that require
some funds to be spent in order to receive others. However, when
Congress delimits the activities that are eligible for tax-exempt bonds
or defines 'the manner in which such bonds may be issued, it imposes
accountability requirements on the uses of federal tax subsidies, just
as it imposes accountability conditions on the use of federal grants.
Thus, a federal decision to reduce or condition tax-exempt bond
authority should be treated legally the same as a condition of federal
aid.
The ACIR also argues that states are hurt by intergovernmen-
tal tax competition. States allegedly lose revenue when both the state
and federal governments tax the same commodity such as gasoline.
3s2
The empirical basis for this claim is not clear. A state may choose as a
matter of policy to avoid additional taxes on a commodity already
taxed by Congress in order to avoid making that commodity too ex-
pensive to consumers. However, from a purely fiscal perspective,
those revenues can be replaced by increasing other types of taxes not
imposed by the federal government, such as those on property.33
While this reduces state and local autonomy by restricting the scope of
tax policy decisions, federal taxation probably does not reduce state
and local revenue-generation capacity unless all taxable commodities
are being taxed to the maximum extent economically possible.
Moreover, intergovernmental tax competition raises legal
issues no different from those suggested by preemption. Congress has
authority to impose taxes to "provide for the common Defence and
Budget and Tax Policy at 18 (cited in note 29). For a more detailed argument that federal taxa-
tion of state and local bond interest is constitutional, see Rotunda, 57 U. Colo. L. Rev. at 866-68
(cited in note 2).
381. See Tax-exempt Financing at 18 (cited in note 102) (discussing a failed 1976 proposal
by President Carter to replace tax-exempt bonds with a more efficient direct transfer of federal
funds); Rotunda, 57 U. Colo. L. Rev. at 851 (cited in note 2) (citing statistics that the federal
government loses 50% more in taxes than cities and states save in interest).
382. Federally Induced Costs at 24 (cited in note 17). See Rosenthal, 39 Stan. L. Rev. at
1936-38 (cited in note 78) (explaining that the federal government, when offering funds to the
states with conditions attached, is in effect offering to return to the states funds which could
have been taxed directly by the states).
383. The three basic levels of government tend to tax different revenue sources. Federal
revenue is derived primarily from income taxes, local revenue predominantly from property
taxes, and state revenue from a mixture of the two. Peterson, The Price of Federalism at 20 tbl.
2.1 (cited in note 8) (listing sources of revenue for federal, state, and local governments).
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general Welfare of the United States."3 84 Federal tax power clearly in-
fringes on state sovereignty to some degree. So long as the tax is
within the scope of authority granted by the Constitution, however,
the intrusion is legally sanctioned, even if it results in revenue loss or
incidental regulatory impacts.385
F. Incidental Federal Policy Impacts
1. Increased Demands for State Services
By including in its definition of federally induced costs any
federal action that "imposes additional financial burdens on states and
localities, 386 the ACIR included a wide range of incidental federal
policy impacts. These include increased demand for state and local
services near federal installations and for education, health, and other
benefits for legal and illegal immigrants.
38 7
While several such impacts have been challenged under the
unfunded federal mandate rubric, most of those challenges have
failed. For example, in Padavan v. United States, 3 8 the Second Circuit
rejected claims that the federal government, because it has plenary
power over immigration and the impact of immigration policy, must
reimburse the state of New York for expenditures made on legal and
illegal aliens.38 9 To the contrary, Congress may act within its plenary
powers even though the intergovernmental effects may be onerous. 390
The court found the claims based on the Naturalization and
384. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
385. See United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1961) (upholding against a Tenth
Amendment challenge a federal statute vesting in the United States the property of deceased
veterans who died intestate or without heirs); Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. at 363 (upholding a
federal estate tax against a Tenth Amendment challenge despite incidental regulatory impacts);
Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at 549-50 (upholding against claims of nonuniformity and
violations of state sovereignty portions of the Social Security Act allowing credits against federal
unemployment tax for contributions to state unemployment funds); Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S.
12, 12 (1927) (upholding against a federalism challenge federal inheritance tax that allowed
deduction of state inheritance tax).
386. See note 71.
387. Federally Induced Costs at 3, 24 (cited in note 17).
388. 82 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 1996). The service expenditures involved the costs of providing for
the "education, confinement, health, and welfare of legal and illegal aliens." Id. at 25.
389. Id. at 26-27.
390. Id. at 26 (citation omitted).
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Guarantee Clauses nonjusticiable 9' and rejected a Tenth Amendment
challenge under the commandeering theory of New York v. United
States, reasoning that the federal government does not "commandeer"
the state to provide the services in question.392
Each of the services for which the state sought reimbursement
in Padavan have been addressed above in other categories. For ex-
ample, states provide emergency medical services through voluntary
participation in Medicaid, from which they are legally free to with-
draw.39 3 Further, any requirement that states provide education to
illegal immigrant children derives not from a congressional mandate,
but from the Constitution,394 and thus cannot violate the Tenth
Amendment.3 95 In addition, any state obligations to prosecute and
incarcerate legal and illegal immigrants stem from their own laws and
"not from any federal mandate."396
Thus, two principles already discussed appear to preclude
most, if not all, possible legal challenges to this potpourri of "other"
federal actions that may have an incidental fiscal impact on states and
cities by increasing the cost of providing public services. First, when
Congress acts within its enumerated powers, principles of supremacy
dictate that the action is valid notwithstanding incidental require-
ments on states, however burdensome. Second, in order to be vulner-
able under New York, Congress must actually command the state to
engage in the underlying activity; it is not enough that the federal
action merely increases demand for a service. No New York violation
occurs when the activity is undertaken voluntarily or due to independ-
ent constitutional or other legal requirements placed on the states.
2. Limits on State-Owned Commodities
Federal bans or constraints on the export of state-owned com-
modities, with incidental impacts on state revenues due to differential
391. Id. at 27-28. The court summarily dismissed, presumably as not worthy of comment,
an argument that the impact of masses of new immigrants violated the Invasion Clause. Id. at
28.
392. See Chiles, 69 F.3d at 1096-97 (rejecting similar arguments made by Florida).
393. Padavan, 82 F.3d at 29.
394. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210-11 (1982) (concluding that illegal aliens are entitled to
equal protection). See also Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 641-42 (applying equal protection to welfare
benefits).




prices in export as opposed to domestic markets, also raise another
type of "incidental impact" on states. 97
In Board of Natural Resources of the State of Washington v.
Brown,398 the Ninth Circuit invalidated a provision of the Forest
Resources Conservation and Shortage Relief Act 39 that restricted
exports of timber harvested from state public lands west of the 100th
meridian and within the continental United States.4°° The court noted
that the ban would result in financial losses to the state of over $500
million.41 However, it did not decide the case on the basis of this
incidental unfunded federal mandate argument; rather, the Ninth
Circuit invalidated the provision under New York because the law
required states to issue regulations to implement the export ban.
Thus, even though the state itself was the only subject of the
"regulations," the court reasoned that the Act included "direct com-
mands to the states to regulate according to Congress's instructions"
in violation of New York. 402
One year later, the federal district court for Alaska refused to
invalidate Congress's prohibition on the export of crude oil trans-
ported through the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS).403 The
district court held that control over oil exports through the Export
Administration Act 404 was a valid exercise of Congress's plenary power
over foreign commerce. 405 To the extent that exercise of this power
impaired state autonomy, the court held that Alaska must rely on the
political process. Reliance on New York was misguided because the
Act neither fell outside of Congress's enumerated powers nor contra-
vened the structure of the Union.406
The district court may not have applied New York correctly.
Under New York, it is possible for Congress to act within the scope of
its substantive authority under the Constitution but to violate the
Tenth Amendment if the means chosen are impermissible, i.e., com-
397. These two cases also can be viewed as direct order mandates, but the legal analysis is
not affected by this definitional issue.
398. 992 F.2d at 937 (9th Cir. 1993).
399. Pub. L. No. 101-382, 104 Stat. 714 (1990), codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 620-620j (1994).
400. Brown, 992 F.2d at 941, 949.
401. Id. at 941.
402. Id. at 947.
403. Brown, 850 F. Supp. at 828.
404. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406(d) (1994).
405. Brown, 850 F. Supp. at 827.
406. Id. at 828. The court also rejected claims based on the Guarantee Clause, as nonjusti-
ciable, id.; issues of presentment, bicameralism, and separation of powers, id. at 825-26; and the
Port Preference Clause. Id. at 826-27.
1997] 1223
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
mandeering the state's regulatory apparatus rather than regulating
the matter directly or through the spending power. Although the oil
export prohibition was a substantively valid exercise of congressional
power over foreign commerce, it still might be prohibited under New
York, as was the timber export ban in Washington v. Brown, if it
forced the state to promulgate regulations. The TAPS export ban,
however, can be upheld consistent with both New York and
Washington v. Brown because it operates directly and does not require
Alaska to promulgate regulations.
The inconsistency between these two cases, however, suggests
a problem either with the manner in which the New York test is ar-
ticulated or in the manner in which it was interpreted in Washington
v. Brown. In New York, the state was forced either to take title to the
low-level nuclear waste in question or to issue regulations effective
against third parties.4 7 The target of regulation was not the state, but
other parties who generate low-level waste. The violation identified
by Justice O'Connor was that Congress, rather than regulating di-
rectly, required the state to regulate the third parties.
While the statute in question in Brown required that
"regulations" be issued, the target of regulation was the state itself,
and the "regulations" were simply a vehicle to require the state to
comply with the federal statute.48 It is anomalous to hold that the
validity of the congressional enactment turns on the use of
"regulation" terminology in the timber ban as opposed to the more
direct command in the TAPS export ban. The real thrust of New York
and the reasoning that would prevent this anomalous result is that
while Congress may regulate states as the targets of legitimate regu-
lation, it may not require states to act as unwilling federal agents to
regulate third parties.409 To cure this problem, New York could be
modified to adopt a "target of regulation" test.
407. New York, 505 U.S. at 153 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (1994)).
408. It could be argued that private parties issued leases to harvest state timber also would
be the targets of the state regulations. However, the state owns the timber which is the subject
of the federal export ban. Arguing that a state can render direct federal regulation invalid under
id. at 144, by leasing or contracting its legal rights to a third party could be used to avoid a wide
range of federal direct orders.
409. Stated with regard to the language of the Tenth Amendment, the "power" not delegated
to Congress is the power to require states to regulate third parties, rather than the power that
Congress clearly does have to regulate third parties-including states-directly. What is
"reserved" to the states is the power to decide how they will use their own regulatory power, on
whom, and on what issues. This view is consistent with the accountability reasoning in New
York, 505 U.S. at 144. See Part VI. See also Dana, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 6 (cited in note 4)
(distinguishing between "implementation" and "compliance" mandates).
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3. Conclusion
In sum, the only "incidental impact" case in which a federal
action was stricken on Tenth Amendment grounds might be based on
a misapplication by the Ninth Circuit of the prohibition against
"commandeering" in New York. Even if Brown was decided correctly,
the federal regulation therein was struck down because it included a
direct order for the state to regulate within the meaning of New York
and not because it resulted in indirect fiscal impacts on the state.
Thus, there is no independent legal basis on which a federal action
with incidental fiscal impacts can be rejected because it constitutes an
unfunded federal mandate. While federal actions may be struck down
if they stray beyond the bounds of authority granted by the
Constitution, the fact that otherwise valid exercises of such authority
cause incidental fiscal impacts appears to be legally irrelevant.
G. Federal Statutory Liability
Federal statutory liability41O differs qualitatively from other
mandates because liability merely requires compensation for conduct
that causes identifiable damages to third parties. 41 It does not, as do
most "mandates," require states or cities to take new action.412
410. Opponents of unfunded federal mandates have not, at least to date, identified federal
common law liabilities as a problem. This may be because, after the decision in Erie R.R. Co., v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 64 (1938), the scope of federal common law is relatively narrow and of mi-
nor, if any, concern to states and cities as a source of federal dictates. Nevertheless, Professor
Meltzer maintains that a small body of legitimate federal common law remains:
Despite Erie's declaration that "[t]here is no federal general common law," courts
have fashioned what Judge Friendly has termed "specialized federal common law" to
govern a broad range of areas. Unlike the "spurious" federal common law of the era of
Swift v. Tyson, this new federal common law is binding under the Supremacy Clause in
the state courts.
The proper scope of federal common lawmaking is a matter of considerable uncer-
tainty.
John J. Cound, et al., Civil Procedure, Cases and Materials 394 (West, 5th ed. 1990) (quoting
David J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1128, 1167-72
(1986)). Thus, it is at least possible that liability may be imposed on states and cities under
federal common law. Presumably, such liability would be subject to the same rules of validity
under the Supremacy Clause as federal statutory liability. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (discussing the application of federal law to achieve uniformity
and finding commercial law to be a reference source).
411. See notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
412. Superfund and other federal environmental laws may require states or localities to
take affirmative remedial steps. See, for example, 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1994) (requiring abatement
actions). However, such requirements constitute direct regulatory orders discussed above, rather
than liability for damages. See notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1137
Nevertheless, it does meet the two criteria of a mandate: authority to
issue and duty to comply. 413
There appears to be no reason why federal statutory liability
should be more vulnerable to legal challenges based on federalism
than direct order mandates. So long as the statute constitutes a
proper exercise of federal power, the fact that it results in state and
local liability should be treated no differently from other burdens
imposed by federal enactments.
There are, however, Eleventh Amendment 4 4 constraints on the
judicial forum in which liability may be imposed against states.
Unless waived,4' 5 the Eleventh Amendment bars not only cases seek-
ing monetary damages, 4 6 but all cases brought by citizens of another
state4 7 against states in federal court regardless of the nature of relief
sought, even injunctive relief resulting in state expenditures. 4 s If a
state allows suit in its own courts, this limit might be insignificant
except for differences in the likelihood of success in state versus fed-
413. See notes 64-73 and accompanying text. The allegedly most onerous example of such li-
ability is CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq. (1994). While CERCLA liability is based largely on
existing common law, see notes 138-39 and accompanying text, federal courts could interpret this
liability more broadly in light of the broad deterrent and remedial purposes of the statute. See,
for example, United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemical Co:, 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th Cir.
1989) (noting the broad language used in CERCLA and finding that a liberal judicial interpreta-
tion consistent with the remedial scheme should be used). Other statutes might impose new
liability or higher measures of liability.
414. U.S. Const., Amend. XI (stating that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State").
The Amendment protects many of the same principles of federalism as are at issue with un-
funded federal mandates. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1124 (1996)
(concluding that the Amendment "serves to avoid 'the indignity of subjecting a State to the
coercive process of [federal] judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties'" and quoting
Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)). It was
passed after Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 419 (1792), which ruled that states could be
sued in federal court by citizens of another state. The decision "created such a shock of surprise
throughout the country that, at the first meeting of Congress thereafter, the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution was almost unanimously proposed." Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.
1, 11 (1890). See Anastaplo, The Amendments to the Constitution at 102 (cited in note 16)
(discussing the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment).
415. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1122. In CERCLA cases, for example, a state can waive
its immunity by bringing a cost recovery claim against a private party, which then may bring a
compulsory counterclaim against the state; or when the state brings its own counterclaim in a
suit filed by a private party. See Gail Ruderman Feuer and David S. Beckman, Citizen Suits Are
Alive and Well Following the Seminole Tribe Decision, 5 Envir. L. News 40, 40-41 & n.10 (1996)
(discussing private cost recovery actions under CERCLA).
416. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 665-68 (1974).
417. In Hans, 134 U.S. at 20-21, the Supreme Court ruled that, despite the literal limita-
tions of the text, suits brought against a state by its own citizens are also barred by the
Amendment.
418. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1124 (citing Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90 (1982)).
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eral court. 419 If a similar suit is barred in state court, though, the
Eleventh Amendment may shield states altogether from statutory
liability otherwise imposed by federal law. There are limits, however,
to a state's ability to avoid a federal claim when there is no "neutral or
valid" reason for the state court to apply governmental immunity to a
federal as opposed to a state cause of action.
420
Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment provides only partial relief
from unfunded federal statutory mandates. First, the Amendment is
limited to suits brought by citizens. Suits may be brought in federal
court by the federal government 421 or by another state422 to impose
liability created by federal statute. In addition, the Eleventh
Amendment provides potential mandate relief only to states and not
to their political subdivisions.423 Thus, counties and municipalities
remain subject to federal statutory liability in federal and state courts.
Congress may also override the Eleventh Amendment under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 424 This can include the imposition of
419. Moreover, federal review by the Supreme Court ultimately will be available for federal
issues decided by state courts. McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco,
Department of Business Regulation of Florida, 496 U.S. 18, 30-31 (1990).
420. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 379-81 (1990).
421. United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S 128, 140-41 (1965).
422. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 2 (conferring jurisdiction on federal courts to hear cases between
states and all cases in which the United States is a party); South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192
U.S. 286, 315-21 (1904).
423. See Will, 491 U.S. at 70 (finding that municipalities enjoy no Eleventh Amendment
protection). In some cases, however, it may be difficult to decide whether a defendant is an "arm
of the state" for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Mancuso v. New York State
Thruway Auth., 86 F.3d 289, 292 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, New York State Thruway Auth. v.
Mancuso, 117 S. Ct. 481, 481 (1996) (finding that a Thruway Authority would be entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity if it could show that it is more like an arm of the state than a
municipality); New Jersey v. Gloucester Environmental Management Services, 923 F. Supp. 651,
655-60 (D.N.J. 1995) (noting that a party is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity if it is
basically an "alter ego" of the state).
424. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment is limited by the enforcement provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment). The key
remaining issue is whether Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity under constitu-
tional authority other than the Civil War amendments. Presumably, the reasoning of Fitzpatrick
applies to authority granted to Congress under other post-Civil War amendments, such as
Section 2 of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. A plurality in Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 6 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe, 65 U.S.L.W. at 4731, addressing the
ability of a private party to bring a cost recovery action against a state under CERCLA, found
that Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Interstate Commerce Clause.
In Seminole Tribe, however, the Court rejected a claim that Congress could revoke state
immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1122. Rather than
distinguishing the Indian Commerce from the Interstate Commerce Clause, a five-Justice
majority instead overruled Union Gas:
In overruling Union Gas today, we reconfirm that the background principle of state
sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dis-
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retroactive damages425 and orders for prospective payments to ensure
future compliance with substantive federal law.426 Finally, under Ex
parte Young,4 27 the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against
state officials to enjoin prospective or ongoing violations of federal law.428
While this may not result in the imposition of retroactive liability except
in Fourteenth Amendment cases, 42 9 state or local expenditures might
be needed to prevent recurring violations in other areas as well.430
The application of the Eleventh Amendment in the context of
unfunded federal mandates is not entirely clear. Now, sovereign
immunity probably bars all cases brought by private parties against
states seeking to impose federal statutory liability enacted under
sipate when the subject of the suit is an area... that is under the exclusive control of the
Federal Government. Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete lawmak-
ing authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional
authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting States.
Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1131. See Will, 491 U.S. at 65 (stating in the context of 42 U.S.C. §
1983 the rule of statutory construction that if Congress intends to alter the "usual constitutional
balance between the States and the Federal Government," it must make its intention to alter the
balance "unmistakeably clear in the language of the statute"); Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-40 (1985) (concluding that Congress may exercise its Fourteenth
Amendment powers to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity only where "an
unequivocal expression of intent" to do so exists). The Seminole Tribe dissent argued that
Congress had the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity, at least with respect to
citizens of the defendant state, who are not covered by the express terms of the Eleventh
Amendment, so long as Congress acts within its sphere of delegated authority. Seminole Tribe,
116 S. Ct. at 1144-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In essence, Justice Stevens argued that sovereign
immunity was among the elements of sovereignty surrendered by the States when they ratified
the Constitution.
425. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456 (upholding an award of back pay against a state when
the cause of action was created by Congress under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
426. See Millikin v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289-91 (1977) (concluding that prospective relief
in the form of payments for future educational costs did not violate the Eleventh Amendment);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 664-66 (concluding that the Eleventh Amendment barred
payment of retroactive benefits by Illinois). However, in another application of the plain state-
ment doctrine, the courts have found that state sovereign immunity is abridged only when
Congress has done so clearly. Millikin, 433 U.S. at 266; Edelman, 415 U.S. at 651.
427. 209 U.S. 123, 123 (1908).
428. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1132 (stating that federal jurisdiction exists in suits
against state officials "when that suit seeks only prospective injunctive relief in order to 'end a
continuing violation of federal law' ").
429. Millikin, 433 U.S. at 289-91.
430. The majority appeared to accept this possibility in footnote 17 of Seminole Tribe, which
suggested that Congress properly authorized prospective remedies under Ex parte Young in
statutes such as the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (authorizing suits against any person,
including a state or municipality, alleged to be in violation of water pollution control require-
ments). Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1134-35. In most cases, state or local expenditures will be
required to remedy water pollution violations, and plainly it cannot be envisioned that such costs
be borne by the nominal state official being sued. The Court found no such congressional intent
in the relevant provision of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7), which was
at issue in Seminole Tribe. Id.
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authority other than the Civil War amendments. 431  However,
Congress can impose similar requirements in other ways. First, de-
pending on the nature of the issue, the United States and other states
may sue directly to impose statutory liability notwithstanding the
Eleventh Amendment.432 Second, citizens may still sue state officials
who act in violation of federal law, at least to obtain prospective in-
junctive relief and attorney's fees.43
H. Conclusion: The Legal Implications of Unfunded
Federal Mandates
Evaluation of potential legal challenges to unfunded federal
mandates leads to several conclusions. First, as suggested by the
definitional and fiscal analysis, the idea of unfunded federal mandates
adds little or nothing to the legal discourse on federalism. For those
limited types of federal mandates prohibited by New York, federal
funding would make no legal difference.434 Second, analysis of federal-
431. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1125-28.
432. In CERCLA, for example, Congress created causes of action for the federal government,
a state or an Indian tribe, or "any other person" to recover cleanup costs from other responsible
parties. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (providing for cost recovery actions). Any person may also bring
"contribution" actions against other responsible parties when the plaintiff is subject to a civil
action by a governmental or nongovernmental party. Id. § 9613(f). Under Seminole Tribe,
CERCLA suits against states by private parties appear to be barred in federal court. At least
one lower federal court has dismissed a CERCLA suit against a state on the basis of Seminole
Tribe. Prisco v. New York, No. 91 Civ. 3990 (RLC), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14944 at *42-44
(S.D.N.Y., Oct. 16, 1996). According to some experts, the effect of Seminole Tribe "will be limited
because counties and municipalities... are sued for contribution most frequently." Robert V.
Percival, et al., Environmental Regulation, Law, Science and Policy 332 (Little Brown, 2d ed.
1996). Moreover, even with respect to states, the scope of the shield depends on how a cleanup is
conducted. The federal government could conduct its own cleanup, 42 U.S.C. § 9604, and bring a
cost recovery action directly against a responsible state. Or, in some circumstances, the United
States could bring an action to force a responsible state to conduct the cleanup, see id. § 9606,
and the state may then bring cost recovery or contribution actions against other parties. In
either case, the state would incur liability in ways that do not implicate the Eleventh
Amendment. As discussed in note 415, states may waive their immunity in CERCLA cases by
bringing a cost recovery action or responding to a claim by filing a counterclaim.
433. In a case following Seminole Tribe, the Ninth Circuit dismissed a Clean Water Act
citizen suit against the state and against state officials with respect to retroactive relief involving
payments of state funds but declined to dismiss the suit against state officials seeking prospec-
tive injunctive relief. Natural Resources Defense Council v. California Dept. of Transportation, 96
F.3d 420, 421-24 (9th Cir. 1996). See Strahan v. Coxe, 939 F. Supp. 963, 981-83 (D. Mass. 1996)
(finding that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar citizen suits under the Endangered Species
Act). See generally Feuer and Beckman, 5 Envir. L. News at 40 (cited in note 415) (discussing
CERCLA private citizen suits).
434. Except for federal requirements attached to aid conditions, when federal funding itself
provides the legal justification for the requirement, the unfunded status of a federal requirement
appears irrelevant to its legality. Nor was the decision in New York, 505 U.S. at 144, premised
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ism from the perspective of unfunded federal mandates counsels
against any temptation to return to the impact-focus approach to
regulatory challenges in National League of Cities, at least to the
extent that it implicates evaluation of fiscal burdens. 435 , Similarly, it
suggests that an impact test is also inappropriate in other contexts,
such as challenges to aid conditions or federal taxes.436 Third, judicial
use of plain statement and similar rules of statutory construction
safeguards principles of federalism. If states are protected against
excess national power through the national political process, plain
statement rules ensure that Congress in fact considers potential im-
pacts on state and local governments and announces its decision on
the matter clearly. In this sense, plain statement rules are more
consistent theoretically with the view that states are protected by the
national political process than with the view that states are entitled to
judicial protection as well. Finally, evaluation of legal issues involving
federalism in the context of unfunded federal mandates underscores
the overlooked role of the Sixteenth Amendment in supporting federal
spending and regulatory policy as well as taxation. Because it allows
the collection of income taxes "without apportionment among the
several States," the Sixteenth Amendment, read together with the
Spending Clause, authorizes the federal government to redistribute
income among the states to meet federal policy objectives. At a mini-
mum, the Amendment justifies the use of the spending power to pro-
mote federal policy without regard to proportionate distribution
among states. More broadly, however, the Amendment also rebuts the
idea that Congress must offset the burdens of any given federal regu-
lation through federal dollars.
In conclusion, there appear to be few viable legal avenues to
challenge unfunded federal mandates. Under New York, a federal
on the fiscal burdens imposed on the state by the mandate, as was true in NLCs. Thus, those
lower courts which used unfunded federal mandates as a basis to invalidate the Brady Bill were
wrong in reasoning if not in result.
435. As explained above, Justice Rehnquist advocated use of a similar impact test in the
context of the Spending Clause. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. Due to the split decision in New York
(Tax), 326 U.S. at 572, a degree of burden analysis remains a potential basis to invalidate
elements of federal tax policy.
.436. Legal challenges to federal spending, tax, or regulatory policies usually focus narrowly
on individual programs as defined by the challenging plaintiff. Often, it is difficult or impossible
to weigh the fiscal impact of a given federal policy on a single jurisdiction, and the impact may
vary considerably among jurisdictions. Moreover, assessing the fiscal impacts of discrete federal
actions ignores the complex relationship between a wide range of related or unrelated federal
decisions, some of which may burden and others of which may benefit state and local govern-
ments. This provides support for the proposition that such issues are best left to the national
political process. Unlike courts in individual cases, Congress can evaluate the combined effects
of federal tax, spending, and regulatory decisions.
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statute is vulnerable only when it commandeers the state's regulatory
process. This leaves most forms of unfunded federal mandates, in-
cluding aid conditions, direct orders, and full and partial preemptions,
legally permissible so long as they are properly grounded in a valid
source of congressional power. Indeed, federal courts may be barred
from hearing claims based on statutory liability mandates because of
the Eleventh Amendment or related principles of sovereign immunity.
However, neither principle bars suits brought by the United States or
another state or suits against state officials acting in violation of fed-
eral law.
VI. NORMATIVE OPPOSITION TO UNFUNDED FEDERAL MANDATES
Even if unfunded federal mandates are constitutionally sanc-
tioned and even if they do not impose substantial fiscal burdens on
states and cities, important policy questions remain about which
government should decide what types and amounts of public goods,
services, and regulations are required and by which government these
requirements are funded. 437 In fact, those who remain convinced that
unfunded federal mandates burden state and local finances object to
mandates on public policy as well as fiscal grounds. 438  While such
arguments are best directed to the political branches rather than the
courts, they are equally deserving of serious analysis.
437. Robert D. Reischauer, testifying before the Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs, stated:
The issue of who pays for federal mandates is a serious one and goes to the heart of
our system of government. When the federal government identifies problems and man-
dates solutions that affect different localities in different ways, which taxpayers should
bear the burden of the costs? Or which level of government should cut funding for other
programs in order to pay for such costs?
... On a philosophical level, a key question is whether the federal government
ought to automatically be responsible for the costs of remedial actions it mandates, re-
gardless of who caused the problem and who is responsible for the affected activities.
Reischauer Testimony at 8-9 (cited in note 54).
438. See generally State of America's Cities at 1-2, 7-9, 23-24 (cited in note 40) (identifying
unfunded federal mandates as a worsening problem despite generally improved city fiscal
health); Fix and Kenyon, Introduction, in Fix and Kenyon, eds., Coping with Mandates at 5-6
(cited in note 11) (discussing the growth of unfunded federal mandates in the 1980s); Federal
Mandate Relief at 17 (cited in note 34) (arguing that unfunded federal mandates reduce effi-
ciency and obscure congressional accountability); Towns Report at 2 (cited in note 44) (listing the
concerns of state and local officials concerning unfunded federal mandates); Federally Induced
Costs at 4 (cited in note 17) (discussing the problems associated with unfunded federal man-
dates).
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Some policy challenges to unfunded federal mandates can be
dismissed as substantive opposition to individual programs43 9 rather
than structural opposition to the use of unfunded federal mandates as
vehicles to implement those programs. Other critics admit that most
federal mandates address legitimate problems, but argue that the use
of unfunded federal mandates, as opposed to other legal and policy
tools, results in inappropriate solutions.440 These policy arguments
include the two related political issues of autonomy and accountability
and the two related economic and ethical issues of efficiency and
equity.441
A. Political Autonomy and Accountability
State and local autonomy is central to federalism 442 and serves
two fundamental values.44  First, "[a] system of local govern-
439. Fix, Observations, in Fix and Kenyon, eds., Coping with Mandates at 34 (cited in note
158) (noting that legitimate questions of federalism have been "distorted to serve the regulation-
bashing objectives of many who had grown impatient with a rise in the size and power of the
federal government"); Tryens, Unfunded Mandates at 2, 7-8 (cited in note 12) (finding the misuse
of the issue by groups opposed to particular governmental activity); James P. Lester, A New
Federalism? Environmental Policy in the States, in Norman J. Vig and Michael E. Kraft, eds.,
Environmental Policy in the 1990s 59, 60-61 (Congressional Quarterly, 1990) (comparing
proponents of increased flexibility in federal environmental regulation with critics who charged
that the real goal was to eliminate programs altogether). See also Choper, 86 Yale L. J. at 1578-
79 (cited in note 10) (citing examples of legal challenges by private individuals based on federal-
ism that did not necessarily reflect opposition by the state itself. Some argue that the issue of
federalism in general has been used throughout U.S. history, by Supreme Court Justices as well
as others, as a subterfuge to oppose substantive policies. See Shapiro, Federalism at 7-8, 30
(cited in note 1) (discussing scholars who urged that federalism arguments should not be taken
seriously); Dana, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 3 (cited in note 4) (concluding that many "ostensible
attacks" on unfunded federal regulation are actually "attacks on the broad reach of government
regulation" and on the decline of "substantive limitations on federal authority"); Rubin and
Feeley, 42 UCLA L. Rev. at 948, 950 (cited in note 10) (suggesting that claims of federalism are
mere strategies to advance substantive positions).
440. See Federal Regulation at iii (cited in note 11) ("Many of the new requirements ad-
dressed longstanding social problems. Most also enjoyed broad support from the general public
and from state and local officials. As the number of requirements proliferated, however,
questions began to be raised about the appropriateness, costs, complexity, effectiveness, and
efficiency of intergovernmental relations").
441. See generally Fix and Kenyon, Introduction, in Fix and Kenyon, eds., Coping with
Mandates at 5-6 (cited in note 11) (grouping concerns into issues of intergovernmental resource
distribution, responsibility and authority, and program effectiveness); Towns Report at 2 (cited in
note 44) (noting that typical concerns involve cost, local flexibility and priorities, and validity of
federal regulations); Federally Induced Costs at 2 (cited in note 17) (stating that nonfiscal
concerns include "legitimacy, accountability and political representation"); Kelly, State Mandates
at 11 (cited in note 3) (noting that mandates raise issues of "responsibility, accountability, and
autonomy").
442. See generally Peterson, The Price of Federalism at 18-25 (cited in note 8) (discussing
the ability of state and local governments to successfully create and implement the nation's
physical and social infrastructure).
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ment... gives citizens some choice in the level and type of basic gov-
ernmental services they are to have.'" 4 Citizen choice is enhanced
through exit rights: the right to move if a citizen disagrees with state
or local policies. 445 Second, autonomy serves as a check to protect
individual liberties against abuse of power by a strong national gov-
ernment. 446
443. Obviously, the values of federalism can be categorized in other ways. See, for example,
Caminker, 95 Colum. L. Rev. at 1060 n.232 (cited in note 68) (classifying the following as the
values of federalism: greater political liberty from tyrannical regimes, greater rates of personal
participation in self-government, and greater local tailoring and aggregate diversity of policies
throughout the nation); Rubin and Feeley, 41 UCLA L. Rev. at 906-07 (cited in note 10)
(discussing the themes which support federalism).
444. Peterson, The Price of Federalism at 19 (cited in note 8). See Shapiro, Federalism at
91-106 (cited in note 1) (discussing the argument that decentralization of government would
bring government closer to the people); Kaden, 79 Colum. L. Rev. at 852-54 (cited in note 4)
(finding a primary value of the federal form to be the potential for public participation in gov-
ernment to its maximum extent); Merritt, 88 Colum. L. Rev. at 10 (cited in note 9) (noting that
state and local governments increase the opportunities for citizens to participate in the demo-
cratic process); Caminker, 95 Colum. L. Rev. at 1078 (cited in note 68) (noting that scholars often
claim that state and local governments can best meet the needs of their residents); Michael
McConnell, Evaluating the Founders'Design, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1484, 1493 (1987) (discussing the
advantages of decentralized decision making). But see Rubin and Feeley, 41 UCLA L. Rev. at
917-22 (cited in note 10) (arguing that federalism does not promote adequate variability to
support the choice hypothesis).
445. See Shapiro, Federalism at 78, 96 (cited in note 1) (finding competition among states,
combined with the right of exit, to be at the heart of the argument in support of federalism);
McConnell, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1498-99 (cited in note 444) (finding that smaller units of go-
vernment will compete with each other to attract additional taxpayers to move into their com-
munity). Exit rights are related to the constitutionally guaranteed right to travel and to enjoy
the legal benefits of a new jurisdiction. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336-340 (1972)
(invalidating a durational residency requirement for voters based on the protected right to
travel); Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627 (invalidating a one-year residency requirement for welfare
benefits based on the right to travel and equal protection, notwithstanding state fiscal impacts);
Nevada v. Crandall, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1867) (invalidating a tax on persons leaving the
state by common carrier). Autonomy coupled with exit rights breeds innovation and interjuris-
dictional competition, but also creates disparities between levels of service provided to different
citizens, linking autonomy with the related issues of economic efficiency and equity. See notes
499-538 and accompanying text. Thus, while the types and levels of government services
provided in each jurisdiction reflect the preferences of the majority of its citizens, individuals
may seek their own preferences in another jurisdiction where priorities better match their own.
This system is impaired to some degree whenever uniform requirements are imposed at the
national level.
446. See Shapiro, Federalism at 76 n.74, 95-99 (cited in note 1) (arguing that federalism
does, in some ways, protect individual rights and liberties); Amar, 96 Yale L. J. at 1428 (cited in
note 2) (arguing that competition among the federal government and states can "protect popular
sovereignty"); Merritt, 88 Colum. L. Rev. at 10 (cited in note 9) (finding that a dual system of
government is one of the principal values of federalism).
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1. The Choice Value of Autonomy
a. State and Local Fiscal Priorities
In the context of unfunded federal mandates, the choice value
of autonomy is impaired to the extent that states and cities must raise
funds to address national priorities, reducing their ability to meet
state and locally-defined needs. 447 As noted in the Price Waterhouse
city survey, "having to pay for unfunded federal mandates means that
local revenues are not available for other programs and services that
may be needed."448
It is difficult to assess the validity of these claims. Every local
dollar spent to comply with a federal mandate no longer is available to
meet other priorities. However, if the value of federal aid to states
and localities exceeds the costs of unfunded federal mandates, as
suggested in Part IV, those mandates might have little or no real
impact on state and local priorities, depending on the amounts and
types of expenditures imposed on a jurisdiction. Federal mandates
restrict local priorities only to the extent that they impose costs be-
yond those the city would have spent anyway on the subject program.
447. See Towns Report at 2 (cited'in note 44) (noting that as states and cities were faced
with budget constraints in the 1980s, their ability to "absorb mandate costs" declined); Federally
Induced Costs at 4, 12, 15-16 (cited in note 17) (discussing the distortion of state and local budget
priorities, noting combined impacts of federal mandates and state spending limits); Steinzor, 81
Minn. L. Rev. at 175-77 (cited in note 4) (discussing the arguments of local officials that cities
should have autonomy to ignore federal mandates altogether "depending on the budgetary
exigencies of their individual communities"). Even Alexander Hamilton accepted "the justness of
the reasoning which requires that the individual States should possess an independent and
uncontrollable authority to raise their own revenues for the supply of their own wants"
Federalist No. 32 (Hamilton), in Rssiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 197-98 (cited in note 103).
Former New York Mayor Ed Koch complained that mandates impair local autonomy as well as
fiscal health: "Throughout its history, this nation has encouraged local independence and
diversity. We cannot allow the powerful diversity of spirit that is a basic characteristic of our
federal system to be crushed under the grim conformity that will be the most enduring legacy of
the mandate millstone." Koch, 61 Pub. Interest at 57 (cited in note 11). Professor Caminker,
who rejects virtually every aspect of the anti-commandeering rationale of New York, 505 U.S. at
144, writes that "externality-induced state program reductions mean that local policies are less
responsive to the needs and preferences of particular communities" and that this creates the
"only realistic threat to federalism values ... posed by a regime of commandeering authority."
Caminker, 95 Colum. L. Rev. at 1080-81 (cited in note 68).
448. Price Waterhouse City Report at 1-15 (cited in note 42). The survey gave city officials
an "open-ended" opportunity to identify programs and services that were reduced or foregone to
pay for federal mandates, to which officials responded with a profusion of unmet needs. Id. The
programs and services identified, with the numbers of respondents in parentheses, included
infrastructure (135 cities), police and fire services (76), water and sewer services (70), streets
(63), community services (56), parks (55), waste services (28), and maintenance (31). Id. The
claims made by individual cities are identified in Appendix C of the report.
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Similarly, if a federal mandate dictates how, as opposed to whether, a
service is provided, local fiscal priorities are displaced only to the
extent that federal methods cost more than local methods.4 9 As noted
above, Price Waterhouse measured total rather than incremental costs
and did not distinguish between procedural and substantive man-
dates.
450
Some light was shed on this subject by the early research of
Lovell and Tobin, who found that most federal and state mandates




Somewhat inconsistently, this research also found that nearly half of
all mandates introduced new activities, which are more likely to dis-
place local priorities.452 However, the study also showed that half or
more of all mandated programs would be continued even if the man-
date were withdrawn, because the "values behind some of the man-
dates apparently have become internalized and organization struc-
tures, support systems, and budget lines have been developed around
the mandated activities.."45 3 These data suggest competing conclu-
sions. A mandate may become a local priority because local constitu-
ents or officials agree that the program is beneficial. But if costs
continue merely because bureaucracies perpetuate themselves, un-
wanted mandate costs may persist even after the formal mandate
lapses.
Similarly, the degree to which intergovernmental policies
displace local priorities depends on the amount and types of aid re-
ceived by a jurisdiction. If direct federal spending meets needs that
otherwise would be met at the state and local level, other state or local
funds are freed to meet local priorities. Partial federal funding of
direct order mandates reduces but does not eliminate the degree to
which the mandate displaces local priorities. By contrast, when a
state or city chooses to participate in a voluntary federal program, by
definition it decides that the program constitutes a state or local
priority.454 The degree of accompanying autonomy, however, depends
449. Of course, procedural mandates impair local autonomy to the extent that they force
methods of implementation that are disfavored by the local electorate.
450. See notes 216-25 and accompanying text.
451. Lovell and Tobin, 41 Pub. Admin. Rev. at 320 (cited in note 11) (noting that nearly 84%
of federal and 90% of state mandates were procedural rather than substantive).
452. Id. at 323 (finding that new programs were introduced in 42% of cases).
453. Id. (noting that nearly 62% of vertical mandates and 50% of horizontal mandates would
be continued even if the mandate was withdrawn).
454. It is less clear whether the same is true for voluntary participation in a cooperative or
partial preemption program, because the state or city may participate either because it agrees
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on the funding vehicle. Some federal aid, such as the deductibility of
state and local taxes, comes with few if any strings attached. Other
forms of aid, such as block grants or tax-exempt bonds, can be used to
meet priorities that are at least partially defined at the local level,
although some restrictions apply even to these relatively flexible
forms of aid. Categorical grants, though, are more restricted to feder-
ally defined methods or priorities. 455 Thus, it is extremely difficult
empirically to assess the degree to which state and local priorities are
displaced by the net impact of federal mandates considered-as they
should be-in conjunction with other intergovernmental fiscal policies.
b. Political Accountability
Even assuming that such impacts are real, however, it is
equally important to ask whether they are necessarily inappropriate.
Because the real economic effect of federal, state, and local policies is
felt by individual citizens and taxpayers, this issue best is expressed
as one of political accountability or the extent to which policies reflect
the will of the public.456  Unrestricted use of the Spending Clause
similarly has been assailed on political accountability grounds analo-
gous to those used to challenge direct orders.457
Federal mandates are neither enacted by autocratic national
fiat nor passed without input from state and local governments.
Under a structural protection view of federalism, states are repre-
sented and protected in the national government through elected
members of both houses 45s and through election of the President by the
the program is important or because it wants to minimize the degree of federal intrusion on state
or local autonomy.
455. See note 23.
456. See Dana, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 10 (cited in note 4) (arguing that the absence of political
accountability is "at the core of the critique of unfunded mandates"); Kaden, 79 Colum. L. Rev. at
853 (cited in note 4) (finding that public participation in government is "critical to any viable
notion of accountability"); La Pierre, 80 Nw. L. Rev. at 645-46 (cited in note 10) (discussing how
political accountability forces Congress to act responsibly); Caminker, 95 Colum. L. Rev. at 1020
(cited in note 68) (noting that concerns of political accountability motivated the Supreme Court's
anti-commandeering rule).
457. See Baker, 95 Colum. L. Rev. at 1933-35 (cited in note 78) (discussing issues of account-
ability under the spending power given to Congress).
458. It is argued that the degree to which states are represented in Congress was dimin-
ished by the Seventeenth Amendment. See, for example, Kaden, 79 Colum. L. Rev. at 858 (cited
in note 4) (discussing the effects, or lack thereof, of popular election of Senators upon state
autonomy); Merritt, 88 Colum. L. Rev. at 16 n.90 (cited in note 9) (noting that many scholars
suggest that any link between Congress and state politics has declined substantially in recent
decades); McConnell, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1488 (cited in note 444) (noting that the Seventeenth
Amendment contributed to the erosion of state and local political autonomy). However, Senators,
like Representatives, are elected entirely by the citizens of individual states and presumably
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Electoral College.459 Moreover, state and local governments maintain
a substantial lobbying force at the national level.460 Federal mandates
are passed because they are supported by a majority of the national
electorate and in many cases state and local officials.461 Thus, they
meet the test of political accountability.4
62
It is frequently argued, however, that state and local govern-
ments are more democratic because they are more accessible to local
citizens and better represent local needs.46 3  Spending priorities de-
termined locally are more likely to reflect direct citizen participation
and local needs and preferences than those established in
reflect the views and preferences of that subset of the national electorate. Moreover, the
Seventeenth Amendment was adopted because many states, and the public at large, believed
that direct election was more democratic than selection by state legislatures. See generally
Anastaplo, The Amendments to the Constitution at 188-91 (cited in note 16) (describing the
American preference to allow citizens to decide how the federal government should use its
power).
459. See Federalist No. 17 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers at 119 (cited in
note 10) (arguing that the states are protected from encroachments on their power made by the
federal government).
460. Major intergovernmental organizations that maintain professional lobbying staffs in
Washington, D.C., include the National Governor's Association, the National Conference of State
Legislatures, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the National League of Cities, and the National
Association of Counties. These omnibus groups are supported by an army of more specialized
lobbying forces. In the environmental field alone, for example, there are the Association of State
and Interstate Water Pollution Control Agencies, the Association of State and Territorial Air
Pollution Control Agencies, the Association of State Waste Management Organizations, and the
Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies. See also Dana, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 23-25 (cited
in note 4) (citing the effectiveness of state and local lobbyists in weakening environmental
requirements); Anastaplo, The Amendments to the Constitution at 193 (cited in note 16) (finding
that the states are most effective in Congress).
461. For example, the legislative history of the Clean Air Act reflects strong support for
uniform national standards from states and localities to prevent the use of disparate standards
to attract business and jobs. H.R. Rep. No. 91-294, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 134, 194-95 (1977),
reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.N. 1077, 1212, 1273-74. Of course, the statute invalidated in New
York was enacted not only with the support, but at the behest, of the National Governor's
Association. See New York, 505 U.S. at 188 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(discussing the National Governor's Association meeting on policy proposals regarding radioac-
tive waste management).
462. Federal Regulation at iii (cited in note 11) (noting that many federal requirements
addressed longstanding social problems and enjoyed broad support from the public and from
state and local officials).
463. See Shapiro, Federalism at 91-92 (cited in note 1) (examining the argument that a
decentralized political structure brings government closer to its citizens, more fully realizing
democratic ideals); Kaden, 79 Colum. L. Rev. at 853-54 (cited in note 4) (finding that smaller
units of government provide more public participation); McConnell, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1493,
1509 (cited in note 444) (finding that decentralized decision making better reflects the prefer-
ences and interests of a community). The danger that national representatives would be "too lit-
tle acquainted with all their local circumstances" was acknowledged in Federalist No. 10
(Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 83 (Mentor, 1961), and Federalist No.
17 (Hamilton), in Clinton Ressiter, ed., The Federalist Papers at 120 (cited in note 10).
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Washington, D.C. Based on historically lower levels of voter partici-
pation in local as opposed to national elections, 464 it is not clear that
this is true. Moreover, it is not altogether clear why elected members
of Congress are any less valid "representatives" of state and local
interests than governors or mayors.465 Nevertheless, the thrust of the
argument is that state and local officials better represent local needs
because they are "closer" to the people they represent.
466
This supposed lack of political accountability is a particular
concern in the context of unfunded federal mandates. It is one thing
for a national legislature to enact requirements that reflect the will of
the national electorate if the resulting costs are borne by the national
taxpayer. To take credit for addressing a national need, Congress also
must be held accountable for raising taxes. According to the ACIR:
Intergovernmental mandat[es] interfere with th[e] chain of democratic ac-
countability by breaking key linkages between policy adoption and implemen-
tation. Officials responsible for setting policy objectives are freed from the re-
sponsibility for financing their decisions. This can distort public choices about
government services and taxes and create confusion and intergovernmental
conflict.
467
464. Pat Dunham, Electoral Behavior in the United States 48, 205 (Prentice-Hall, 1991).
Dunham has noted the irony of lower voter turnout in elections of officials "who have the most di-
rect impact on our daily lives." Id. at 48. See William H. Flanigan and Nancy H. Zingale,
Political Behavior of the American Electorate 12-13 (Congressional Quarterly, 7th ed. 1991)
(observing a higher voting turnout in presidential elections than congressional elections); David
B. Hill and Norman R. Luttbeg, Trends in American Electoral Behavior 86-88 (F.E. Peacock, 2d
ed. 1980) (discussing the psychology behind voter turnout and noting that the increased saliency
of the national government to most people accounts for the higher voter turnout in national
elections). See also Rubin and Feeley, 41 UCLA L. Rev. at 915-16 n.54 (cited in note 10) (noting
low voter turnout in local elections and suggesting other means to increase local participation).
465. Choper, 86 Yale L. J. at 1563, 1565-67 (cited in note 10).
466. See Caminker, 95 Colum. L. Rev. at 1077-78 (cited in note 68) (noting that state and lo-
cal governments allow greater public involvement in the political process than does the federal
government).
467. Federally Induced Costs at 17 (cited in note 17). See also Federal Mandate Relief at
11, 17 (cited in note 34) (observing that unfunded mandates obscure congressional accountability
and reduce efficiency because the "pleasure of spending tax dollars is divorced from the pain of
raising those dollars"); Dana, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 3 (cited in note 4) (stating that issues of
political accountability arise when unfunded mandates are utilized); Lovell and Tobin, 41 Pub.
Admin. Rev. at 326 (cited in note 11) (noting that traditional notions of accountability are not
applicable in the face of pervasive mandates); Whitman and Bezdek, Pub. Budgeting and Finance
at 52 (cited in note 130) (discussing the effect of unfunded federal mandates upon the political
accountability of both state and federal officials); Caminker, 95 Colum. L. Rev. at 1061-62 (cited
in note 68) (discussing reasons that voters may blame state officials for the content of federal
policies that Congress imposes through mandates); Merritt, 88 Colum. L. Rev. at 62 (cited in note
9) (finding that citizens will hold local officials responsible for congressional mandates). But see
Zelinsky, 46 Vand. L. Rev. at 1370 (cited in note 4) (finding unfunded mandates to be an issue of
hidden taxation rather than accountability).
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A similar notion of political accountability underlies New York v.
United States, although with respect to a narrower category of federal
actions. In cases of preemption, Justice O'Connor wrote:
[I]t is the Federal Government that makes the decision in full view of the pub-
lic, and it will be federal officials that suffer the consequences if the decision
turns out to be detrimental or unpopular. But where the Federal Government
directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt
of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory
program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their deci-
sion.
468
For purposes of the debate over unfunded mandates, Justice Scalia
took this argument one step further in Printz by tying accountability
more directly to the absence of federal funding.469
The most straightforward response to the political accountabil-
ity argument 470 is that, by delegating constitutional authority in some
areas to a duly elected and hence representative Congress, the people
468. New York, 505 U.S. at 168-69. See Kaden, 79 Colum. L. Rev. at 857 (cited in note 4)
("To the extent accountability is diminished by reason of the electorate's lack of knowledge or
understanding of the lines of authority, the value or effectiveness of participation is necessarily
reduced, and the protection of political liberty is necessarily jeopardized."); La Pierre, 80 Nw. L.
Rev. at 657-62 (cited in note 10) (distinguishing commandeering from general applicability or
accountability grounds).
469. In response to the Government's attempt to distinguish New York on grounds that the
Brady Bill did not pose the same accountability problems as the statute in New York, Justice
Scalia wrote:
By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal
regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without
having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. And
even when the States are not forced to absorb the costs of implementing a federal pro-
gram, they are still put in the position of taking the claim for its burdensomeness and for
its defects. Under the present law, for example, it will be the CLEO and not some federal
official who stands between the gun purchaser and immediate possession of his gun. And
it will likley be the CLEO, not some federal official, who will be blamed for any error
(even one in the designated federal database) that causes a purchaser to be mistakenly
rejected.
Printz, 65 U.S.L.W. at 4740 (citing Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a
Formula for the Future, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1563, 1580 n.65 (1994)).
470. In addition to the policy considerations suggested below, a public choice theory justifi-
cation for unfunded federal environmental mandates has been presented by Professor Dana.
Dana, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 1 (cited in note 4). Professor Dana counters Professor Zelinsky's
public choice theory indictment of unfunded federal mandates. Id.; Zelinsky, 46 Vand. L. Rev. at
1369 (cited in note 4). See Caminker, 95 Colum. L. Rev. at 1085 n.320 (cited in note 68)
(challenging Professor Zelinsky's public choice theory). Public choice theory cannot currently ad-
dress the full range of variables that affect legislative behavior, and variables affecting legisla-
tion cannot be tested well empirically. See Kaden, 79 Colum. L. Rev. at 858 (cited in note 4)
(noting the various factors affecting legislation). I attempt to address a wider range of policy
arguments relevant to mandate validity.
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
decided that the national government legitimately can be responsible
for particular legislative policy decisions. 471 Nothing in the text or
history of the Constitution suggests that funding in these areas is a
prerequisite of accountability. In New York, however, the Supreme
Court invalidated the take-title provision of the LLRWPA despite the
fact that Congress has plenary power to regulate low-level nuclear
waste under the Commerce Clause. The provision was stricken be-
cause the means chosen to regulate in an otherwise permissible area
of federal authority lacked, in Justice O'Connor's view, adequate
political accountability.472  In upholding certain portions of the
LLRWPA as simple exercises of federal preemption, Justice O'Connor
was not faced with-and did not address-whether similar issues of
accountability arise where the federal government has the power to
act in a field but regulates states or localities directly without provid-
ing federal funds for compliance.
Several possible conclusions could be reached about the appli-
cability of Justice O'Connor's accountability argument to unfunded
federal mandates. If unfunded mandates raise similar issues of ac-
countability as commandeering state regulatory power, they might be
viewed as equally unconstitutional. Alternatively, Justice O'Connor
could have erred in using extra-textual grounds to invalidate an oth-
erwise valid exercise of constitutional power.4 3 Otherwise, unfunded
federal mandates must be distinguished from commandeering with
respect to the issue of accountability.
The accountability argument assumes an uninformed elector-
ate which is not able to discern the source of a mandate. 47 4 One corol-
lary assumption is that only the government that raises taxes is held
accountable for a requirement, even though the mandate was imposed
from above; a second is that good public information about the source
471. See Caminker, 95 Colum. L. Rev. at 1022-28 (cited in note 68) (affirming the legitimacy
of federal law within individual states).
472. See note 468 and accompanying text.
473. See generally Caminker, 95 Colum. L. Rev. at 1022-28 (cited in note 68) (discussing the
anti-commandeering principle). Moreover, Justice O'Connor may not have fully recognized
competing issues of political accountability. See notes 468-71 and accompanying text. See also
Printz, 65 U.S.L.W. at 4744 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ('CThere is not a clause, sentence, or para-
graph in the entire text of the Constitution of the United States that supports the proposition
that a local police officer can ignore a command contained in a statute enacted by Congress
pursuant to an express delegation of power enumerated in Article I").
474. Caminker, 95 Colum. L. Rev. at 1061-68 (cited in note 68). Professor Caminker argues
convincingly that the case for misplaced blame may be incorrect and, in any event, is irrelevant
because there are many ways in which the electorate is uninformed or misinformed. Such
imperfections in public understanding do not constitute constitutional flaws. Id. at 1061-63.
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of a mandate 475 is not adequate to solve the accountability problem. A
properly informed electorate can express approval or disapproval to
the level of government responsible for imposing the costs476 or vote
them out of office in favor of those who would adopt different poli-
cies. 477
This argument probably works best with respect to individual
mandates that are the subject of targeted opposition from local offi-
cials. The case against unfunded federal mandates, however, rests
upon aggregate costs from a large number of individual mandates.
Faced with a rising local tax bill that cannot be tied to a single federal
mandate, local citizens are likely to target their blame on state and
local, as opposed to federal, elected officials in spite of the skill with
which these local officials shift the blame back to Washington.
Moreover, a similar argument could be made with respect to comman-
deering. The public could be informed that a regulation implemented
by state and local officials derived from Congress, and they would be
free to object to their senators and representatives.478
A more compelling distinction is that competing issues of ac-
countability suggest that unfunded federal mandates are not only
legitimate, but in many cases necessary. Moreover, in a number of
important respects the relief sought by anti-mandate advocates would
create the opposite problem by eliminating the accountability of state
and local officials for their decisions.
First, many federal mandates are enacted to enforce a legiti-
mate obligation on state and local officials. In such cases, there is no
reason why the federal government should pay for individual jurisdic-
475. See id. at 1063-64 (discussing the incentives of affected private and public parties to in-
form voters of the true source of unpalatable mandates). For example, public water companies
who must raise their rates to meet federal Safe Drinking Water Act requirements can place a
notice in the bill informing customers why water bills are rising.
476. See Stanton, One Nation Indivisible at 19 (cited in note 12) (stating that "American
taxpayers ultimately pay the costs [of meeting federal requirements], and they have shown the
ability to direct all levels of government to reduce spending when such costs prove unaccept-
able"). Of course, the electorate can reach sound conclusions about the validity of a mandate only
if it is properly informed about the mandate's benefits as well as its costs.
477. The dramatic realignment of Congress in 1994 could be seen as the electorate's
reaction against perceived excesses by the federal government and, hence, an example of political
accountability. Indeed, the enactment of UMRA itself by this new Congress can be viewed as
evidence of the structural protection model of federalism at work. Printz, 65 U.S.L.W. at 4749
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that UMRA's "passage demonstrates that unelected judges are
better off leaving the protection of federalism to the political process in all but the most extraor-
dinary circumstances").
478. Thus, this argument could be used to refute the political accountability rationale of
New York as well as its potential applicability to unfunded federal mandates.
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tions to meet their legal obligations. This is clearest with respect to
legislation adopted to enforce constitutional principles. 479 If the fed-
eral government must pay states and cities to comply with constitu-
tional requirements, those jurisdictions would avoid accountability to
their citizens to meet their most fundamental legal obligations.48
Similar arguments can be made with respect to federal man-
dates designed to address issues other than constitutional rights,
particularly when private parties are held equally accountable. For
example, most federal environmental statutes adopt the principle that
a polluter should pay the costs of preventing or controlling its own
pollution. And while all jurisdictions provide basic services such as
water supply and waste disposal, federal statutes impose require-
ments to ensure that all citizens receive certain minimum levels of
protection. Exempting state and local governments from compliance
with these laws absent federal funding would shift accountability for
meeting those basic requirements from the states and cities to the
national government. Jurisdictions that do the best job of meeting
their public obligations would be penalized, and those who do the least
rewarded, by a rule that the incremental costs of minimum federal
requirements must be funded at the national level.481 Criticism of the
shift from the pure federal aid approach to the more coercive regula-
tory approach ignores the fact that federal statutory mandates were
enacted, with the approval of the national public, because of the in-
adequacy of the earlier approach.
482
Proposed solutions to the issue of unfunded federal mandates
include increases in federal aid and increased flexibility in the use of
federal aid through block grants and other less restricted funding
vehicles. 83 The call for more federal dollars with fewer requirements
and restrictions, however, suggests opposite but equally disturbing
problems of accountability. States and cities complain that by enact-
ing unfunded federal mandates, Congress takes credit for solving
national problems and sends the bills downward. However, states and
479. The political accountability argument is not relevant to direct constitutional mandates.
480. Whitman and Bezdek, Pub. Budgeting and Finance at 55 (cited in note 130).
481. Indeed, accountability to the local electorate would produce the opposite effects. Local
citizens would urge their officials to avoid spending local dollars in the hope that programs would
be funded federally.
482. For example, enactment of the Clean Water Act in 1972 was preceded by two decades
in which the federal water pollution role was largely to provide grants for state and local pollu-
tion controls. The modern regulatory approach was adopted because Congress found the old
approach to be "inadequate in every vital aspect," leading to a severe nationwide water pollution
crisis. See Adler, Landman, and Cameron, The Clean Water Act at 5-8 (cited in note 143)
(discussing the background of the Clean Water Act).
483. See notes 31-34, 45-49 and accompanying text.
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cities are net beneficiaries of intergovernmental transfers.484 For
every dollar of federal aid in excess of the costs imposed by federal
mandates, Congress is held accountable for raising taxes and creating
a deficit, while state and local public officials take credit for solving
local problems with federal dollars.
485
While block grants provide more flexibility in the implementa-
tion of cooperative programs, they have been criticized as imposing too
little accountability for the proper use of federal funds.48 6 State and
local officials are saved from the politically unpopular task of raising
taxes, 487 but may use federal dollars to meet locally defined priori-
ties-a mirror image of the accoiantability problem posed by unfunded
federal mandates.48 Completely unrestricted federal aid, as with
general revenue sharing, leaves both Congress and recipients with
virtually no accountability for the proper use of those funds. 89
Moreover, ironically, the use of block grants and other less
restricted forms of funding decreases the accountability of the national
government as well. Congress can throw money at a problem but
leave the details of implementation-and potential blame for program
failure-to lower levels of government. 490 While Congress is held
accountable for raising taxes, it relieves itself of responsibility for how
those funds are spent.
484. See notes 235-37 and accompanying text.
485. This model is somewhat less true, of course, in the case of pork barrel politics, where
Senators and Representatives make sure that they receive appropriate credit for winning
targeted funding for local projects.
486. Peterson, The Price of Federalism at 33, 60, 63 (cited in note 8) (concluding that
categorical grants are better at ensuring that federal funds are not misdirected and discussing
problems with block grants). See generally Block Grants at 4-7, 10-17 (cited in note 23)
(discussing the need for accountability provisions in federal block grant programs).
487. Peterson, The Price of Federalism at 60 (cited in note 8) (observing that block grants
"were a local politician's dream--'free' money to be spent on whatever legal purpose one wanted
without having to tax the local voters").
488. Id. at 63 ("Why... should the federal taxpayer give unrestricted money to local govern-
ments? Would not local officials be more accountable to their own citizens and taxpayers if they
were not so dependent on federal assistance?").
489. See Block Grants at 16-17 (cited in note 23) (noting the problems that arose in the
federal general revenue sharing program). For example, while states and cities criticize recent
restrictions on the use of tax-exempt bond authority, Tax-exempt Financing at 10-18 (cited in
note 102), those restrictions were passed to prevent the use of federally subsidized public bonds
to finance projects with predominantly private benefits, that is, to impose accountability on the
use of federal bond subsidies. Rymarowicz and Zimmerman, Federal Budget and Tax Policy at
17-24 (cited in note 29).
490. Peterson, The Price of Federalism at xi (cited in note 8) (stating, with respect to welfare
block grants, that "[ploliticians in Washington can avoid blame for the welfare mess by handing
over to lower tiers of government the obligation to clean it up").
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Political accountability is a legitimate concern in assessing the
propriety of unfunded federal mandates. The issue, however, cuts two
ways. While the accountability of Congress is reduced when it im-
poses requirements that must be funded at the state and local level,
often those mandates are imposed to ensure that states and cities, like
private entities, are held accountable for their actions and responsi-
bilities. Moreover, opposite issues of accountability are raised given
that states and cities are net beneficiaries in intergovernmental rela-
tions. Congress is held accountable for raising federal taxes, while
state and local elected officials benefit politically from the use of
federal dollars. Block grants, tax-exempt bonds, and similarly flexible
means of federal funding pose particularly troublesome issues of
accountability, because it is difficult to ensure that those funds are
spent for appropriate purposes.
2. The Liberty Value of Autonomy
State autonomy can protect individual liberty against abuse of
power by a strong national government.491  Professor Shapiro cites
numerous cases in which states successfully resisted national efforts
to curtail individual rights.492 The relevance of this value to the de-
bate over unfunded federal mandates is somewhat less clear, espe-
cially in the context of mandates imposed on states and cities rather
than individuals. Presumably, however, the national government will
be somewhat less inclined to enact measures that infringe on individ-
ual rights if the resulting bill must be paid from the federal treasury.
The liberty value of federalism, however, must be balanced
against the value of uniformity as a check against the abuse of state
power. One reason for establishing a strong national government was
"its tendency to break and control the violence of faction.."493 National
491. Shapiro, Federalism at 51 (cited in note 1); Amar, 96 Yale L. J. at 1428, 1500-09 (cited
in note 2); Kaden, 79 Colum. L. Rev. at 855-57 (cited in note 4); Merritt, 88 Colum. L. Rev. at 10,
18 (cited in note 9); McConnell, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1500-07 (cited in note 444).
492. See Shapiro, Federalism at 76 n.74, 95-99 (cited in note 1) (citing the role of states in
opposing the Alien and Sedition Acts and the Fugitive Slave Laws and as early champions of
individual rights). See also id. at 56 n.155 (listing situations in which state courts and legisla-
tures have provided broader protection to individual rights than has been provided by the
Constitution); Amar, 96 Yale L. J. at 1500-09 (cited in note 2) (providing examples of state
remedies against federal infringement upon individual rights).
493. Federalist No. 10 (Madison), in Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers at 77 (cited in note
463). Madison explained that by extending the sphere of the national government, a greater
variety of parties and interests can be taken into account, making it less probable that a majority
will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens. Id. at 80-81. If such a common
motive exists, extending the sphere of the national government will make it more difficult for all
who feel the common motive to act in unison upon the motive. Id. See Federalist No. 85
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power to defend individual rights was strengthened in the Civil War
amendments with express grants of congressional enforcement
power.494 As such, the national government probably has been more
successful in protecting citizens against state abuse than vice versa.495
Political accountability is also not an issue as it is irrelevant in
the context of legally protected individual rights. Constitutional
protections and freedoms are of value primarily because they protect
the liberties of a minority from the prejudices and abuses of a hostile
majority. When the federal government intervenes, judicially or legis-
latively, to protect individual rights against state or local abuse, the
federal action often will be unpopular with the majority in the target
jurisdiction.49 By definition, federal intervention will likely violate
principles of political accountability at the local level while meeting
the test of accountability nationally. This, however, is the very justifi-
cation for federal action to protect individual rights.
In addition, national uniformity has been lauded as a "moral
and practical force" in areas such as minimum national requirements
for education.497  When used to promote extraconstitutional values,
however, national uniformity cannot be justified based on legal rights.
While it may be argued, for example, that all U.S. citizens have an
equal moral right to clean air or clean water, no such "rights" have
(Hamilton), in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 521 (Mentor, 1961) ("The additional
securities to republican government, to liberty, and to property... consist chiefly in the
restraints which the preservation of the Union will impose on local factions and insurrec-
tions... [among others].").
494. Anastaplo, The Amendments to the Constitution at 169 (cited in note 16); Shapiro,
Federalism at 28, 50-56 (cited in note 1).
495. While citing cases in which states guarded against federal abuses of individual rights,
Professor Shapiro concludes that "these instances may, in total, fall short in both quantity and
quality when compared with the converse cases in which national power has been used to sustain
individual rights against the assertion of state power." Shapiro, Federalism at 99 (cited in note
1). National power has also been used to protect constitutional rights in areas that go beyond
racial discrimination. See id. at 56 ([Tihe historical record, viewed in its entirety, fails to
support the existence of state autonomy as a critical means of protecting against abuse of
governmental power. On the contrary, national power has had to be continually invoked in order
to protect our freedoms against state infringement."); McConnell, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1501
(cited in note 444) (finding that the federal government, rather than state governments, is the
primary protector of individual liberties); Peterson, The Price of Federalism at 9 (cited in note 8)
(noting the increased importance of the federal government). Examples in which the federal
government has led the way in protecting individual rights include criminal procedure, free
speech, and the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. Shapiro,
Federalism at 55 (cited in note 1).
496. See, for example, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 483 (1954) (making a decision
which was politically unpopular in many parts of the country).
497. Shapiro, Federalism at 138 (cited in note 1). The same argument could be made for
other issues such as environmental quality.
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been recognized judicially. 498 Moreover, it can be argued with equal
force that state and local autonomy is needed so that citizens have
some choice about the appropriate level and nature of various gov-
ernmental services. Thus, in areas other than constitutional rights,
uniformity must be justified on other grounds.
B. Economic Efficiency and Equity
A separate but related structural criticism is that because
Congress does not have to pay for unfunded federal mandates, it is not
subject to market constraints. This, in turn, leads to inefficient, inef-
fective, and inappropriate solutions to social and economic problems.
Mandate opponents argue that because Congress is not forced to face
compliance costs directly, it does not select the most cost-effective
solutions, it does not ensure that costs are justified in relation to
benefits, and it does not necessarily select solutions that are appropri-
ate to individual jurisdictions with diverse needs and problems but
instead adopts "one-size-fits-all" programs.
499
Economic efficiency approaches to regulatory policy, however,
can be criticized on various grounds. For example, cost-benefit analy-
sis is of dubious utility when compliance costs are readily quantified
but program benefits are intangible and difficult to put in monetary
terms.50 For purposes of this analysis, however, it may be conceded
that the absence of market constraints on congressional decisions
presents a legitimate structural concern.
Of course, the same efficiency arguments also apply to govern-
mental mandates imposed on private parties, who usually bear the
full costs of regulatory compliance. If unfunded mandates produce
inefficient results for the affected public sector, the same is true for
the private sector.501 Thus, the efficiency argument proves too much to
498. See William H. Rodgers, Environmental Law 62-67 (West, 2d ed. 1994) (discussing ju-
dicial rejection of various theories of constitutionally derived rights to a clean environment).
499. See Federally Induced Costs at 16 (cited in note 17) (noting that Congress often
imposes "unduly expensive requirements on jurisdictions" when a simpler or more efficient
solution could be implemented); Federal Mandate Relief at 4-9, 17, 24 (cited in note 34)
(observing that Congress has little incentive to tailor programs adequately to accomplish goals);
Lovell and Tobin, 41 Pub. Admin. Rev. at 326 (cited in note 11) (discussing the standardization
versus particularization issue in mandates); Whitman and Bezdek, Pub. Budgeting and Finance
at 53 (Spring 1989) (cited in note 130) (discussing the tailoring of grand programs); Steinzor, 81
Minn. L. Rev. at 174-75 (cited in note 4) (arguing that Congress should only impose those
requirements on state and local governments that allow for flexibility).
500. See Percival, et al., Environmental Regulation at 562-67 (cited in note 432) (discussing
problems that arise in a cost-benefit analysis when intangible benefits are involved).
501. While UMRA includes no procedural barriers to the enactment of unfunded federal
mandates imposed on private parties as it does for public sector parties, the Act does require the
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the extent that it indicts all regulations along with unfunded inter-
governmental mandates.50 2  Intergovernmental mandates are distin-
guishable, however, because they dictate the extent to which public
funds are spent on public goods and services. Thus, it is fair to ask
whether public funds are spent efficiently when the level of govern-
ment that decides to impose the costs is not required to pay the bill.
A related efficiency argument is that autonomy breeds interju-
risdictional competition and innovation, which is suppressed by the
imposition of uniform national requirements. Interjurisdictional
competition is valuable to induce states and cities to improve pro-
grams and services to maximize economic and social welfare. 0 3
Autonomy is valuable because it allows states or cities to try a variety
of approaches. Diverse approaches may be desirable if different solu-
tions are appropriate to places with distinct needs and conditions. If
an experiment fails, the consequences are reduced if it is limited to
one jurisdiction.
This position is misplaced, however, as an argument against
federal legislative activity.50 4 When federal judges invalidate state
social and economic experiments on grounds other than federal pre-
emption, they leave a void in which no solutions are sought to a par-
CBO to estimate the costs and benefits of private as well as public compliance. 2 U.S.C.
§ 658b(c)(1).
502. Opposition to unfunded federal mandates was packaged along with broader attacks on
federal regulatory policy as applied to both the public and the private sectors. See Tryens,
Unfunded Mandates at 2 (cited in note 12) (discussing opposition to unfunded mandates). In the
Contract with America promoted by Republicans during the 1994 congressional election, un-
funded mandates were included along with other regulatory reforms as part of the proposed "Job
Creation and Wage Enhancement Act." H.R. 9, 10th Cong., 1st Sess. (January 8, 1995).
503. Shapiro, Federalism at 35-38, 78 (cited in note 1); McConnell, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at
1498 (cited in note 444). Again, because citizens and businesses have exit rights, they fuel
competition to the extent that they can move in search of their preferred mix of governmental
policies and services. For a similar argument in the context of the spending power, see Baker, 95
Colum. L. Rev. at 1947-54 (cited in note 78) (discussing the negative effects of reduced competi-
tion among states due to mandates, including increased aggregate social welfare costs). But see
Rubin and Feeley, 41 UCLA L. Rev. at 923-26 (cited in note 10) (arguing that experimentation in
identifying preferred means of achieving a shared goal is better promoted by decentralization
than by true federalism).
504. See, for example, Derthick, The Brookings Review at 35 (cited in note 11) (arguing that
states assist Congress by enacting novel solutions to certain issues and by handling many
familiar problems Congress "chooses to ignore"); Federally Induced Costs at 16 (cited in note 17)
(arguing that uniform national standards and procedures erode "the ability of state and local
governments to experiment and test varying programs under different circumstances"); Lopez,
115 S. Ct. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing New York State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 262 (1932), and arguing that federalism allows state experimentation); Chandler v. Florida,
449 U.S. 560, 579-80 (1981) (invoking New York State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 262, to uphold state
experimentation with televised trials against federal judicial intervention).
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ticular problem. Justice Brandeis50 5 believed that it was not appropri-
ate for federal judges to usurp state as well as federal legislative
decisions on social and economic policy.5°s It is far different to argue,
however, that the national legislature cannot decide, as a matter of
policy, that a uniform national program is preferable to disparate
state solutions. In fact, one of the justifications for innovation is that
individual jurisdictions, through experimentation, may discover inno-
vative and effective solutions which then may be adopted nationally.
50 7
While uniformity must be balanced against the value of state innova-
tion and competition, this policy choice is appropriately made by the
national legislature rather than the judiciary.
The value of innovation and competition, moreover, must be
balanced against competing issues of efficiency and equity.
Intrajurisdictional decisions are efficient only to the extent that they
address the full costs of state and local actions and policies. Public
goods and services are likely to be supplied only to the extent that
they serve the local electorate and not where they benefit citizens
across state or local borders. 50 8 Where activities result in external
505. In his famous dissent in New York State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing), opposing federal judicial action to invalidate state activity under notions of substantive due
process, Justice Brandeis wrote:
There must be power in the States and the Nation to remould, through experimentation,
our economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic
needs.... To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibil-
ity. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the
Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.
This position is cited out of context, however, as an argument against federal legislative activity.
506. Compare id. at 271 (Sutherland, J., majority opinion); id. at 280 (Brandeis, Stone, JJ.,
dissenting); Butler, 297 U.S. at 53 (Roberts, J., majority opinion); id. at 78 (Stone, Brandeis,
Cardozo, JJ., dissenting); with Davis, 301 U.S. at 634 (Cardozo, J., majority opinion); id. at 646
(McReynolds, Butler, JJ., dissenting); Darby, 312 U.S. at 100.
507. See Shapiro, Federalism at 77, 85-88 (cited in note 1) (citing workers' compensation,
public education, welfare reform, health care, tax systems, penology, and environmental protec-
tion as areas in which state programs later were adopted nationally); Derthick, The Brookings
Review at 34-35 (cited in note 11) (proclaiming state experiments as models for subsequent
national action); Lester, A New Federalism?, in Vig and Kraft, eds., Environmental Policy in the
1990s at 59, 62 (cited in note 439) (concluding that state environmental programs should serve as
models for national action).
508. Shapiro, Federalism at 131 (cited in note 1). Indeed, spillover effects and disparities in
existing state solutions probably explain strong state and local support for uniform national
environmental laws in the 1970s.
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costs to other jurisdictions,5°9 adequate state or local action is unlikely
and federal intervention is appropriate. 510
Similarly, as a proposed solution to unfunded federal man-
dates, requiring the federal government to subsidize or fully reim-
burse state and local compliance costs itself can produce inefficient re-
sults. When compliance with federal mandates is subsidized from a
national taxbase, taxpayers in the recipient governments may reap
most or all of the benefits, but pay only a small fraction of the costs.
Thus, they have little incentive to minimize costs and to implement
the most efficient solutions. 51
One proposed solution to this dilemma is to identify an optimal
cost-sharing arrangement whereby intrajurisdictional and national
taxpayers pay the appropriate, efficient percentage of any given pro-
gram. A somewhat crude variation on this theme is that public goods
should be provided by the government that can tax all program bene-
ficiaries. 512  However, "pure" public goods that benefit all national
taxpayers equally, such as reducing the likelihood of nuclear war, are
extremely rare.513 A more refined proposal is to tie the appropriate
level of intergovernmental funding to the percentage of non-local
benefit.514 Alternatively, federal regulation could be limited to the
extent necessary to address externalities. 1 5
509. A good example is interjurisdictional pollution, where internal control costs may pri-
marily benefit external citizens. Id. at 83. See Rymarowicz and Zimmerman, Federal Budget
and Tax Policy at 2 (cited in note 29) (discussing these external costs).
510. Shapiro, Federalism at 83-84 (cited in note 1); McConnell, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1495
(cited in note 444); Steinzor, 81 Minn. L. Rev. at 167-68 (cited in note 4). But see Richard L.
Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2341, 2349-60
(1996) (agreeing with the validity of the externality rationale but arguing that existing regula-
tory approaches are not effective).
511. See McConnell, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1496 (cited in note 444) (discussing the ineffi-
ciency of centralized capital spending). One notorious example is the federal sewage treatment
grant programs, which have been criticized for encouraging "perverse incentives for overinvest-
ment." Kenneth I. Rubin, Managing Community Wastewater in the 1990s: What is Needed to
Attain National Water Quality Goals and Why, in Martin Reuss, ed., Water Administration in the
United States: Policy, Practice and Emerging Issues 231, 238 (Michigan State U. 1993). In fact,
some argue that this overinvestment partially offsets the water quality gains attained through
better sewage treatment by stimulating suburban growth and increased stormwater runoff
pollution. Richard G. Cohn-Lee and Diane M. Cameron, Urban Stormwater Runoff
Contamination of the Chesapeake Bay: Sources and Mitigation, 14 Envir. Prof. 10, 10-11 (1992).
512. Shapiro, Federalism at 82 (cited in note 1).
513. Id.
514. See Peterson, The Price of Federalism at 23 (cited in note 8) (proposing that, under
such a functional theory, "the amount of [the] national grant should exactly match the amount of
benefit enjoyed by non-local residents"); Whitman and Bezdek, Pub. Budgeting & Finance at 51
(cited in note 130) (discussing a proposal to tie intergovernmental funding to the percentage of
local benefit). Many federal water resource development programs were based on this theory.
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The goal of optimal funding and regulation by different levels
of government, however, is elusive and objectionable in some applica-
tions. The degree of local versus national benefit to be obtained by a
given program may be very hard to measure or predict and often
involves subjective judgments. 516  While an optimum federal-state-
local cost split may reflect sound economic theory, in practice the
principle would have to be applied to tens of thousands of jurisdictions
implementing hundreds of separate federal programs. Moreover,
while cost-sharing may be fair for programs that provide benefits,
such as dams that provide water and power for local and interjurisdic-
tional uses, it is not appropriate in situations such as cross-border
pollution where activities in one jurisdiction cause both internal and
external effects.
In contrast, some suggest that inefficiencies and intergovern-
mental tension have been created by too much cooperative federalism
between federal and state governments.5 17 These commentators advo-
cate a move back to distinct separate spheres of authority for the
federal and state governments. Paul Peterson, for example, argues
that the federal government acts most efficiently and appropriately in
the area of redistributive policy, where market constraints pose a
barrier to good policy, while state and local governments act more
efficiently in the area of developmental policy, where market con-
straints provide healthy incentives for efficient public spending and
regulatory policy. 518 The ACIR proposes that federal action be limited
to clearly negative interjurisdictional externalities, federal treaty obli-
See Adler, 25 Envir. L. at 1028 (cited in note 83) (stating that an early federal flood control act
introduced the concept "that state and local beneficiaries should pay a fair share of project costs
tied to the value of benefits received").
515. Whitman and Bezdek, Pub. Budgeting & Finance at 53 (cited in note 130).
516. Rymarowicz and Zimmerman, Federal Budget and Tax Policy at 2 (cited in note 29);
Whitman and Bezdek, Pub. Budgeting & Finance at 52 (cited in note 130).
517. As discussed in Part H, intergovernmental relations in the United States evolved from
the idea of dual sovereignty or "layer cake" federalism in which each level of government acted
within its own sphere, with little interference from above or below, to one of "marble cake" or co-
operative federalism in which states implement federal policies through acceptance of federal
aid, or later, through compliance with federal regulations. See Peterson, The Price of Federalism
at 55 (cited in note 8) (discussing "layer cake" and "marble cake" federalism).
518. Id. at 17-19, 25-29, 35-37. Developmental policy involves the provision of physical and
social infrastructure to facilitate economic growth and prosperity; redistributive policy addresses
disparities between income and other benefits and amenities. Id. at 17. Alice Rivlin agrees that
while the federal government should act in areas such as social security, health care, and other
social programs, it should withdraw from developmental programs such as job training, road
improvements, and other public works programs. Id. at 176 (citing Alice M. Rivlin, Reviving the
American Dream: the Economy, the States, and the Federal Government (The Brookings
Institution, 1992)). Some refer to this philosophy as the "new (new) federalism." Steinzor, 81
Minn. L. Rev. at 124-29 (cited in note 4).
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gations, uniform policy goals not attainable through purely state ac-
tion, necessary redistributive policies, and clear state and local fail-
ures to protect basic rights. 519
The theory that more separation should be sought between
areas of federal and state policy is most sound where there is a clear
distinction between developmental and redistributive policies.
However, this distinction is artificial in many ways. Road construc-
tion could be viewed as an issue of purely local developmental policy,
but decisions about interstate highways affect national modes of
transportation and commerce and a wide range of related issues of
national policy.520 Even decisions about local highways can affect
issues of national concern, such as regional or interstate air pollu-
tion.521 Job training programs are developmental when they promote
local employment, but federal job training serves redistributive goals
where some states can afford better programs than others.522
Moreover, federal withdrawal from many areas of policy could
raise serious equity concerns. Absent national standards, citizens of
different states and cities receive disproportionate levels of public
services and protections. 523 If constitutional or other legal rights are
not affected, such differences may reflect legitimate differences in
choice.524 For several reasons, however, interjurisdictional differences
may produce inequitable results. Some jurisdictions may have no
choice but to sacrifice important public goals for reasons of economic
compulsion. There is a strong moral argument 525 that citizens of poor
cities and states should not enjoy fewer public benefits, such as educa-
519. Federal Mandate Relief at 23 (cited in note 34). For five suggested "sorting principles"
to allocate authority for environmental programs between the federal and state governments, see
Steinzor, 81 Minn. L. Rev. at 166-77 (cited in note 4).
520. A national network of highways facilitates national as opposed to purely local com-
merce. Moreover, the choice between alternative modes of transportation, such as highways
versus railroads, can affect broader issues of national commercial, social, and environmental
policy.
521. See 42 U.S.C. § 7506 (1994) (linking federal aid, including highway grants, to compli-
ance with transportation planning and air quality requirements); Browner, 80 F.3d at 880-82
(upholding Clean Air Act highway sanctions against a Tenth Amendment challenge).
522. Moreover, decisions about the focus of job training programs can affect national as well
as local economies.
523. Peterson, The Price of Federalism at 22 (cited in note 8); Steinzor, 81 Minn. L. Rev. at
171-74 (cited in note 4).
524. For example, some jurisdictions might prefer higher taxes and more services, while
others prefer lower taxes and fewer services. Some jurisdictions might prefer lower environ-
mental quality in order to attract more industry and hence more jobs, while others place a higher
value on the environment relative to economic growth.
525. Shapiro, Federalism at 138 (cited in note 1).
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tion, health programs, and environmental protection, than those in
wealthier states.
Redistributive rather than regulatory programs may be a more
efficient means for the federal government to solve these problems.
26
Purely redistributive approaches fail, however, when the impacts of
weaker standards and services fall disproportionately on the poorest,
politically least powerful citizens within the jurisdiction. 527 Even in
areas other than civil rights, uniform national standards can provide
important protection for individuals with little political power within a
jurisdiction.
In fact, interjurisdictional competition itself may cause some
jurisdictions to sacrifice less tangible benefits, such as public health,
safety, and welfare, in favor of the tangible benefits of economic
growth.528 Again, the legitimacy of this strategy turns in part on the
degree to which the benefits and burdens of a policy are shared
equally or disproportionately within the jurisdiction. As intrajurisdic-
tional disparities increase, the moral and legal case for federal inter-
vention improves. While some dispute the reality of this "race to the
bottom" phenomenon, 529 there is considerable support for the existence
526. Peterson, The Price of Federalism at 22 (cited in note 8).
527. For example, those who can afford to send their children to private schools, and who
exert disproportionate political influence, may prefer to pay lower taxes at the expense of the
public education system. Id. (discussing the possible effect of choices made by politically influ-
ential citizens). Similarly, the benefits and environmental impacts of new industrial growth may
be distributed disproportionately among the population, resulting in unfair decisions made in the
name of economic efficiency. See Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing 'Tnvironmental Justice"- The
Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 787, 792-806 (1993)
(discussing the potential for disparity between the distribution of the benefits of environmental
regulation and the related burdens).
528. In Davis, 301 U.S. at 644, Justice Cardozo stated:
Apart from the failure of resources, states and local governments are at times reluctant
to increase so heavily the burden of taxation to be borne by their residents for fear of
placing themselves in a position of economic disadvantage as compared with neighbors or
competitors. A system of old age pensions has special dangers of its own, if put in force in
one state and rejected in another. The existence of such a system is a bait to the needy
and dependent elsewhere, encouraging them to migrate and seek a haven of repose. Only
a power that is national can serve the interests of all.
See McConnell, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1499-1500 (cited in note 444) (noting the existence of both
"races to the bottom" and "races to the top").
529. See, for example, Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking
the 'Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1210, 1211-13, 1233-44 (1992) (challenging validity of "race-to-the-bottom" arguments and
emphasizing competition between states); Steinzor, 81 Minn. L. Rev. at 177-78 (cited in note 4)
(noting that "race-to-the-bottom" arguments are based merely on threats of future behavior
derived from perception and not derived from empirical evidence). But see Kristen H. Engel,
State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a Race and is it '"To the Bottom'?, 48 Hastings
L. J. 271, 374-76 (1997) (concluding, based on an empirical study, that states do engage in "race-
to-the-bottom" behavior in the environmental area).
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of service and protection disparities in areas such as welfare530 and
environmental protection. 531
The value of national uniformity justifies substantive man-
dates to a greater degree than procedural mandates. National per-
formance standards can equilibrate levels of public rights, goods, and
services without demanding inflexible, arguably inefficient implemen-
tation strategies. Thus, many policy analysts suggest the use of more
outcome-oriented as opposed to output-oriented532 federal programs. 533
There may be serious problems, however, with the efficacy of perform-
ance standards without compulsory compliance requirements. 534
Moreover, for some issues it may be difficult to define meaningful
national performance standards.535
530. Out of fear that better welfare benefits will attract more poor residents, the history of
welfare reform shows a steady race to the bottom. Peterson, The Price of Federalism at 108-115
(cited in note 8). The implications of the recent federal welfare reform legislation, however, are
beyond the scope of this Article.
531. Researchers have documented severe differences in levels of expenditures and the
degree of protection afforded by different states in the area of environmental quality. See, for
example, Lester, A New Federalism?, in Vig and Kraft, eds., Environmental Policy in the 1990s at
63-70 (cited in note 439) (discussing the disparities among states in environmental funding and
quality); National Association of Public Administration, Setting Priorities, Getting Results: a
New Direction for EPA 72-74 (1995) (noting the different levels of expenditures and environ-
mental protection among various states).
532. For example, an outcome-oriented environmental program might require that certain
end performance standards be met in all states, see 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1994) (requiring the EPA
to establish national ambient air quality standards), while an output-oriented program would
require that prescribed implementation strategies be used. See id. §§ 7661 et seq. (requiring
states to implement air quality permit programs).
533. With respect to environmental programs in particular, see National Association of
Public Administration, Setting Priorities at 71-77 (cited in note 531) (discussing environmental
program performance standards); Lester, A New Federalism?, in Vig and Kraft, eds.,
Environmental Policy in the 1990s at 75-76 (cited in note 439). See also U.S. General Accounting
Office, Managing for Results, Achieving GPRA's Objectives Requires Strong Congressional Role 1
(U.S. G.P.O., 1996) (discussing the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L.
No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993) ("GRPA"), codified as amended at scattered sections of 39 U.S.C.
(1994 & Supp. I), which requires federal agencies to "set strategic goals, measure performance,
and report to the President and Congress on the degree to which goals are met").
534. For example, water quality improvements have been achieved through the use of
uniform minimum national control requirements that apply automatically to all dischargers. See
Adler, Landman, and Cameron, The Clean Water Act at 14-16 (cited in note 143) (describing
pollution reduction achieved through minimum national requirements, but noting that there
remain needed improvements). By contrast, related programs designed to achieve ambient (in-
stream) water quality standards through flexible state implementation strategies have been far
less successful. Id. at 126-27, 158-64.
535. For example, it may be appropriate to make a national judgment about the level of air
pollution at which human health is adversely affected. By contrast, it may not be appropriate to
establish minimum national educational test score requirements when different populations vary
greatly in predictive indicators, for example, based on the percentage of the population for which
English is a second language.
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The private sector also may receive inequitable treatment as a
result of efforts to prevent unfunded federal mandates. If federal
mandates apply to private but not to competing public parties, or if
mandates are federally subsidized for public but not private parties,
public activities enjoy a competitive advantage, 536 especially when
public and private entities compete directly.537 In addition, in some
areas, the efficiency of the private economy is better served by uniform
national standards as opposed to fifty or more separate regulatory
targets.
538
C. Conclusion: A Neutral Approach to Federal Mandates and the
Flawed Policy of UMRA
Opponents of unfunded federal mandates raise legitimate
issues of autonomy, accountability, economic efficiency, and equity.
However, unfunded federal mandates can be justified on the basis of
equally compelling normative grounds. This balance of policy inter-
ests refutes categorical arguments against the structural validity of all
unfunded federal mandates. Rather, it suggests a neutral approach
under which the wisdom of individual mandates should be weighed
through the normal political process.
To this end, procedural rules and protections, such as the judi-
cially created plain statement doctrine, legitimately seek to ensure
that Congress considers intergovernmental impacts before it adopts
intergovernmental mandates. At the same time, however, such proce-
dural rules are consistent with the notion that the ultimate policy
wisdom of specific mandates should be left to the political rather than
the judicial branch of government.
Congress's effort to impose its own procedural protections
through UMRA pursues similar goals but suffers from many of the
same problems that render substantive judicial intervention inappro-
priate. Congress envisioned in UMRA that decisions on individual
legislation should be based on bill-specific fiscal statements prepared
536. Whitman and Bezdek,, Pub. Budgeting & Finance at 53 (cited in note 130); Dana, 69 S.
Cal. L. Rev. at 35 (cited in note 4).
537. For example, public and private entities compete in areas such as waste disposal, water
supply, and education. Disparate regulatory requirements may favor public over private enter-
prises, resulting in less efficient or more costly provision of services to the consuming public. See
Steinzor, 81 Minn. L. Rev. at 133 (cited in note 4) (noting opposition to UMRA by private compa-
nies who compete with the public sector to provide environmental services).
538. See generally Dana, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 31 (cited in note 4) (observing that regulated
private industries prefer that "state and local governments bear the costs of implementing and
complying with federal standards").
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by the CBO. As acknowledged by CBO experts, however, the accuracy
of pre-implementation cost estimates is open to serious question.
While it is difficult to quarrel with the notion that public spending and
regulatory decisions should be based on better information, sound
public policy decisions may be impaired rather than promoted if the
best available information is inaccurate or misleading.
Moreover, just as judges are not able to assess the effects of
individual federal programs outside the context of overall intergov-
ernmental policy, legislative policy decisions will suffer if they are
based on a narrow focus on the direct fiscal costs of individual bills.
As with cost-benefit analyses, such assessments cannot focus well on
the offsetting value of proposed legislation, particularly when benefits
are difficult or impossible to express in monetary terms. More impor-
tantly, if Congress is tempted to focus narrowly on the costs of an
individual bill, it risks loss of its broader institutional perspective
from which the overall effects of combined federal tax, spending, and
regulatory policy are viewed in balance.
Finally, the point of order procedure in UMRA suffers from the
inappropriate assumption that unfunded federal mandates are cate-
gorically bad from a policy perspective. Proponents of a bill must
overcome this presumption through a majority vote before the merits
of legislation can even be debated. A return to a neutral approach to
unfunded federal mandates in which the wisdom and validity of the
mandate are addressed in concert with the substantive debate on the
bill would better serve a sound legislative process.
VII. CONCLUSION
The argument that unfunded federal mandates impose an un-
due fiscal burden on states and cities lacks credible empirical support.
Most mandate impact studies rely on inappropriately broad defini-
tions and suffer from serious methodological flaws, which suggest that
the resulting impact estimates are overstated. Even if current esti-
mates are accepted, when the estimates are viewed in the context of
overall intergovernmental relations, states and cities remain net fiscal
beneficiaries of federal policy.
Legal opposition to unfunded federal mandates is similarly
flawed. Federal mandates are valid if they stem from legitimate
sources of constitutional authority, irrespective of either the degree to
which they are accompanied by federal aid or the resulting fiscal
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impact on states or localities. If federal mandates lack such authority
or if they use impermissible means of exercising that authority, they
cannot be saved with federal funding.
Unfunded federal mandates do pose legitimate normative
issues of autonomy, accountability, efficiency, and equity. Mandates,
however, can also be supported on equally valid competing grounds.
This balance of interests refutes the notion that unfunded federal
mandates are presumptively bad and suggests a neutral approach to
assessing their validity in individual cases. Therefore, Congress
should reconsider its adoption of procedural barriers in UMRA, which
inappropriately skews the legislative debate in opposition to the use of
unfunded federal mandates.
The unfunded federal mandate terminology contributes little to
serious legal, fiscal, or political discourse on issues of federalism. The
idea presents intractable problems of definition that render it an
uncertain if not misleading tool for legal and policy analysis. It is
extremely difficult to ascertain which federal policies qualify as
"mandates" as opposed to voluntarily assumed exercises of cooperative
feddralism; which costs result from federal versus state, local, or other
dictates; and which costs are unfunded, especially given the complex
nature of intergovernmental fiscal and other relations. Moreover, the
fiscal impacts of individual federal mandates cannot properly be as-
sessed in isolation from overall federal tax, spending, and regulatory
policy. This problem poses even more difficult issues of accounting
and analysis.
All of these conclusions support the notion that issues of feder-
alism are best left to the national political process. Given the complex
interrelationship of federal tax, spending, and regulatory policies, it is
impossible for federal courts, bound by the narrow constraints of
party-defined litigation, to assess the fiscal burdens of individual
federal programs in the proper context. These issues are viewed more
appropriately by elected federal officials in the course of the national
political process. The fact that states and cities remain net fiscal
beneficiaries of intergovernmental programs suggests that lower
levels of government do receive adequate protection and representa-
tion in this manner.
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